Security Convergence

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Discussion Questions: Evaluate the impact of convergence on your role within the security industry, personally, and on your organization. If you are not currently employed in the industry (or one of the military services or the government at some level), select an organization and use that as the basis for your response.

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2016 National Network
of Fusion Centers
Final Report
July 2017
Table of
Contents
Executive Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 1
Data Sources and Methodology …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4
Fusion Center Profiles ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 4
Key Customer Survey ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 5
Partner Agency Data ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
Fusion Center Readiness Initiative…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 5
Findings……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6
2016 National Network ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 6
Colocation with Partner Agencies ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 7
Fusion Center Staff …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 8
Analysts……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9
Key Positions ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 9
Governance Structure …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 10
Governance Body Membership …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 10
Operational Costs ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 11
Year-Over-Year Funding Changes ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 11
Non-Staff Spending……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 12
Mission ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 12
Information Sharing ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 13
2016 Information Sharing Activities per FTE ……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 14
Distributable Analytical Production……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 14
Tips and Leads and RFIs …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 15
Special Events, Federal Disasters and Public Safety Incidents …………………………………………………………………………….. 15
Key Customer Survey ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 16
Performance Measures …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 17
The Path Forward …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 20
Key Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations …………………………………………………………………………………………… 21
Appendix ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 23
Key Terms………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 25
ii / 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report
Executive
Summary
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducts the annual fusion center assessment to provide a comprehensive
picture of the performance of the National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network), help measure the
effectiveness of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grant funding, and guide partners to invest in mission
areas with the greatest potential benefit to the entire homeland. The assessment primarily evaluates fusion centers’
achievement of selected performance measures. It also strives to ensure functional consistency across the National
Network, regardless of fusion center size, scope, geography, or mission.
As a result of the steady progress since 2011, the 2015 fusion center assessment concluded that the National Network
had reached maturity. The 2015 report closed-out the former measures focused on the National Network’s
achievement of critical operational and enabling capabilities. This year’s 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final
Report (2016 Final Report) reflects this change through a focus on performance measures developed by a DHS-led
working group of fusion center directors.
The key findings, conclusions, and recommendations in this 2016 Final Report center on: the need for a shared
understanding of critical fusion center functions; the importance of aligning staffing, training, and collaboration with key
fusion center focus areas; the need for training, transition procedures, and onboarding materials to enhance skills and
maintain continuity for new and existing staff; the restrictions that state and local laws and policies impose on many
fusion centers in sharing analytical products on the Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence Community of
Interest (HSIN-Intel) and elsewhere; and the opportunity to convert increased fusion center colocation and law
enforcement focus into outcomes that more fully address partner needs. See “Key Findings, Conclusions, and
Recommendations.”
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 1
2 / 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 3
Data Sources and
Methodology
Fusion Center Profiles
In 2016, DHS introduced the HSIN-Intel Profile System to its Homeland Security Information Network-Intelligence (HSINIntel) Community of Interest. The new system gives fusion centers direct control over their data while providing a
platform to share information and work collaboratively and effectively as a National Network. The HSIN-Intel Profile
System replaces the online fusion center questionnaire DHS used in prior years to collect Assessment data with a live
two-part system: a closed view—accessible only by DHS staff—in which fusion centers can post sensitive Assessment
information, and a public view that enables fusion centers to share general information with other fusion centers and
with HSIN-Intel users as a whole. This system offers two advantages. First, it provides a secure system that permits
fusion centers to update their information in real-time throughout the year and eliminates the burden of inputting much
of the same information year after year. Second, the HSIN-Intel Profile System provides a platform for the National
Network to promote the sharing and adoption of best practices, such as standard operating procedures (SOPs), policy
documents, supporting increased functional consistency across the National Network. Seventy-seven of 78 fusion
centers completed their Profiles.1 DHS used data that fusion centers entered into their Profiles as of February 1, 2017 in
creating this 2016 Final Report.
In December 2016, following the fusion centers’ submission of their HSIN-Intel Profiles, DHS performed data validation.
DHS personnel conducted detailed reviews of individual fusion center Profile submissions to identify data that failed to
upload properly and other errors and inconsistencies and to minimize data discrepancies. The results of these reviews
were shared with Fusion Center Directors and their key staff via email for follow up. DHS staff were made available for
phone calls when additional clarity and guidance were required. Additional information was packaged into FAQs and
distributed via email. Finally, DHS provided Fusion Center Directors with proposed changes to identified Profile data,
and each Fusion Center Director was given the opportunity to accept, reject, or otherwise comment before verifying
their center’s Profile data.
1
Participation in the profile system was voluntary and one fusion center opted not to participate.
4 / 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report
Key Customer Survey
DHS worked with partner agencies to identify fusion center customers and group them into categories reflecting
common requirements and perspectives. One of these groups—defined as “key customers”—includes state and
territorial Homeland Security Advisors; the heads of state police agencies, state investigative agencies, and state
emergency management agencies; major city police chiefs; and major county sheriffs. DHS coordinated with the
National Fusion Center Association (NFCA) to conduct the survey through its prominent associations—the National
Governor’s Association Homeland Security Advisors Council (GHSAC), the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP), the Association of State Criminal Investigative Agencies (ASCIA), the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA), the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA), the Major County Sheriffs’ Association (MCSA), and the
National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA)—to gauge their perspectives and solicit feedback on a wide range of topics related
to the fusion centers within their respective areas of responsibility. A total of 168 individuals responded to the survey—
the highest number of respondents received for the key customer survey.
Partner Agency Data
The performance metrics developed by Fusion Center Directors and DHS come in part from the fusion centers’ input to
their HSIN-Intel Profiles and from the Key Stakeholder Survey. The remaining metrics are gathered from within DHS
(Intelligence Information Report (IIR) data, Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) data, and the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) Watchlist data) and from partners and other agencies. For example, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency provided lists of federally declared disasters and the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning
provided a list of National Special Security Events and other events that received a Special Event Assessment Rating.
Defined public safety events came from data maintained by the University of Maryland and Texas State University. The
FBI also provided data on fusion center access to FBI-sponsored classified systems, fusion center colocation with FBI
entities, and FBI investigations initiated or enhanced based on fusion center information. Finally, I&A conducted the FY
2016 Federal Cost Inventory, which is a catalog of all federal personnel, related costs, and programmatic support being
provided to the National Network. I&A contacted 48 government agencies for spending data relating to Personnel,
Information Systems and Technology, Training and Exercise, Management and Administration, or Programmatic costs
that supported the fusion centers in FY 2016. Fiscal Year 2015 historical data was utilized in instances where no
response to the FY 2016 data call was received.
Fusion Center Readiness Initiative
Through the Fusion Center Readiness Initiative (FCRI), DHS conducts fusion center-focused drills and exercises, provides
exercise-related tools and subject matter expertise to fusion centers, and facilitates fusion center participation in
prevention-focused exercises hosted by other agencies. As part of the FCRI, I&A conducts an annual communications
drill to test the National Network’s ability to access and share information from the federal government. In 2016, the
following systems were tested:





Fusion center unclassified e-mail
Homeland Security Information Network Intelligence Community of Interest (HSIN-Intel)
Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN)
Secure telephone equipment and the classified audio bridge
Secure video teleconference
All 78 fusion centers participated in the 2016 communications drill to assist in operational preparedness. Each fusion
center received an after action report detailing its results (see Appendix).
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 5
Findings
2016 National Network
The following is an overview of the composition and analysis of the National Network as of September 30, 2016.2 The
total number of fusion centers remained at 78, all but one of which participated in the 2016 Assessment. Fifty-three
fusion centers operate at the state or territorial level, meaning that their areas of responsibility (AORs) encompass the
entirety of these states or territories. The remaining 25 fusion centers operate within major urban areas, meaning that
their AORs typically encompass areas in and around cities.
Based on mission requirements and available resources, fusion center business hours vary across the National Network:



Twenty-one fusion centers operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Thirty-five fusion centers have extended operating hours, typically over 10 hours a day or more than 5 days a
week, but less than 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Twenty-one fusion centers operate only during core business hours, typically 10 hours or less a day, 5 days a
week.
2 The 78 fusion centers that make up the National Network can be found at: http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information.
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 6
Fusion center business hours increased overall in 2016 compared with 2015, with the greatest increase in centers
operating extended hours (over 10 hours per day, 5 or more days per week). Figure 1 portrays this increase.
Figure 1: Fusion Center Business Hours (2015 vs. 2016)
Colocation with Partner Agencies
Fusion center colocation has reached a milestone, with 100% of fusion centers now reporting being located either in the
same office space or building with at least one other federal or SLTT agency. Increased colocation improves
opportunities for distribution to and synchronization with other organizations on counterterrorism, law enforcement,
critical infrastructure protection, and public safety objectives. Additionally, colocation provides opportunities to work
collaboratively with fusion center partners. Table 1 presents the instances of reported colocation by agency type.
# of Fusion Centers
2014
2015
2016
% Change in
2016
Colocated with one or more partners, including:
66
69
77
12%
State, county, or city law enforcement
39
40
57
43%
State, county, or city law enforcement intelligence unit
22
28
31
11%
FBI (field offices, JTTFs, FIGs, and/or other FBI)
14
12
27
125%
State homeland security agency
18
19
25
32%
State, county, or city emergency operations center
19
21
23
10%
State National Guard
8
12
23
92%
State, county, or city emergency management agency
19
20
22
10%
State, county, or city fire service
10
13
16
23%
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (ISC or Watch Center)
10
10
15
50%
Real-time crime center
8
11
14
27%
RISS Node and/or RISSafe™ Watch Center
3
7
14
100%
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Border Intelligence
Center
3
3
6
100%
Other fusion center
4
4
3
-25%
0
0
1
n/a
Entity
Maritime Interagency Operations Center (USCG Sector)
Table 1: Colocation of Fusion Centers with Other Entities
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 7
This increase continues a three-year trend of increased fusion center colocation. Most notably, fusion center colocation
with Customs and Border Protection, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Nodes, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) all doubled over 2015. Other developments included a 50% increase in colocation with High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area offices and a 43% increase in colocation with state, county or city law enforcement. Increased
colocation offers fusion centers opportunities for more effective information sharing and collaboration, access to
specialized resources, and cost savings.
Fusion Center Staff
Fusion centers operate with a combination of SLTT and private sector staff. In 2016, fusion centers reported 2,539 fulltime or part-time staff members, an increase of 60 (2.4%) from the previous year. Table 2 presents the breakdown of
staff across the National Network by function.
State
Local
Tribal
Territorial
Private
Sector
FY15
TOTAL
FY16
TOTAL
Analysis
Investigative
Liaison &
SME
720
323
1
6
290
197
0
1
171
84
0
4
Training
&
Exercise
19
31
0
0
1
4
7
947
514
1051
492
Legal
Mgmt &
Administration
Other
FY15
TOTAL
FY16
TOTAL
13
3
0
0
274
159
0
4
125
96
0
1
1,497
931
0
17
1,612
893
1
16
3
1
0
1
34
17
349
43
8
383
235
2,479
N/A
266
53
17
437
223
N/A
2,539*
Table 2: Fusion Center Staff by Function (2016)
* 10 fusion center personnel were omitted due to data inconsistences or incompleteness
The current workforce is distributed across six
types of positions. The greatest year-over-year
increase was seen in the Analyst category, with
104 new personnel (11.0%). The greatest
reduction was seen in the Liaison and SME Staff
category, which decreased by 83 positions
(23.8%). The second largest position segment,
Investigative Staff, experienced a decline of 22
people (4.3%) in 2016, and 54 staff (14.1%)
were added to Management and
Administration Professionals in 2016.
Figure 2: 2016 Increase/Decrease in FTE by Function
8 / 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report
The National Network is composed primarily of individuals with a law enforcement background; 80% of the 2,539 staff
members specialize in law enforcement. Cyber security, corrections, and emergency management all make up less than
3% of the total staff.
Figure 3: 2016 Primary Discipline of Fusion Center Personnel
The functional composition suggests a workforce
focused on analysis and possessing a law enforcement
background. This may enable deep integration with
local law enforcement operations and a focus on law
enforcement analytical production. A workforce largely
possessing a law enforcement background combined
with declining liaison staff may challenge the mission of
the Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) program due to the lack
of functional diversity. Furthermore, a larger number of
Management and Administration personnel per full time
employee (FTE) in the National Network may challenge
the ability to maintain historical production and outputs
per FTE due to an increased focus in personnel relations,
policy, and organization. The General Services
Administration and the Office of Personnel Management
do not provide clear and concise recommendations for
Management and Administration staff ratios.
Analysts
Analysts play an essential role in processing and sharing the intelligence gathered and held by
the National Network. Three hundred and eleven (29%) analysts reported basic level
proficiency in 2016, while 397 (37%) and 237 (22%) reported intermediate and advanced level
proficiency, respectively. These proficiency levels, combined with 202 analyst vacancies,
suggest that analyst training presents a high-impact opportunity for a large number of staff.
Key Positions
Five key positions—Director, Deputy Director, Privacy/Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL)
Officer, Security Officer, and Lead Analyst—play a vital role in the operation of fusion centers.
The Director, P/CRCL Officer, and Security Officer have been tracked in previous years and
showed significant gains in average position tenure. Additionally these three positions
showed much less turnover than previous years. This suggests that despite frequent
movement and position turnover, in 2016 fusion centers maintained greater consistency in
staffing key roles.
Deputy Directors and Lead Analysts were added to the key positions data collection in 2016.
These positions were marked as vacant in 15 fusion centers. This indicates either that these
positions are difficult to fill or more likely, based on anecdotal evidence, a divergence in the
staffing models and needs at each fusion center. Smaller fusion centers in particular reported
little need for the designation of a Lead Analyst position.
New to Position in 2014
Director
Deputy Director
P/CRCL Officer
Security Officer
Lead Analyst
22
n/a
14
20
n/a
28%
n/a
18%
26%
n/a
New to Position in 2015
32
n/a
23
28
n/a
42%
n/a
30%
36%
n/a
Figure 4: Analyst Skills
New to Position in 2016
15
16
8
14
5
20%
26%
11%
19%
8%
Average
Tenure (yrs)
3.3
3.6
4.3
3.6
5.7
Table 3: Tenure in Key Positions (2014-2016)
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 9
An in-depth look at Director tenure shows that despite the 2016 decline in new Director placements, 53% of Directors
have two or fewer years of tenure in their current position. Centralized resources, such as transition plans and
published standard operating procedures, are common tools to curb challenges that arise from high turnover rates.
Figure 5: Current and Expected Key Position Turnover
Figure 6: Director Tenure
Governance Structure
A formal governance structure supports fusion center operations and guides mission priorities. Good governance
facilitates the ability to assign resources and develop and enforce policy. A majority (69%) of fusion centers reported
formal governance bodies in 2016. Another 15 fusion centers (19%) have formal alternatives to governance bodies in
place.
Governance Body Membership
The composition of governance bodies provides an
opportunity to incorporate broader representation of
stakeholders into fusion center operations. As shown
in Figure 8, 82% of fusion centers have law
enforcement representation on their governance
body, 44% have homeland security, 37% have fire
Figure 7: Fusion Center Governance Structures
service, and 34% have emergency management.
Several fusion centers indicated they lacked a formal governance
body or alternative oversight body but still indicated they possess
similar functions in their local governance. This may indicate that
the term “governance body” lacks a standard definition across the
National Network. Additional or unexplored opportunities may exist
to integrate stakeholders through governance body membership.
Figure 8: Stakeholder Service Membership on Fusion Center
Governance Bodies
10 / 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report
Operational Costs
Operational funding for the National Network is provided from Federal (both through grants and direct contributions),
SLTT and private sector sources. The information below combines data from the fusion center profiles with the FY 2016
Federal Cost Inventory data call. Overall, funding for the National Network in the 2016 assessment period was $322
million, a less-than-1% ($714,000) increase from 2015.
Information
Systems &
Technology
Staff
*Direct Federal
Expenditures
Federal Grants
Expended by SLTT
DHS
Training &
Exercise
Management &
Administration
Other
2016 Totals
$41,481,990
$2,591,452
$3,208,222
$491,815
$2,308,303
$50,081,782
$50,273,893
$13,847,247
$3,701,863
$2,707,130
$1,695,684
$72,225,816
$62,439,823
$1,482,165
$1,599,936
$6,703,891
$111,581,875
$80,949,377
$0
$3,751,072
$698,330
$2,859,147
$322,147,399
$41,988,205
$12,995,123
$3,539,479
$2,331,725
$1,585,292
DOJ/COPS
$980,165
$500,000
$2,000
$0
$0
DOJ/BJA
$1,387,331
$173,970
$7,181
$31,454
$0
$5,918,191
$178,154
$153,203
$343,951
$110,392
State
HIDTA
$99,165,038
$4,386,234
$701,996
$6,470,860
$857,746
Local
$73,592,350
$2,613,509
$917,107
$3,603,720
$222,691
Tribal
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$3,574,572
$35,500
$60,000
$40,000
$41,000
Territorial
Private Sector
$698,330
$0
$0
$0
$0
Other
$1,445,236
$1,308,589
$102,200
$3,122
$0
Total
$270,231,410
$24,782,531
$8,691,388
$13,316,646
$5,125,424
Table 4: 2016 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory
*Staff salary expenditures were calculated using the GS-13 step 5 salary in the Washington-Baltimore-Arlington locality of $107,439. An additional
30% benefits cost estimate was added to this base salary resulting in an estimated yearly expenditure of $139,670, per employee. There were a
reported 297 federal employees dedicated to support the fusion centers in FY 2016.
Year-Over-Year Funding Changes
Every major funding source showed modest growth in 2016 except for Direct Federal Expenditures, which decreased by
27% ($18M). This decrease was offset by gains in Federal Grants ($8M) and in SLTT, private, and other funding ($10M).
Figure 9: Year-over-Year Budget Comparison
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 11
Non-Staff Spending
Some of the most dramatic shifts in areas of expenditure can be seen best after removing the amount spent on staffing.
Non-staff areas increased 11% in 2016 ($5M). Information systems and management and administration mirrored the
growth trends experienced by non-staff spending (7% growth and 20%
growth, respectively). Training and exercise expenditures decreased 9% in
2016 ($1M).
Information
Systems &
Technology
Training &
Exercise
Management &
Administration
2015
$23,176,435
$9,569,566
2016
$24,782,531
$8,691,388
Other
Total
$11,126,462
$2,998,220
$46,870,683
$13,316,646
$5,125,424*
$51,915,989
Table 5: Non-Staff Spending Budget Comparison
* Future data collection methodology enhancements will allow insight into resource change
rationale not available in this year’s assessment.
Mission
As in past Assessments, DHS asked each fusion center to identify the 10
focus area priorities of its mission, ranking them in order of importance.
Figure 11 displays the results.
Figure 10: Bar Chart Non-Staff Spending
Comparison
Across the National Network, five topics among the 24 choices offered appeared consistently among the top focus area
priorities in both 2015 and 2016, revealing a concentration of fusion center focus. Of the top five, Narcotics,
Counterterrorism and Critical Infrastructure gained in importance, while Cybersecurity and General Crime declined. This
consensus of focus areas quickly disappears outside of the top five. Beyond the top five focus area priorities, fusion
centers maintain different focuses and no two fusion centers rank the priorities the same way, but there are many focus
areas in common and therefore opportunities for cross-cutting and collaborative work
Cybersecurity was a top-five focus area for 31 fusion centers in 2016 and offers an opportunity for cross-cutting analysis
with other data in the Assessment. Of these 31 fusion centers, 15 reported capability in all three of the “Cyber-Related
Analysis Activities” the National Network provides, with another seven centers reporting capability in two of the three
(Figure 12).
12 / 2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report
Figure 12: Cybersecurity Focus Priority vs. Capability
This suggests opportunities for additional training and hiring to bring fusion center capabilities more fully in line with
their expressed priorities. In addition, given that cybersecurity work can be performed virtually, this may provide an
opportunity for collaboration between fusion centers.
Similarly, Critical Infrastructure was a top-five focus area for 49 fusion centers in 2016. Of these 49, however, only
25 reported having participants from the critical infrastructure field in their Fusion Liaison Officer program (Figure 13).
This suggests an opportunity for fusion centers to increase their engagement with the critical infrastructure community
through their FLO programs and, in doing so, grow their capability, collaboration and awareness in this highly-prioritized
focus area.
Figure 13: Critical Infrastructure Focus vs. FLO Participation
Information Sharing
Fusion centers aim to compile, analyze, and disseminate criminal/terrorist information and intelligence and other
information to support efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal/terrorist activity.3 In February
2017, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) removed “the area of Establishing Effective Mechanisms for Sharing
and Managing Terrorism-Related Information to Protect the Homeland” from GAO’s High-Risk Series Reporting. GAO
wrote, “The Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) and key departments and agencies have
made significant progress to strengthen how intelligence on terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement, as well
as other information…., is shared among federal, state, local, tribal, international, and private-sector partners.”4
To accomplish this objective, fusion centers are designed to serve as a focal point of vertical and horizontal information
sharing within their respective AOR.5 Success in this information sharing role depends both on creating intelligence
products (through working with partners and other fusion centers) as well as the ability to find the appropriate
destination for collected information. To this end, situational awareness products, case support/tactical products,
analytical products, requests for information (RFIs), and tips and leads were tracked in the fusion center profiles and
3 https://it.ojp.gov/gist/94/Fusion-Center-Guidelines–Law-Enforcement-Intelligence–Public-Safety–and-the-Private-Sector
4
GAO Report to Congress, GAO-17-317, “HIGH-RISK SERIES Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others Report to Congressional
Committees,” February 2017, Page 4.
5 2014-2017 National Strategy for the National Network of Fusion Centers, p.8
https://nfcausa.org/html/National%20Strategy%20for%20the%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers.pdf
2016 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 13
compared to 2015 figures. Quantifiable product and output numbers can lead to a misleading characterization of the
National Network, as products of the same type (e.g., two situational awareness products) may not require the same
amount of resources. The range of self-reported totals for situational awareness products, case support/tactical
products, and analytical products between fusion centers show that like-named products are not taking the same
amount of resources to complete. Fusion centers reported outputs of these three products types outside of seven
standard deviations of one another (this could also be a result of varying definitions of the product types themselves).6
Given the magnitude of differences, data outside of one standard deviation above the average in these three categories
was removed as outliers.
2016 Information Sharing Activities per FTE
Analyzing fusion center information sharing activities per FTE helps highlight the impact the National Network is able to
have with its available resources more clearly than simply comparing total overall year-over-year production figures.
The average analytical products created per FTE in 2016 were 3. Case support/tactical products and situational
2016 Production Per FTE
2015 Production Per FTE
Tips and Leads
Tips and Leads
RFIs (10s)
RFIs (10s)
Analytical Products
Analytical Products
Case Support/Tactical Products
Case Support/Tactical Products
Situational Awareness Products
Situational Awareness Products
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Figure 14: Year-over-Year Production per FTE Comparison
awareness averaged 20 and 10 per FTE, respectively. On average 150 RFIs and 30 tips and leads were reviewed and
processed per FTE. While situational awareness products and RFIs decreased (29% and 15%, respectively) from the 20