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Consider the following questions when writing your journal entry. You do not need to answer all questions, but you should address at least one of the questions. Aim for more than a summary, and use your write-up to show your understanding of the readings. Where possible, deepen your discussion by adding comparisons, addressing points of agreement or disagreement, or adding critiques (refer to comments given on previous assignments). Your answer should be in paragraph form with proofread, clear prose, between 300 and 500 words.What is ethnicity? How does ethnicity relate to nationalism?Distinguish between essentialism, instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism as they relate to identity.Contemplate the discussion of religion and nationalism. Compare and/or contrast Brubaker’s contributions with others we have discussed.=====================================================================You do not have to answer the third one because I could not find Brubaker reading.
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10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170715
Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2006. 9:397–424
doi: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.062404.170715
c 2006 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved
Copyright
WHAT IS ETHNIC IDENTITY AND
DOES IT MATTER?
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Kanchan Chandra
Department of Politics, New York University, New York, New York 10003;
email: [email protected]
Key Words
ethnicity, culture, violence, democracy, patronage
■ Abstract Since the publication of Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict, comparative political scientists have increasingly converged on their classification of ethnic
identities. But there is no agreement on the definition that justifies this classification—
and the definitions that individual scholars propose do not match their classifications.
I propose a definition that captures the conventional classification of ethnic identities
in comparative political science to a greater degree than the alternatives. According to
this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which membership
is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent
(described here simply as descent-based attributes). I argue, on the basis of this definition, that ethnicity either does not matter or has not been shown to matter in explaining
most outcomes to which it has been causally linked by comparative political scientists.
These outcomes include violence, democratic stability, and patronage.
INTRODUCTION
What is ethnic identity? Since the publication of Horowitz’s (1985) Ethnic Groups
in Conflict, there has been a convergence among comparative political scientists
on which identities we classify as ethnic. For Horowitz, ethnicity is an umbrella
concept that “easily embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and castes” (Horowitz 1985, p. 53).
Much of the recent theoretical literature on ethnic politics explicitly follows this
umbrella classification (e.g., Varshney 2002, Chandra 2004, Htun 2004, Wilkinson
2004, Posner 2005). Even more importantly, the four principal datasets on ethnic
groups that constitute the foundation for cross-national empirical studies of the
effect of ethnic identity in comparative politics—the Atlas Narodov Mira (Bruk
& Apenchenko 1964), Alesina et al.’s (2003) dataset on ethnic groups in 190
countries, a comparable count of ethnic groups in 160 countries (Fearon 2003),
and the Minorities at Risk project (http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/)—also
generally employ this umbrella classification. Only some quibbles remain on
the margin about whether castes should be excluded (e.g., Fearon 2003) or retained (e.g., Bruk & Apenchenko 1964, Varshney 2002, Chandra 2004, Htun
1094-2939/06/0615-0397$20.00
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2004, Wilkinson 2004, Posner 2005) and whether region and clan should be
included.
But we do not have a definition of ethnic identity that matches this classification.
Many comparative political scientists do not define the term before using it, and
those who do often classify an identity as ethnic even when it does not correspond to
their own definitions. Horowitz (1985), for instance, counts Hindus and Muslims in
India, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, and Creoles and Indians in Guyana and
Trinidad as ethnic categories, even though these groups do not possess his primary
defining characteristic, namely a myth of common ancestry. Fearon (2003) counts
Hindi-speakers as an ethnic group, even though individuals who either speak Hindi
or have Hindi as their mother tongue do not meet his definitional criterion of having
a distinct history as a group or a shared culture valued by the majority of members.
And Chandra (2004, 2005) often counts categories based on region as ethnic, even
though it is not clear whether these groups meet her definition of ethnic groups as
“ascriptive” groups.
Why is a definition necessary if comparative political scientists are approaching a consensus on classification? Because a definition tells us how to evaluate
and build theories about ethnic identity—and concepts based on ethnic identity,
such as ethnic diversity, ethnic riots, ethnic parties, ethnic voting, and so on—as
an independent variable. A large body of work in comparative political science
argues that ethnicity matters—for violence, democratic stability, institutional design, economic growth, individual well-being, and so on—and makes general,
cross-country predictions about its effects (e.g., Dahl 1971; Rabushka & Shepsle
1972; Geertz 1973; Bates 1974; Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Landa 1994; Kaufmann 1996; Cox 1997; Fearon 1999; Przeworski et al. 2000; F. Caselli & W.J.
Coleman, unpublished manuscript; Reilly 2001; Petersen 2002; Chua 2003; Toft
2003). Claims as to why these variables matter for some outcome are always based
on the assumption that ethnic identities have particular properties that explain the
outcome. If we are to assess these claims and build new ones, we need some basis on which to judge which properties can reasonably be associated with ethnic
identities. A definition provides an analytical basis for making this judgment.
This article proposes a definition of the term ethnic identity that captures the
conventional classification to a greater degree than previous definitions. According to this definition, ethnic identities are a subset of identity categories in which
eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed
to be associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes).
Most previous definitions also emphasize the importance of descent. This definition differs from previous ones in two ways. First, it introduces a distinction
between categories of membership and the attributes that qualify individuals for
membership in that category. These two concepts have been conflated in previous
work, but making a consistent distinction between them has large consequences for
how we think about ethnic identity. Second, it empties the definition of characteristics such as a common culture, common history, common territory, and common
language, which are only sometimes associated with the identities that we think
of as ethnic and thus cannot be thought of as defining characteristics.
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ETHNIC IDENTITY
399
My approach to building this definition is to identify the principles underlying
the classification of the term ethnic identity within the specialized community of
comparative political scientists—not to define ethnicity objectively nor to capture broader social scientific usage or everyday usage. The virtue of this approach
lies in the opportunities it provides for cumulation of research on ethnic identity as an independent variable. In order to theorize about the effect of ethnic
identity in a cumulative fashion, we must evaluate the previous body of work in
comparative political science that argues that ethnicity matters, retain the insights
that survive an evaluation, and discard those that do not. To evaluate whether
and how ethnicity matters in the way these works propose, we need a definition that identifies the properties of ethnic identities, as classified by this body of
work. It would be an added advantage if this definition also captured the way in
which the term is understood among other communities, but that is not my main
concern.
I show here that many of the properties commonly associated with ethnic identities in our explanatory theories do not characterize the identities that we classify as
ethnic in general, although they may apply to particular subsets of these identities.
These properties include common ancestry, common myth of ancestry, common
language, common culture, and common homeland. On the basis of the definition
proposed here, I also identify two properties that are indeed intrinsic to ethnic
identities, on average: constrained change and visibility. By “constrained change,”
I mean that although an individual’s ethnic identities do change in the short term,
the pattern of change and the mechanisms driving it are constrained by an underlying set of attributes. By “visibility,” I mean that some information about an
individual’s ethnic identity categories—and the categories to which she does not
belong—can be obtained through superficial observation. But these two properties
are not uniquely associated with ethnic identities; they characterize all identity categories in which membership is determined by descent-based attributes. And they
are only associated with descent-based identity categories on average. Particular
descent-based identities may resemble particular non-descent-based identities in
particular contexts.
This forces us to conclude that ethnic identity—and concepts related to ethnic
identity such as ethnic diversity, ethnic riots, ethnic parties, ethnic violence, ethnic
conflict, and so on—either does not matter or has not been shown to matter as an
independent variable by most previous theoretical work on ethnic identity. Only
a small subset of previous claims about why and how ethnic identity matters rely
on properties that have been shown to be intrinsic to ethnic identities. In most instances, the mechanisms driving our explanatory theories about the effect of ethnic
identity assume properties such as fixedness of identity, cultural homogeneity, and
a shared history, which are not associated with ethnic identities even as classified
by this body of work. The outcome our theories seek to explain, then, must be
caused by some other variables that act independently or interact with ethnic identity. Thus, these theories must either be reformulated by taking into account one
or more omitted variables, or reinterpreted as theories that are not about the effect
of ethnic identities at all.
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Note that defining the concept of ethnic identity in a way that accords with the
conventional classification in comparative political science is an enterprise distinct
from defending or perpetuating the use of the concept in our explanatory theories.
Rather, it provides a basis on which to question the claims of previous theories
and the continued use of the concept. But if we discard the claims of previous
theories or discontinue the use of the concept, we must know just what we are
rejecting and why—and what should replace it. A definition of ethnic identity,
therefore, is necessary not only to defend the use of the concept but also to justify
discarding it.
The section below elaborates on the definition proposed here. Next, I situate
this definition in the lineage of past definitions, eliminating some of the properties
routinely associated with ethnic identity. The third section identifies two of the
properties that can indeed be taken to be intrinsic to ethnic identity: constrained
change and visibility. The final section uses the discussion of the properties that
can and cannot be associated with ethnic identity to evaluate theories about how
ethnicity matters.
DEFINITION OF ETHNIC IDENTITY
By “identity,” I mean any social category in which an individual is eligible to be
a member. Ethnic identity categories, I propose, are a subset of identity categories
in which eligibility for membership is determined by descent-based attributes.
By attributes that “determine” eligibility for membership, I mean either those
that qualify an individual for membership in a category or those that signal such
membership. By “descent-based attributes,” I mean attributes associated with,
or believed to be associated with, descent. Attributes “associated with descent”
include those acquired genetically (e.g., skin color, gender, hair type, eye color,
height, and physical features), through cultural and historical inheritance (e.g.,
name, language, place of birth, and origin of one’s parents and ancestors), or in the
course of one’s lifetime as markers of such an inheritance (e.g., last name or tribal
markings). Attributes “believed to be associated with descent” are attributes around
which a credible myth of association with descent has been woven, whether or not
such an association exists in fact. The definition thus includes both a subjective
and an objective element.
The set of identity categories in which membership is determined by descentbased attributes is large. Ethnic identity categories are a subset of this larger set,
defined by the following restrictions: (a) They are impersonal—that is, they are
an “imagined community” in which members are not part of an immediate family
or kin group; (b) they constitute a section of a country’s population rather than
the whole; (c) if one sibling is eligible for membership in a category at any given
place, then all other siblings would also be eligible in that place; and (d) the qualifying attributes for membership are restricted to one’s own genetically transmitted
features or to the language, religion, place of origin, tribe, region, caste, clan,
nationality, or race of one’s parents and ancestors.
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ETHNIC IDENTITY
401
If some of the restrictions that constitute the subset of ethnic identities appear
somewhat arbitrary, they are. Why impose a rule that requires siblings to be equally
eligible for membership before a category can be called ethnic? Why allow this
particular set of descent-based attributes and not others? I do not offer analytical
justifications for these restrictions here. Indeed, I argue that there is so far no good
reason to wall off ethnic identities from other types of descent-based identities
My purpose here is simply to identify those restrictions that must be imposed in
order to approximate the conventional classification of ethnic identities. Having
identified these features, we are in a position also to recognize their arbitrariness
and discard them where necessary.
Let me illustrate this definition using the fictionalized example of Helen, imagined from a mélange of characters in Waters’ (1999) study of West Indian immigrants in New York City. Born in the English-speaking island of Trinidad to
parents of African origin, Helen has dark skin, dark brown eyes, and straight hair.
She moved to the United States after obtaining her high school diploma in Trinidad
and works as a food service employee, earning $25,000 a year. She belongs to and
votes for the Democratic Party. Helen married a Haitian man in New York and
learned to speak French, which is now her primary language of communication
with her children and husband. Her brother Derek, who has lighter skin, light brown
eyes, and otherwise similar features, remained behind in Trinidad. Their parents
are well-educated professionals who belong to the People’s National Movement
in Trinidad. They are Presbyterians, but Helen herself converted to Catholicism
after meeting her husband.
According to the definition above, Helen’s ethnic identity categories include
“Black” (in which the qualifying attribute, according to current norms, is descent
from African parents, signaled by attributes such as the color of her skin and
physical features) and West Indian (in which the qualifying attribute is descent
from parents who lived in Trinidad, signaled by her accent, among other attributes).
Both these categories are determined by attributes associated, or believed to be
associated, with descent, and both sets of attributes place Helen and Derek in the
same categories. Helen’s ethnic identity categories also include African-American
(in which membership is determined by the attributes of descent from African
parents, skin color, and physical features, in the United States). Derek, because he
stayed behind in Trinidad, cannot call himself African-American, but if he moved
to the United States, he would be eligible for membership in this category, just like
his sibling.
Helen’s ethnic identity categories according to this definition do not include
several other identity categories also based on descent-based attributes, such as
“descendant of People’s National Movement supporters” (excluded because it is
not based on physical features nor on her parents’ language, religion, race, tribe,
caste, nationality, or place of origin), “people with dark brown eyes” (excluded
because, although it is based on her physical features, it excludes her sibling Derek),
and “female” (also excluded because it excludes Derek).
Helen’s ethnic identity categories also do not include Catholic (determined not
by descent nor by a myth of descent, but by conversion, openly acknowledged,
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during her lifetime), French speaker (determined by acquisition of a language that
was not her ancestral language), working class (determined by attributes acquired
during her lifetime, such as her high school diploma and her job as a food service
worker), and Democrat (determined by her joining the Democratic party during
her lifetime).
This definition captures most, but not all, of the categories listed by comparative
political scientists include in the list of ethnic categories. For instance, although that
list includes all categories based on language, this definition distinguishes between
categories in which the attribute for membership is an ancestral language (or a
language presented as an ancestral language), which it considers ethnic categories,
and categories in which the attribute for membership is a language acquired during
a lifetime, which are not considered ethnic categories. It also provides a decision
rule for whether and when to classify ambiguous categories, such as those based
on clan and region, as ethnic categories. A regional category is an ethnic category
according to this definition only if the membership rule takes into consideration
the region of origin of an individual’s parents and ancestors, rather than the region
in which an individual currently resides. And an identity category based on clan
membership is an ethnic category according to this definition only if it constitutes
an imagined community of individuals not connected to each other by direct ties
of kinship, and if the clan membership in question is that of one’s parents and
ancestors.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER DEFINITIONS
The most widely used definitions of ethnic identity proposed in previous literature
include the following:
1. According to Max Weber, “ethnic groups are those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities
of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization or migration; this belief must be important for the propagation of group
formation; conversely, it does not matter whether or not an objective blood
relationship exists” (quoted in Hutchinson & Smith 1996, p. 35).
2. According to Horowitz (1985, p. 52), “[e]thnicity is based on a myth of
collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate.
Some notion of ascription, however diluted, and affinity deriving from it are
inseparable from the concept of ethnicity.”
3. According to Fearon & Laitin (2000, p. 20), an ethnic group is “a group
larger than a family for which membership is reckoned primarily by descent,
is conceptually autonomous, and has a conventionally recognized ‘natural
history’ as a group.”
4. In a subsequent refinement, Fearon (2003, p. 7) defines a “prototypical” ethnic group as one that has several of the following features: (a) Membership
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is reckoned primarily by descent; (b) members are conscious of group membership; (c) members share distinguishing cultural features; (d) these cultural
features are valued by a majority of members; (e) the group has or remembers a homeland; and (f) the group has a shared history as a group that is
“not wholly manufactured but has some basis in fact.”
5. According to Smith, an ethnic group is “a named human population with
myths of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more elements of a common culture, a link with a homeland and a sense of solidarity”
(Hutchinson & Smith 1996, p. 6).
Virtually all definitions in this inventory agree that descent is somehow important in defining an ethnic group. The differences are over how to specify the
role of descent, and whether and how other features should be combined with it
in defining ethnic groups. The role of descent is specified in four different ways:
(a) a common ancestry, (b) a myth of common ancestry, (c) a myth of a common
place of origin, and (d) a descent rule for membership. The features combined with
descent include a common culture or language, a common history, and conceptual
autonomy.
Below, I consider whether any of these characteristics, taken separately, can
adequately define ethnic identity, and then I evaluate definitions based on combinations of these characteristics. Taking examples of sets of categories commonly
classified as ethnic by comparative political scientists, I ask three questions of
any single defining characteristic: (a) Does the rule for inclusion in any single
category within a set require individuals to have this characteristic in common?
(b) Does the rule for inclusion in different ethnic categories within a comparable
set require individuals to have different values on this characteristic? (c) Do the
sets of categories that comparative political scientists classify as ethnic uniquely
possess these characteristics? An ideal definition should fulfill all three conditions, but the first two are most consequential for the purpose of this project. A
definition that covers most of the categories we call ethnic allows us to evaluate
claims about how ethnic identity matters, even if it includes some extra categories, since it describes, at a minimum, the entire sample from which the inferences are drawn. A definition that excludes categories we routinely classify as
ethnic makes us less able to evaluate these claims because it describes a truncated
sample.
Common Ancestry
A definition of common ancestry must stipulate the nearness of the connection
required to call a group an ethnic group. Does common ancestry mean a shared
ancestor one branch ago, a hundred branches ago, or a million branches ago?
Without such a stipulation, we can find a point of intersection in the family trees
of any two individuals by going back far enough, thus eliminating group differentiation altogether (Cavalli-Sforza 2000). Let us stipulate that “common ancestry”
means individuals in the same ethnic group share a more proximate ancestor than
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individuals in different ethnic groups. This minimally reasonable stipulation excludes many of the categories classified as ethnic.
Consider, for example, the categories black and white. As a set of categories
based on race, they fit the conventional classification in comparative politics, and
they are explicitly counted as ethnic by at least Fearon (2003), Alesina et al. (2003),
and the Minorities at Risk dataset (which uses the term African-American rather
than black). However, many white Americans from former slave-owning families
share proximate ancestors with black Americans. Consider the example of E.C.
Hart, classified as a Louisiana white, who had several children with Cornelia, a
woman of color (Dominguez 1986, pp. 26–27). Hart’s children with a white wife
would have shared common ancestry at the most proximate level (the same father)
as his children with Cornelia. But the two sets of children were not classified in
Louisiana as members of the same group. Hart’s children with Cornelia were then
classified as colored and would now be classified as black, whereas his children
with a white wife would then and now have been classified as white. Thus, in
classifying these categories as ethnic, comparative political scientists appear to
follow a rule that does not rely on common ancestry.
At the same time, individuals with far more distant ties of ancestry—such
as Irish-Americans and Lithuanian-Americans, or Jamaican and Nigerian
immigrants—are classified as members of the same ethnic categories. And in
the case of other categories, such as Hindus and Muslims in India, Punjabis and
Sindhis in Pakistan, or Flemish and Walloon in Belgium, the question of common
ancestry does not even arise. A common ancestry, thus, cannot be a defining feature of an ethnic group. Indeed, individuals often belong to different ethnic groups
despite the objective fact of common ancestry.
A Myth of Common Ancestry
Many ethnic groups have a myth of common ancestry, especially among tribes in
Africa. For example, Yorubas in Yorubaland trace their descent to the mythical
ancestor Oduduwa, and Yorubas in different “ancestral cities” trace their descent
even more specifically to particular sons of Oduduwa (Laitin 1986, p. 110). Zulus
in South Africa claim direct descent from the patriarch Zulu, who was born to a
Nguni chief in the Congo Basin area. Kikuyus in Kenya claim descent from the
single ancestor Gikuyu. Indeed, the great influence that scholars who study Africa
have had on the study of ethnicity may be one reason why a myth of ancestry is
so often proposed as a defining characteristic of ethnic groups.
However, this criterion excludes a significant number of groups that we also
classify as ethnic, both in Africa and in other regions, which do not claim an ancestor in common and do not differentiate themselves from others in a comparable
set on the basis of myths of ancestry. This is the case with blacks and whites in the
United States; Punjabis, Sindhis, and Pathans in Pakistan; Hindus and Muslims in
India; Serbs and Croats in the former Yugoslavia; and blacks, whites, coloreds, and
Indians in South Africa, among others. None of these groups claims an ancestor
in common (whether or not such an ancestor exists in fact) or differentiates itself
from the others on the basis of ancestry myths.
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ETHNIC IDENTITY
405
The irrelevance of a myth of common ancestry to membership rules in groups
that we commonly consider ethnic is especially clear when we consider the process
by which new ethnic groups form as a result of fissures from old ones. Consider
one example of this process of fission:
The anticolonial struggle produced the ethnic category of Pakistani. An early
fissure in this category (itself a product of a fissure from the larger category Indian),
the split between Bengali Muslims and others, resulted in the creation of the
separate state of Bangladesh for Bengali Muslims. Other new ethnic groups to
emerge within Pakistan included Punjabis, Sindhis, Pathans, and Baluchs. Myths
of common ancestry were not part of the process by which political entrepreneurs
and masses within these groups distinguished themselves from each other. Yet
comparative political scientists routinely categorize these groups as ethnic (e.g.,
Horowitz 1985, p. 281; Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003).
Perhaps what is important is not a myth of common ancestry but a myth of
common origin, with which ancestry is often conflated. In the case of blacks and
whites, although neither group is defined or distinguished by a common ancestor,
each is associated with a distinct point of origin: blacks with Africa and whites
mainly with Eurasia. Similarly, although Serbs and Croats are not distinguished
by common ancestry, they can be associated with distinct territories in central and
southern Europe. And in the example of Pakistani group fission, each fissure is
associated with a distinct territory. I will turn to this point shortly.
But first, let us relate the critique so far to the definition that I propose in
this article. To argue that the fact or myth of common ancestry does not capture
the classification of ethnic groups used by comparative political scientists does
not imply that ancestry, real or imagined, is not important—quite the opposite.
According to the definition proposed here, ancestry, or a myth of ancestry, is
critical to the definition of an ethnic group; however, common ancestry or a myth
of common ancestry is not. For instance, the membership rule for classification of
individuals as black or white in the Unites States separates individuals who have,
or are believed to have, some African blood from individuals who do not have, or
are not believed to have, a drop of African blood (Nobles 2000). This membership
rule renders the categories black and white ethnic categories because it requires
the possession of attributes based on ancestry (the proportion of African blood)
even though it does not require common ancestry. By the same logic, the category
Mohajir in Pakistan would be classified as ethnic because the qualifying attribute
is descent, or fabricated descent, from parents who immigrated from northern
India. The fact of common ancestry, even if it were verifiable, is irrelevant to this
membership rule.
A Common Region of Origin, or Myth of a Common
Region of Origin
Suppose, instead of common ancestry, we define an ethnic group as a collection of
individuals with a common region of origin, or a myth of common origin. We can
certainly identify a subset of ethnic groups associated with a common region of
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origin. However, the perception of a common homeland presupposes the existence
of a group; it does not define it. Given a group with this perception, we can reason
backward, proposing that definition of a “region” and choosing the time span that
allows us to discover a common region of origin. But we cannot, from the point
of origin, predict ethnic group boundaries.
To illustrate this rule, we return to the case of blacks and whites in the United
States. Blacks in the United States may be associated with a common origin in
Africa and whites with a common origin in Eurasia, but these associations depend
on (a) the definition of “region” that we employ and (b) the time period we choose
as a staring point. Some definitions of region and choices of time period would
reveal distinct homelands for both groups, whereas others would reveal a shared
one.
If we categorize Africa and Eurasia as distinct regions, then we can associate
blacks and whites with distinct regions of origin and thus define them as distinct
ethnic groups. But there is no analytical reason to think of Africa and Eurasia
as distinct regions instead of disaggregating further within both “regions.” If we
thought of regions in Africa, including present-day Liberia, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire,
Togo, Benin, and Cameroon, as distinct, then we should find
