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Questions: 2. The chapter outlines three different approaches to assessing consequences—ethical egoism, utilitarianism, and altruism. a. Which of these approaches do you feel most accurately summarizes Captain Brett Crozier’s approach? Why? b. Which of these do you feel most accurately summarizes Acting Secretary Thomas Modly’s approach? Why? c. Which approach applies to Rear Admiral Stuart Baker?
4. . The chapter outlines five Principles of Ethical Leadership. Which of these principles applied to Captain Brett Crozier’s leadership? Which principles applied to Thomas Modly’s leadership?
Assignment
Answer all parts of questions 2 and 4 from Case 15.3: Ship Shape.
Your response should be at least 500 words.
Your response should cite each of the following references at least once.
Required references at the bottom
Passage: Act 1—The Virus
It was believed to have begun on March 5, 2020, with the Vietnamese port call of the U.S. naval aircraft
carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt . The port call in Da Nang, only the second visit by an American
aircraft carrier to the country since the Vietnam War, was ordered partly as a show of military strength in
a region threatened by perceived growing territorialism by China in the South China Sea.
At the time the Roosevelt arrived there, Vietnam had 16 reported cases of the highly contagious
coronavirus (COVID-19), but they were all in the country’s northern region, far from the ship’s port of
call. Because the Roosevelt , commanded by Captain Brett Crozier, a Naval Academy graduate with
more than 30 years of service, was too large for the city’s docks, the ship anchored offshore and relied
on small boats to ferry its sailors to Da Nang, where they spent several days within the city, frequenting
its restaurants, shops, and hotels and engaging in community service projects. On the fourth day,
several crew members were ordered back to the ship when it was feared they may have been exposed
to COVID-19 at a hotel where two British nationals who had tested positive for the virus had also been
staying.
The Roosevelt then left port and headed out to sea, returning to normal operations with aircraft flying to
and from the ship bringing supplies from Japan and the Philippines. Meanwhile, the ship’s medical team
watched the crew closely for signs of the virus, knowing that symptoms generally appear within the first
14 days after exposure.
On March 24, an announcement came over the ship’s loudspeakers: “Set River City 1.” This alerted the
sailors that the ship had entered into a period of restricted communications, meaning no internet or
phone calls for most everyone onboard. The reason why, the crew soon discovered, was that three
sailors aboard the Roosevelt had tested positive for COVID-19. Within 24 hours, the number of cases on
the ship doubled and each subsequent day rendered new cases (Simkins, 2020).
The Roosevelt , a massive 1,000-foot nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, is essentially a small city. It
housed almost 5,000 crew members, all living and working in extremely tight quarters. Crew members
shared common cafeterias, bathroom facilities, other social areas, and narrow hallways. They worked in
close proximity to one another day and night. Even their sleeping quarters were close with bunks often
stacked three high.
The sailors who tested positive were all members of the reactor crew, the group responsible for running
the core of the ship. They were flown to a Navy hospital in Guam, with the ship following a few days
later, docking there to begin testing of the entire crew and engage in professional cleaning of the ship.
Just a few months earlier, the Diamond Princess , a cruise ship of 2,600 passengers housed in
individual cabins, had eight of its passengers die of the virus while aboard with more than 700 others
infected. Captain Crozier knew the Roosevelt , with its tight quarters and significantly larger crew, had
the potential to be much worse than the Diamond Princess ; the Roosevelt ’s doctors were estimating
that more than 50 crew members could potentially die from the virus (Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, Cooper, &
Ismay, 2020).
Act 2—The Letter
As the cases aboard the Roosevelt rapidly increased, several options were considered with Captain
Crozier arguing strongly for evacuating nearly all the sailors from the ship, leaving a skeleton crew of
around 500 to perform essential duties and protect the vessel’s reactors, bombs, missiles, and war
planes. The rest of the crew would be quarantined and tested while the ship was cleaned.
Captain Crozier’s commanding officer, Rear Admiral Stuart Baker, disagreed, feeling that less drastic
action would still protect the crew and leave the ship in operation. Ultimately, 1,000 of the ship’s crew
were evacuated to a gymnasium on base where they slept on cots, which quickly resulted in several
more confirmed cases.
After continued denials from his superiors and watching the situation escalate each day, on March 30,
Captain Crozier laid out his concerns and arguments in a four-page letter titled, Request for Assistance
in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic . The letter was sent via unclassified email and addressed to
Crozier’s commanding officer, Rear Admiral Stuart Baker, U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral John
Aquilino, and Naval Air Forces Commander Vice Admiral DeWolfe Miller as well as copied to seven
other Navy captains (Simpkins, 2020).
According to the New York Times , prior to sending the letter, Captain Crozier shared the email with
several of the Roosevelt ’s most senior officers. When they expressed their desire to add their
signatures to the letter, Captain Crozier refused, fearing for their careers, knowing the letter might well
end his (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, & Cochrane, 2020).
Pleading for assistance and consideration, Captain Crozier wrote, “This will require a political solution,
but it is the right thing to do . . . We are not at war. Sailors do not need to die. If we do not act now, we
are failing to properly take care of our most trusted asset — our sailors” (Gafni & Garofoli, 2020). Noting
that only a small group of infected crewmen had been removed from the ship and quarantined, and that
“the spread of the disease is ongoing and accelerating,” Crozier requested “compliant quarantine
rooms” be provided on shore in Guam for his entire crew “as soon as possible” (Gafni & Garofoli, 2020).
The letter was leaked to the San Francisco Chronicle and the plight of the crewmen on the USS
Theodore Roosevelt soon became public knowledge in the midst of a worldwide pandemic.
Act 3—Retribution
Infuriated that the letter had been sent to what he considered a wide distribution (though the recipients
were all Navy personnel) and consequently became public due to being leaked to the press, acting U.S.
secretary of the Navy Thomas Modly fired Captain Crozier on April 2.
Modly, himself a Naval Academy graduate and former Navy helicopter pilot, was the acting secretary
positioned to become the permanent Secretary of the Navy. He had replaced Richard Spencer, who had
been fired by U.S. president Donald Trump for opposing Trump’s support of a Navy Seal who had been
charged with war crimes. According to the New York Times , Modly, concerned that Captain Crozier’s
letter would anger Trump, sought the advice of colleagues, including the chief of naval operations and
the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, who counseled Modly to first order an investigation (Gibbons-Neff,
Schmitt, Cooper, & Ismay, 2020). He did not.
Although Modly acknowledged that there was “no evidence that Captain Crozier leaked the message” to
the media (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, & Cochrane, 2020) he quickly relieved the captain of his
duties without a formal investigation and, according to Modly’s aides, without pressure from his
superiors, U.S. defense secretary Mark Esper or U.S. president Donald Trump. NavyTimes would later
report that Modly ignored the counsel of his colleagues, “due to the belief that President Donald Trump
wanted Crozier fired” (Simkins, 2020).
Modly’s immediate superior, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, had previously cautioned his commanders
not to make decisions that might contradict Trump’s intended messaging on the growing COVID-19
pandemic. Modly tried to frame the firing of Captain Crozier as a “loss of confidence” rather than
retribution by claiming the letter had “raised alarm bells unnecessarily” and that “in sending it out
broadly, he [Crozier] did not take care to assure it couldn’t be leaked” (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, &
Cochrane, 2020).
As Captain Crozier left his ship, hundreds of sailors and airmen gathered to form a “corridor” for him to
openly express their support for the popular and highly respected commander. Videos of this went viral.
In response, Modly chartered a Gulf Stream business jet and flew immediately to Guam at a cost of
$243,000 where he delivered a scathing, profanity-laced 15-minute reprimand to the Roosevelt ’s crew
over the ship’s public address system (Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, & Ismay, 2020). Modly berated the crew
for cheering the captain, calling Crozier “too stupid” and “too naïve” to command a ship and adding that
blame for the virus belonged to China. Thirty minutes later, he abruptly left, fielding no questions.
Within 30 minutes of his departure from the Roosevelt , social media was widely broadcasting audio
recordings of his tirade.
Act 4—R&R: Resignation and Reinstatement?
When Acting Secretary Modly landed back in Washington, D.C., he was immediately directed by
Defense Secretary Esper to apologize. Lawmakers and former military officials were calling for Modly’s
resignation.
The next day, Modly, in quarantine because of his potential exposure to the virus while onboard the
Roosevelt, tendered his resignation.
Captain Crozier subsequently ended up in quarantine at the naval base in Guam, battling the virus.
More than 4,000 of the ship’s crew members were also quarantined with more than 800 testing positive
for the virus and one crew member dying from it.
But Captain Crozier’s plight and that of the USS Theodore Roosevelt ’s crew had caught the attention of
senior military officials and raised awareness and concern for other warships and missions. General
John Hyten, chair of the joint chiefs of staff shared, “From my perspective, it’s not a good idea to think
that the Teddy Roosevelt is a one-of-a-kind issue. To think that it will never happen again is not a good
way to plan” (Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, & Ismay, 2020).
The Navy subsequently instituted new health and safety procedures for ships at sea and for those
preparing to head out on deployment to prevent future outbreaks, including requiring crew members to
wear masks and observe social distancing guidelines. In addition, in preparation for deployment, a
ship’s crew must be quarantined for 14 days before boarding the ship.
More than 345,000 people signed an online petition to reinstate Captain Crozier. Legislators urged the
Pentagon to reconsider. The chair of the House Armed Services Committee and other top subcommittee
leaders condemned Crozier’s dismissal, stating that “Dismissing a commanding officer for speaking out
on issues critical to the safety of those under their command discourages others from raising similar
concerns” (Cooper, Gibbons-Neff, Schmitt, & Cochrane, 2020).
Amidst pressure from the public and lawmakers, and after a preliminary inquiry, the Navy’s top
leadership took the unprecedented step to recommend reinstatement of Captain Crozier as commander
of the USS Theodore Roosevelt . The final decision on whether Captain Crozier would be reinstated as
captain of the USS Roosevelt was delayed by acting Navy secretary James E. McPherson (who
replaced Thomas Modly) who has called for a broader investigation into the matter (Martinez, 2020). At
the time this was written, Crozier remained in the Navy, maintaining his rank, but had been given a
temporary duty assignment in San Diego (Ziesulewicz, 2020).
Required References
Heffernan, M. (2019). The human skills we need in an unpredictable world | TED Talk. Retrieved February 1, 2023, fromhttps://youtu.be/w4OPtFCs_fw?si=PBzh1uzCssRtHi0BLinks to an external site.
Jones, T. M. (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organizations: An issue-contingent model. Academy of Management Review, 16(2), 366-395. Jones (1991) (1).pdfDownload Jones (1991) (1).pdf
Northouse, P. G. (2021). Leadership: Theory and practice (9th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications
