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please answer the last 5 questions in the ppt slide. and the slides are what we learned in class. maybe you can link to some point .Please read the case and prepare a case report not exceeding 2 pages ( single space)
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W27299
TRANSPARENCY, TRACEABILITY, AND COMPLIANCE IN UNIQLO’S
GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN1
Manolito Hibanada, Ari Van Assche, and Hinrich Voss wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do
not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names
and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveypublishing.ca. Our goal is to publish
materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to [email protected]. i1v2e5y5pubs
Copyright © 2022, Ivey Business School Foundation
Version: 2022-08-08
On January 5, 2021, the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the Long Beach Seaport in
California detained an inbound shipment containing Uniqlo men’s t-shirts.2 Official documents explained
the seizure:
[The shipment was detained] for violating CBP’s Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
(“XPCC”) Withhold Release Order (WRO) which prohibits the importation of all cotton and cotton
products produced by the XPCC, and its subordinate and affiliated entities, as well as any products that
are made in whole or in part with, or derived from, that cotton, such as apparel, garments, and textiles.3
On March 30, 2021, Uniqlo submitted a brief to CBP to contest the detention of its cotton t-shirts, but its
efforts were unsuccessful. The company was given 60 days to remove its shipment or risk that all items
would be disposed of under CBP supervision. On April 19, 2021, Uniqlo filed an Application for Further
Review requesting that the detained cotton garments be excluded from the XPCC WRO.4 However, that
request was also unsuccessful.
On May 10, 2021, Lisa Burley, the chief attorney advisor of the Cargo Security, Carriers and Restricted
Merchandise Branch of CBP issued its response to Uniqlo’s request:
Although Uniqlo has provided evidence relating to the sale, acquisition, source location,
transportation, and delivery of the raw cotton used to produce the subject cotton garments, as
exemplified above, it has not provided any probative evidence to establish that their imported cotton
garments were not produced in part by forced labor by the XPCC. . . . The protestant has not
established that the detained cotton garments were not produced in part by forced labor. Accordingly,
the subject goods are inadmissible. In accordance with applicable regulations set forth in 19 CFR
12.44(a), the protestant will be afforded the opportunity to export the goods. The protest is DENIED.5
Back in Tokyo, Japan, Uniqlo’s parent company, Fast Retailing Co. Ltd. (Fast Retailing), issued a press
release dated May 25, 2021 referring to the detention of its products:
On this occasion, we confirm that certain cotton shirt products, which were manufactured in China
using raw cotton from outside China, were blocked from being imported into the United States. In
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response to this, we presented such documents as certificates of origin for raw materials and
information relating to such production processes as spinning and sewing. We demonstrated that there
is no evidence of forced labor in our supply chain, and that there should be no problem with importing
these products into the United States. . . . However, while the CBP has previously given clearance to
other goods manufactured through the same processes, the CBP did not give clearance this time.6
By the spring of 2021, CBP’s detainment of Uniqlo’s shipment, and eventual refusal to release the detained
container, had caught the attention of numerous media sources. Official statements and press releases from
various organizations condemned the forced labour of the Uyghur Muslims in cotton farms and processing
facilities in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.7 What followed was a media frenzy over retail
brands targeted by both Western and Chinese consumers. Pressure was mounting to ensure ethical and
sustainable sourcing of cotton in the garments industry.8 A social media outcry erupted with calls for
boycotts and the detention of all cotton-related products from Xinjiang that attempted to enter the United
States. Experts described the reaction as “a central source of geopolitical tension between the world’s
second-biggest economy and the West.”9
Uniqlo’s case was one of more than 30 WROs issued by CBP since 2016, based on Section 307 of the
United States Tariff Act of 1930.10 Section 307 prohibited the importation of goods made using forced
labour. However, it had rarely been invoked in prior decades, and over half of the WROs pertained to
products from China. The remaining WROs were issued against products originating from Brazil, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Malaysia, Turkmenistan, and Zimbabwe.11
The increasing use of WROs citing Section 307 led Uniqlo to consider what steps it should take to avoid
future allegations of forced labour within its global value chains. How could Uniqlo ensure that all sourcing,
manufacturing, and distribution in its global value chains was sustainable and supported human rights?
How could the company ensure that it remained compliant with CBP rules? Most industry experts
considered apparel and textile supply chains to be opaque. What specific and concrete action plans should
Uniqlo implement to improve value chain transparency, with the goal of providing full oversight?12 And
what about the detained Uniqlo t-shirts shipment—should the company ship the garments back to China?
Or should the company send them to another location? If so, where?
UNIQLO: THE BRAND PRODIGY OF JAPAN’S RICHEST MAN
In 1963, Fast Retailing was founded by Tadashi Yanai, one of Japan’s richest men. By 2021, it was the
world’s third-largest clothing retailer.13 Its portfolio included seven major brands: GU, Theory, PLST,
Comptoir des Cottoniers, Princesse Tam, J Brand, and Uniqlo. Two of these brands (Comptoir de Cottoniers
and Princesse Tam Tam) were Fast Retailing’s French brands. J Brands was its American premium apparel
brand, which catered primarily to women.14
The Uniqlo brand was sold in 2,309 stores across 25 countries worldwide, surpassed only by the popular
European brands H&M and Zara.15 The key markets that drove continuous growth for the Uniqlo brand
were located mainly in the Greater China, Southeast Asia, and Oceania regions. By May 2021, Uniqlo had
opened 810 stores in Japan, of which 774 were directly operated by the company. Uniqlo also had 818
stores in mainland China, 141 in South Korea, and 63 in the Philippines.16
By August 2020, Uniqlo had generated approximately ¥1.65 trillion17 in global sales for that fiscal year. Its
Japan operations reported total annual revenues of ¥806.8 billion, which reflected a year-on-year decrease
of 7.6 per cent. Uniqlo’s Japan operations reported an operating loss of ¥104.6 billion, which was 2.2 per
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cent higher than the previous fiscal year. For its international operations, Uniqlo reported annual revenues
of ¥843.9 billion in August 2020, which was 17.7 per cent lower than in 2019. It also reported a loss in
operating income (or revenue) of ¥50.2 billion, for an increase of 63.8 per cent (see Exhibit 1).18
FAST RETAILING’S GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN
In March 2022, Fast Retailing listed 578 facilities as its core sewing factories and subcontractors. Uniqlo
had both direct and indirect business relationships with sewing factories. Its direct business relationships
were with sewing factories that Uniqlo referred to as Tier 1 companies, whereas indirect subcontractors
were considered lower-tier suppliers. Most of the listed core sewing factories (239 of them) were located
in China, compared to 58 in Vietnam and 30 in Bangladesh. The company also engaged with 125 sewing
and processing subcontractors, of which 73 were from China. Fast Retailing’s fabric was milled in China,
Indonesia, and Vietnam (see Exhibit 2).19
The growing concerns over sustainable and ethical sourcing in previous decades had already prompted Fast
Retailing to establish rules and regulations among its suppliers. In 2004, the company issued the official
document Code of Conduct for Production Partners, which emphasized compliance to labour condition
standards among its production and manufacturing partners.20 The document outlined minimum
sustainability standards, including those that pertained to assuring the absence of forced labour in all
streams of its value chain activities. A section of the code of conduct made the following statement:
Production partners shall not use any bonded, indentured, forced, or slave labor, labor conducted
by prisoners, labor similar to slavery, or labor engaged through human trafficking. Workers shall
not be required to submit original personal legal documents or make deposits of any kind at any
time during the recruitment and employment process. Workers’ freedom of movement shall not be
restricted in either their workplace or living quarters.21
In 2004, Uniqlo started a workplace monitoring process with its core suppliers, partnering with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and international organizations such as the Sustainable Apparel
Coalition and the Fair Labor Association to set up the monitoring facilities.22 In 2016, Fast Retailing
established a Sustainability Department that identified and oversaw the management of potential risks
related to the environment, human rights, and other sustainability related issues.
The company started publishing a list of Uniqlo’s sewing suppliers in 2017 and fabric mills suppliers in
2018. In 2021, Fast Retailing further increased transparency and published a list of its GU brand’s fabric
mills, along with other outsourcing partners.
In 2018, Fast Retailing became a member of the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), whose mission was to
promote the use of “Better Cotton” made with sustainable production standards. As a part of this initiative,
BCI carried out supply chain monitoring and social audit activities with participating suppliers to help
ensure that cotton sourced under the Better Cotton label was sourced following BCI’s relevant Chain of
Custody requirements.23
BCI’s Chain of Custody model consisted of two principles: product segregation between the farm and the
gin and mass balance beyond the gin. Between the farm and the gin, the BCI standard system required all
Better Cotton to be stored, transported, and processed separately from conventional cotton. After the cotton
left the gin, the mass balance chain of custody model applied. At that time, traders and spinners were
allowed to substitute or mix Better Cotton with conventional cotton, as long as they conducted volume-
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tracking to ensure that the amount of Better Cotton sold never exceeded the amount of Better Cotton
purchased. This meant that there were some final products that did not contain any BCI cotton. However,
Better Cotton licensed farmers knew that their cotton was in high demand.24
A key advantage of the mass balance model was its scalability and cost efficiency, which allowed scaling
up cotton transformation to make it as sustainable and as affordable as possible. A key disadvantage of this
model was the lack of traceability of cotton for specific products.25
ENSURING COTTON’S TRACEABILITY IN FAST RETAILING’S GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN: FUTURE
PROJECTS AND ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL OPTIONS
Cotton was the primary raw material in the global textile industry and garment manufacturing. The entire
process of transforming these white fluffy bolls into rolls of yarn and then eventually to a sheet of fabric
usually took seven stages of value chain activities (see Exhibit 3).26 In each stage of the transformation,
sophisticated machines, the use of chemicals, the consumption of energy and water, and human labour
helped transform these bolls to the best-selling jeans or the most fashionable outfits of the season.27 In most
cases, the output from each stage of the cotton value chain was mixed with other outputs and materials from
other value chains, and then transported across geographical locations for further transformation. As such,
tracing and identifying the origin, history of location and distribution, as well as guaranteeing the
sustainability of the processes involved in all stages of the cotton value chain activities was important.28 As
goods flowed from one value chain activity to the other, and more inputs and additional materials were
mixed with cotton, traceability became more challenging to implement where the chain of custody changed
from one supplier or intermediary to another.29
Fast Retailing recognized the issues of transparency and traceability in relation to human rights within its
supply chain and that additional measures were needed. As such, it took actions aimed at ensuring early
detection of human rights violation risks in its supply chains. For example, in July 2021, the company
formed a global team that conducted due diligence on key activities such as material procurement at the
farthest point of its upstream value chains.30 Whether these actions were sufficient to address the pressing
issues of alleged human rights violation tainting its global value chain was yet to be assessed.
Along the same vein, industry analysts, academics, international organizations, and NGOs admitted that
full traceability compliance in the global cotton value chains was challenging to achieve—particularly from
an international retail brand perspective.31 The inherent opacity attributed to the difficulties of tracing the
provenance of cotton in a complex garment global value chain was exacerbated by the already restrictive
access to cotton supply chain data in China among retail brands like Uniqlo.32 These companies only had
partial control and accessible information over their multiple tiers of suppliers. They could only exercise
limited power over legal, ethical, and sustainability compliance in the myriad of intermediaries,
subcontractors, and additional tiers of suppliers, especially overseas. The chain of custody of the material
traceability became more obscure each time the raw material was transformed from one value chain activity
to another and as more materials and elements (e.g., zippers, buttons) were added to produce the final
product, such as a pair of jeans.33
Despite the challenges, technological solutions existed to overcome the cotton traceability issue in
complement to existing cotton traceability models currently adopted by the industry. The use of technology
and innovation was a key factor toward ensuring cotton traceability.34 For example, blockchain technology
that enabled tracing cotton from farm to retail had been gaining traction among stakeholders as a potential
solution. The use of blockchain technology in the textile and garment industry allowed all relevant
information to be recorded and verified from end-to-end, as raw materials were transformed from one value
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chain activity to another, thereby enhancing traceability.35 Blockchain technology was compatible with
almost all traceability models, if implemented within a consortium of value chain actors that were directly
involved in all the value chain activity streams.
UPHOLDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN INPUTS SOURCING: THE PRESSING ISSUES IN UNIQLO’S
SUPPLY CHAIN
Although Uniqlo had achieved milestones and made significant strides toward ethical sourcing and better
sustainability practices, many difficulties in its global value chains still needed to be resolved. Great efforts
were made to ensure that its value chains were as ethical and sustainable as possible, but regulators and
authorities remained skeptical.
On July 2, 2021, media outlets reported that French authorities from the Central Office to Fight Crimes
Against Humanity, Genocide and War Crimes opened an investigation on major fashion retailers, including
Uniqlo, with accusations of suspected concealment of crimes against humanity in China’s Xinjiang region.
The investigation was opened following a complaint from a group of NGOs claiming that evidence
implicated the company in playing a complicit role in the alleged forced labour among Uyghur Muslims in
the autonomous region.36
China was the top producer of cotton in the 2020–21 period (see Exhibit 4A and 4B). It was also the leading
importer of cotton in the world. With its massive amounts of cotton produced and imported, the country
had consistently driven the global demand for cotton over the previous decade.37 Most of China’s cotton
came from Xinjiang. The region produced almost 75 per cent of China’s cotton and contributed
approximately 20 per cent of the world’s total cotton production (see Exhibit 4C).38
Xinjiang was China’s largest region. It was home to 12 million Uyghurs, most of whom were Turkicspeaking Muslims.39 Despite being the largest region in China, it was among the poorest and most
underdeveloped in the country, with poverty rates usually below the country’s poverty line.40 Cotton was
among Xinjiang’s primary crops, accounting for the most acreage of arable land in the region. The climate
and soil quality rendered its geography ideal to farm and cultivate cotton.41
Although cotton farming and harvesting had been mechanized in Xinjiang for some time, the vast majority of
southern Xinjiang’s cotton was still picked manually. The laborious and time-consuming process required a
massive workforce of cotton pickers between the months of September to November. Labour transfers of
seasonal cotton pickers, most of whom were ethnic minorities such as Uyghurs, were necessary to meet the
cotton demands of the country and of the world. Recent demographic data for that region showed that the Uyghur
Muslim population in Xinjiang was declining, while the Han Chinese population (ethnic majority) was
consistently increasing. This demographic shift was believed to be an effect of the alleged (although officially
denied by China) sponsored mass migration and labour transfers of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities from
the western part of Xinjiang to cotton farms and processing facilities across the autonomous region.42
The alleged state sponsored re-education camps and labour transfer schemes were believed to be under the
oversight of the XPCC, a para-military administrative entity in Xinjiang with a key mandate of economic
development and resettlement in the region. With cotton among the primary crops in the region, the XPCC
was apparently supplying workers to meet the demands of cotton farming and processing. Official Chinese
government documents allegedly seemed to credit the XPCC with playing a significant role in using reeducation camps as skills and vocational training centres to foster Chinese nationalism among ethnic
Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities. The alleged labour transfer scheme was also believed to serve as an
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effective poverty alleviation strategy that would benefit many Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities by
guaranteeing a stable income and their subsequent emergence out of poverty.43
Industry analysts argued that the most important goal of these schemes was, in fact, to meet the everincreasing and insatiable global demand for affordable high-quality cotton for the manufacture of garments
around the world. Critics of the scheme pointed to the alleged coercive nature of labour transfer and
violation of basic human rights against Uyghurs enlisted in the re-education camps in the Xinjiang region.
The alleged coercion to labour transfer schemes and re-education camps had become militarized,
increasingly securitized, and intrusive through the use of sophisticated surveillance technologies. The result
was to stifle the subjected population’s human rights and freedom of choice.44
A group of UN experts raised concerns over re-education camps in Xinjiang:
Numerous and credible reports [indicate] that in the name of combatting “religious extremism” and
maintaining “social stability”, the State party had turned the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region into
something that resembled a massive internment camp shrouded in secrecy, a “no rights zone”, while
members of the Xinjiang Uyghur minority, along with others who were identified as Muslim, were
being treated as enemies of the State based on nothing more than their ethno-religious identity.45
In December 2020, amid mounting evidence on the presence of forced labour and violation of human rights
implicated in Xinjiang cotton, CBP issued a WRO on all products produced by the XPCC and its affiliates
and subordinates. Following its own internal experts’ recommendation, high risk products—including
cotton that was produced and processed in Xinjiang involving forced labour—were banned from entering
the United States, pursuant to Section 307 of the United States Tariff Act of 1930.46
UNIQLO’S PARTNERSHIPS WITH SUPPLIERS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED WITH XPCC
In the summer of 2021, some investigative reports questioned Uniqlo’s partnerships with two Chinese
suppliers with links to the XPCC. Lu Thai Textile Co. Ltd. (Lu Thai) of Shandong and Changzhou Jincheng
Factory Chenfeng Apparel Co. Ltd. (Chenfeng Apparel) of Jiangsu both had active operations in Xinjiang
and were accused of being involved in the use of forced labour.47
Lu Thai was listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and “owned the world’s largest production base of
high-grade yarn and dyed shirt fabrics,”48 with factories located in Xinjiang. Retail brands such as
Patagonia, Nike, C&A, and State of Art faced lawsuits in the Netherlands over allegations of relying on
Uyghur forced labour by using Lu Thai as a supplier.49 Some reports went as far as alleging that Lu Thai
benefitted from funnelling factory workers, most of whom were Uyghur Muslims, who were forced into
labour camps by Xinjiang’s local government.50
Chenfeng Apparel was specifically implicated in the detained shipment by CBP on January 5, 2021. The
company was considered Fast Retailing’s garment manufacturer. Chenfeng Apparel received materials,
such as fabrics, from Lu Thai for its garment manufacturing. Some of these garments were made for Uniqlo,
as CBP stated in its ruling, and were included in the detained shipment at the Long Beach Seaport. Despite
these allegations, Fast Retailing kept both Lu Thai and Chenfeng Apparel on its list of suppliers and
expected to continue a close business relationship (see Exhibit 5).51
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XPCC PRODUCTS AND THE IMPLICATIONS ON FAST RETAILING’S GLOBAL VALUE CHAIN
Increasingly, jurisdictions were building and implementing policy frameworks to tackle forced labour and
modern slavery in the supply and value chains of most industries. It was becoming more and more essential
for Uniqlo to understand the mechanisms of the specific legislations within these frameworks.52 Uniqlo had
to consider the compliance of all suppliers and subcontractors within its oversight. It also had to reflect on
other key actors, such as NGOs, who could use a country’s laws to keep companies in-check.
This issue was currently taking place in France. The complaint lodged to the French authorities in July 2021
by several NGOs, including the anti-corruption organization Sherpa, named various companies including
Uniqlo. Sandra Cossart, Sherpa’s executive director of anti-corruption, one of the NG, complainants, said that:
We welcome the opening of a preliminary investigation into the handling and profiting of crimes
against humanity, which demonstrates the potential involvement of economic actors in the
commission of the most serious crimes in order to increase their profit margins. By choosing to
subcontract their production in the Xinjiang region, companies could benefit from the crimes
against humanity committed against Uyghur workers. This investigation will allow the courts to
decide on the possible criminal liabilities of these companies.53
When asked about the investigation in France, Uniqlo’s chief financial officer, Takeshi Okazaki, claimed that
he had not been contacted by the French authorities. “If there is such an investigation, we will fully cooperate
with it and hope that they would understand how sincerely we are working on the human rights issues in our
own supply chain,” he stated, noting that Fast Retailing had acknowledged the human rights issue as the “most
important business challenge,” and that the company had “led the industry to improve the situation.”54
UNIQLO AT A TURNING POINT IN THE EVOLUTION OF ITS GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
CBP’s detention of the US bound Uniqlo shipment on January 5, 2021 was followed by a related French
investigation in July 2021 and various similar lawsuits in other EU countries. Fast Retailing had to rethink
its global value chain to ensure greater transparency and traceability. It had to adapt by tightening its rules
and regulations on the alleged presence of forced labour in the company’s global value chains.
Since the mid-2000s, Fast Retailing had been increasing its engagement and making necessary efforts to ensure
transparency, traceability, and sustainability in its global value chains. But the company had to do more. An
evolution of its supply chains was indeed imminent. Fast Retailing had to establish long-term sustainable and
ethical input sourcing strategies and mechanisms within its production networks across national borders.
Many jurisdictions around the world were actively tightening their regulations related to companies that
imported products that were suspected to have been made using forced labour. Uniqlo was caught in these
new regulatory measures with the detention of its shipment along, while similar criminal investigations
were pending elsewhere. The company’s management team had to make a fundamental decision: what
managerial and value chain interventions were needed to lead the evolution of Uniqlo’s value chain?
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EXHIBIT 1A: FAST RETAILING CONSOLIDATED BUSINESS RESULTS (IN ¥ MILLION)
FY 2016
Revenue
FY 2017
1,786,473 1,861,917
FY 2018
FY 2019
FY 2020
2,130,060 2,290,548 2,008,846
Operating profit
127,292
176,414
236,212
257,636
149,347
EBITDA
164,089
216,102
281,268
306,112
327,195
Profit before income taxes
90,237
193,398
242,678
252,447
152,868
Profit attributable to owners of the parent
48,052
119,280
154,811
162,578
90,357
Total number of stores
3,160
3,294
3,445
3,589
3,630
B: FAST RETAILING REVENUE BY BUSINESS SEGMENT (IN ¥ MILLION)
FY 2016
FY 2017
Uniqlo Japan
799,817
810,734
864,778
Uniqlo International
655,406
GU
Global Brands
FY 2018
FY 2019
FY 2020
872,957
806,887
708,171
896,321 1,026,032
843,937
—
199,139
211,831
238,741
246,091
328,557
141,003
154,464
149,939
109,633
C: FAST RETAILING OPERATING PROFIT BY BUSINESS SEGMENT (IN ¥ MILLION)
FY 2016
FY 2017
FY 2018
FY 2019
FY 2020
Uniqlo Japan
102,462
95,914
119,040
102,474
104,686
Uniqlo International
37,438
73,143
118,897
138,904
50,234
—
13,542
11,774
28,164
21,835
9,520
500
–4,115
3,685
–12,743
GU
Global Brands
Note: FY = fiscal year; EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
Source:
“Consolidated
Business
Results,”
Fast
Retailing,
accessed
October
2,
2021,
https://www.fastretailing.com/eng/ir/financial/past_5yrs.html; “Revenue by Business Segment,” Performance by Business
Segment, accessed October 2, 2021, https://www.fastretailing.com/eng/ir/financial/segment_5yrs.html; “Operating Profit by
Business
Segment,”
Performance
by
Business
Segment,
accessed
October
2,
2021,
https://www.fastretailing.com/eng/ir/financial/segment_5yrs.html.
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EXHIBIT 2A: FAST RETAILING CORE SEWING FACTORY AND SUBCONTRACTOR LIST
BY COUNTRY, AS OF MARCH 31
Country
Bangladesh
Bulgaria
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
Madagascar
Malaysia
Morocco
Myanmar
2019
24
0
10
128
6
17
0
2
0
2
0
4
2020
24
0
9
134
8
14
0
2
0
3
0
6
2021
20
2
10
144
9
14
1
1
2
3
1
5
2022
30
0
17
239
15
16
5
22
2
3
2
5
Country
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Portugal
Romania
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
United States
Vietnam
Total
2019
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
0
44
242
2020
0
0
0
0
0
2
3
0
0
0
43
248
2021
0
3
0
5
1
2
5
2
6
0
46
282
2022
1
3
1
13
1
0
6
2
11
1
58
453
B: FAST RETAILING SUBCONTRACTOR AND PROCESSING FACTORY LIST
BY COUNTRY, AS OF MARCH 31
Country
Bangladesh
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Italy
2021
3
6
23
0
5
1
2022
11
11
73
2
7
1
Country
Malaysia
Peru
Portugal
Thailand
Turkey
Vietnam
Total
2021
2
2
3
0
0
6
51
2022
1
1
3
1
2
12
125
2021
1
2
0
5
1
9
84
2022
1
2
1
5
1
10
91
C: UNIQLO AND GU CORE FABRIC MILL LIST
BY COUNTRY, AS OF MARCH 31
Country
Bangladesh
China
France
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
2021
4
46
0
1
9
0
6
2022
4
49
2
1
8
1
6
Country
Korea
Malaysia
Portugal
Thailand
Turkey
Vietnam
Source:
“Partner
Factory
List,”
Fast
https://www.fastretailing.com/eng/sustainability/labor/list.html.
Total
Retailing,
accessed
May
3,
2022
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EXHIBIT 3: STAGES OF FAST RETAILING’S GARMENT PRODUCTION
Note: BCI = Better Cotton Initiative.
Source: Adapted by the case authors from Economic Commission for Europe, Executive Committee, Policy Brief—Harnessing
the Potential of Blockchain Technology for Due Diligence and Sustainability in Cotton Value Chains,” United Nations Economic
and Social Council, April 13, 2021, https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/ECE_TRADE_C_CEFACT_2021_12ETextilePolicyBrief.pdf.
EXHIBIT 4A: WORLD COTTON PRODUCTION TABLE, 2020–21
Global Cotton Production
Top Cotton Exporting
Countries
Exports
Country
(in 1,000 bales)
Brazil
2,398
Top Cotton Importing
Countries
Imports
Country
(in 1,000 bales)
China
2,776
Country
China
Production
(in 1,000 tonnes)
6,423
India
United States
Brazil
Pakistan
Uzbekistan
Turkey
6,126
3,181
2,341
980
762
631
India
Greece
Benin
Australia
Cote d’Ivoire
Burkina
1,328
332
305
294
260
185
Bangladesh
Vietnam
Turkey
Pakistan
Indonesia
Mexico
1,851
1,585
1,165
1,154
490
191
Australia
Benin
Greece
610
316
305
Mali
Turkey
Azerbaijan
131
131
128
India
Malaysia
Egypt
174
152
131
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B: CHINESE COTTON TRADE OVERVIEW
Cotton Production Volume
in China (in Million Tonnes)
2010
5.77
2011
6.52
2012
6.61
Import Value of Cotton
in China (in CA$ Million)
2010
n/a
2011
n/a
2012
n/a
Leading Suppliers of Cotton to China*
in 2020 (in CA$ Million)
United States
2,142.6
Brazil
1,382.3
India
515.6
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
6.28
6.29
5.91
5.34
5.65
6.10
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
n/a
n/a
3,254.6
2,072.1
2,836.2
4,114.2
Australia
Sudan
Benin
Burkina Faso
Mali
Côte d’Ivoire
299.8
59.2
58.5
56.4
43.3
22.2
2019
2020
2021
5.89
5.91
5.73
2019
2020
2021
4,735.2
4,746.2
n/a
Uzbekistan
21.9
C: CHINESE COTTON PRODUCTION TABLE
Cotton Yield in China,
(in Million Hectares)
2010
1,322
2011
1,441
2012
1,516
2013
1,509
2014
1,508
2015
1,565
Cotton Acreage in China
(in Million Hectares)
2010
4.8
2011
5.04
2012
4.69
2013
4.35
2014
4.22
2015
3.8
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
1,671
1,769
1,819
1,764
1,865
n/a
3.35
3.2
3.35
3.34
3.17
3.03
Cotton Production in China by Region
(in 1,000 Tonnes)
2019
2020
Xinjiang
5,002.00
5,161
Hebei
227.40
209
Shandong
196.03
183
Hubei
143.61
108
Hunan
81.84
74
Jiangxi
Anhui
Gansu
Henan
Tianjin
65.72
55.54
32.66
27.12
18.13
53
41
30
18
10
Note: * Import value basis; 1 bale = 220 kilograms = 480 pounds.
Source: M. Shahbandeh, “Leading Cotton Producing Countries Worldwide in 2020/2021,” Statista, August 24, 2021,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263055/cotton-production-worldwide-by-top-countries; Leslie A. Meyer, Cotton & Wool
Outlook, United States Department of Agriculture, July 14, 2021, https://ers.usda.gov/webdocs/outlooks/101610/cws21g.pdf?v=9067.2;
C.
Textor,
“Cotton
Production
in
China,”
Statista,
May
10,
2022,”
https://statista.com/statistics/275613/cotton-production-in-china; Yihan Ma, “Import Value of Cotton in China from 2015-2020,”
Statista, November 15, 2021, https://statista.com/statistics/1121901/china-cotton-import-value; Yihan Ma, “Leading Suppliers
of
Cotton
to
China
in
2020,
Based
on
Import
Value,”
Statista,
November
15,
2021,
https://statista.com/statistics/1121908/china-cotton-imports-by-country; C. Textor, “Cotton Acreage in China between 2011
and 2021, Statista, Apr 1, 2022, https://www.statista.com/statistics/241915/cotton-acreage-in-china; C. Textor, “Cotton Yield
in China from 2000 to 2020, Statista, January 24, 2022, Statista, https://www.statista.com/statistics/275
