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Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
1973, Vol. 26, No. 2, 309-320
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS HISTORY
KENNETH J. GERGEN *
Swarthmore College
An analysis of theory and research in social psychology reveals that while
methods of research are scientific in character, theories of social behavior are
primarily reflections of contemporary history. The dissemination of psychological knowledge modifies the patterns of behavior upon which the knowledge
is based. It does so because of the prescriptive bias of psychological theorizing,
the liberating effects of knowledge, and the resistance based on common values
of freedom and individuality. In addition, theoretical premises are based
primarily on acquired dispositions. As the culture changes, such dispositions
are altered, and the premises are often invalidated. Several modifications in
the scope and methods of social psychology are derived from this analysis.
The field of psychology is typically defined
as the science of human behavior, and social
psychology as that branch of the science
dealing with human interaction. A paramount aim of science is held to be the establishment of general laws through systematic
observation. For the social psychologist, such
general laws are developed in order to describe and explain social interaction. This
traditional view of scientific law is repeated
in one form or another in almost all fundamental treatments of the field. In his discussion of explanation in the behavioral sciences,
DiRenzo (1966) pointed out that a “complete explanation” in the behavioral sciences
“is one that has assumed the invariable status
of law [p. 111.” Krech, Crutchfield, and
Ballachey (1962) stated that “whether we
are interested in social psychology as a basic
science or as an applied science, a set of
scientific principles is essential fp. 3].”
Jones and Gerard (1967) echoed this view in
their statement, “Science seeks to understand the factors responsible for stable relationships between events [p. 42].” As Mills
(1969) put it, “social psychologists want to
discover causal relationships so that they
can establish basic principles that will ex1
1 am much indebted to the following persons for
their thoughtful appraisal .of various phases of this
analysis: Shel Feldman, Mary Gergen, Kenneth
Hammond, Louise Kidder, George Levinger, Paul
Rosenblatt, Ralph Rosnow, M. Brewster Smith,
Siegfried Streufert, Lloyd Strickland, Karl Weick, and
Lawrence Wrightsman.
Requests for reprints should be sent to the author,
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19080.
309
plain the phenomena of social psychology
[p. 412].”
This view of social psychology is, of course,
a direct descendent from eighteenth century
thought. At that time the physical sciences
had produced marked increments in knowledge, and one could view with great optimism the possibility of applying the scientific method to human behavior (Carr, 1963).
If general principles of human behavior could
be established, it might be possible to reduce
social conflict, to do away with problems of
mental illness, and to create social conditions
of maximal benefit to members of society.
As others later hoped, it might even be possible to transform such principles into mathematical form, to develop “a mathematics of
human behavior as precise as the mathematics
of machines [Russell, 19S6, p. 142].”
The marked success of the natural sciences
in establishing general principles can importantly be attributed to the general stability
of events in the world of nature. The velocity
of falling bodies or the compounding of
chemical elements, for example, are highly
stable events across time. They are events
that can be recreated in any laboratory, SO
years ago, today, or 100 years from now.
Because they are so stable, broad generalizations can be established with a high degree
of confidence, explanations can be empirically
tested, and mathematical transformations can
be fruitfully developed. If events were unstable, if the velocity of falling bodies or the
compounding of chemicals were in continuous
flux, the development of the natural sciences
310
KENNETH J. GERGEN
would be drastically impeded. General laws
would fail to emerge, and the recording of
natural events would lend itself primarily to
historical analysis. If natural events were
capricious, natural science would largely be
replaced by natural history.
It is the purpose of this paper to argue
that social psychology is primarily an historical inquiry. Unlike the natural sciences,
it deals with facts that are largely nonrepeatable and which fluctuate markedly over time.
Principles of human interaction cannot readily be developed over time because the facts
on which they are based do not generally
remain stable. Knowledge cannot accumulate
in the usual scientific sense because such
knowledge does not generally transcend its
historical boundaries. In the following discussion two central lines of argument will be
developed in support of this thesis, the first
centering on the impact of the science on
social behavior and the second on historical
change. After examining these arguments, we
can focus on alterations in the scope and aims
of the field suggested by this analysis.
IMPACT OF SCIENCE ON SOCIAL
INTERACTION
As Back (1963) has shown, social science
can fruitfully be viewed as a protracted communications system. In the execution of research, the scientist receives messages transmitted by the subject. In raw form, such
messages generate only “noise” for the scientist. Scientific theories serve as decoding devices which convert noise to usable information. Although Back has used this model in
a number of provocative ways, his analysis
is terminated at the point of decoding. This
model must be extended beyond the process
of gathering and decoding messages. The
scientist’s task is also that of communicator.
If his theories prove to be useful decoding
devices, they are communicated to the populace in order that they might also benefit
from their utility. Science and society
constitute a feedback loop.
This type of feedback from scientist to
society has become increasingly widespread
during the past decade. Channels of communication have developed at a rapid rate.
On the level of higher education, over eight
million students are annually confronted by
course offerings in the field of psychology,
and within recent years, such offerings have
become unexcelled in popularity. The liberal
education of today entails familiarity with
central ideas in psychology. The mass media
have also come to realize the vast public
interest in psychology. The news media carefully monitor professional meetings as well
as journals of the profession. Magazine publishers have found it profitable to feature the
views of psychologists on contemporary behavior patterns, and specialty magazines devoted almost exclusively to psychology now
boast readerships totaling over 600,000.
When we add to these trends the broad
expansion of the soft-cover book market, the
increasing governmental demand for knowledge justifying the public underwriting of
psychological research, the proliferation of
encounter techniques, the establishment of
business enterprises huckstering psychology
through games and posters, and the increasing
reliance placed by major institutions (including business, government, military, and
social) on the knowledge of in-house behavioral scientists, one begins to sense the profound degree to which the psychologist is
linked in mutual communication with the
surrounding culture.
Most psychologists harbor the desire that
psychological knowledge will have an impact
on the society. Most of us are gratified when
such knowledge can be utilized in beneficial
ways. Indeed, for many social psychologists,
commitment to the field importantly depends
on the belief in the social utility of psychological knowledge. However, it is not generally assumed that such utilization will alter
the character of causal relations in social
interaction. We do expect knowledge of function forms to be utilized in altering behavior,
but we do not expect the utilization to affect
the subsequent character of the function forms
themselves. Our expectations in this case may
be quite unfounded. Not only may the application of our principles alter the data on which
they are based, but the very development of
the principles may invalidate them. Three
lines of argument are pertinent, the first
stemming from the evaluative bias of psychological research, the second from the liber-
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS HISTORY
ating effects of knowledge, and the third from
prevalent values in the culture.
Prescriptive Bias of Psychological Theory
As scientists of human interaction, we are
engaged in a peculiar duality. On the one
hand, we value dispassionate comportment in
scientific matters. We are well aware of the
biasing effects of strong value commitments.
On the other hand, as socialized human
beings, we harbor numerous values about the
nature of social relations. It is the rare social
psychologist whose values do not influence
the subject of his research, his methods of
observation, or the terms of description. In
generating knowledge about social interaction,
we also communicate our personal values.
The recipient of knowledge is thus provided
with dual messages: Messages that dispassionately describe what appears to be, and
those which subtly prescribe what is desirable.
This argument is most clearly evident in
research on personal dispositions. Most of us
would feel insulted if characterized as low in
self-esteem, high in approval seeking, cognitively undifferentiated, authoritarian, anal
compulsive, field dependent, or close-minded.
In part, our reactions reflect our acculturation ; one need not be a psychologist to resent
such labels. But in part, such reactions are
created by the concepts utilized in describing
and explaining phenomena. For example, in
the preface of The Authoritarian Personality
(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, &
Sanford, 1950), readers are informed that
“In contrast to the bigot of the older style,
(the authoritarian) seems to combine the
ideas and skills of a highly industrialized
society with irrational or anti-rational beliefs
[p. 3].” In discussing the Machiavellian
personality, Christie and Gels (1970) noted
Initially our image of the high Mach was a negative
one, associated with shadowy and unsavory manipulations. However . . . we found ourselves having
a perverse admiration for the high Machs’ ability
to outdo others in experimental situations [p. 339].
In their prescriptive capacity such communications become agents of social change.
On an elementary level, the student of
psychology might well wish to exclude
from public observation behaviors labeled
311
by respected scholars as authoritarian,
Machiavellian, and so on. The communication of knowledge may thus create homogeneity with respect to behavioral indicators of
underlying dispositions. On a more complex
level, knowledge of personality correlates may
induce behavior to insubstantiate the correlates. Not so strangely, much individual
difference research places the professional
psychologist in a highly positive light. Thus,
the more similar the subject is to the professional in terms of education, socioeconomic
background, religion, race, sex, and personal
values, the more advantageous his position on
psychological tests. Increased education, for
example, favors cognitive differentiation
(Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, &
Karp, 1962), low scores in authoritarianism
(Christie & Jahoda, 1954), open-mindedness
(Rokeach, 1960), etc. Armed with this information, those persons unflattered by the research might overcompensate in order to
dispel the injurious stereotype. For example,
women who learn they are more persuasible
than men (cf. Janis & Field, 1959) may
retaliate, and over time the correlation is
invalidated or reversed.
While evaluative biases are easily identified
in personality research, they are by no means
limited to this area. Most general models of
social interaction also contain implicit value
judgments. For example, treatises on conformity often treat the conformer as a
second-class citizen, a social sheep who foregoes personal conviction to agree with the
erroneous opinions of others. Thus, models
of social conformity sensitize one to factors
that might lead him into socially deplorable
actions. In effect, knowledge insulates against
the future efficacy of these same factors. Research on attitude change often carries with
it these same overtones. Knowing about attitude change flatters one into believing that
he has the power to change others; by implication, others are relegated to the status
of manipulanda. Thus, theories of attitude
change may sensitize one into guarding
against factors that could potentially influence him, In the same way, theories of aggression typically condemn the aggressor, models
of interpersonal bargaining are disparaging of
exploitation, and models of moral develop-
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KENNETH J. GERGEN
ment demean those at less than the optimal
stage (Kohlberg, 1970). Cognitive dissonance
theory (Brehm & Cohen, 1966; Festinger,
1957) might appear to be value free, but
most studies in this area have painted the
dissonance reducer in most unflattering terms.
“How witless” we say, “that people should
cheat, make lower scores on tests, change
their opinions of others or eat undesirable
foods just to maintain consistency.”
The critical note underlying these remarks
is not inadvertent. It does seem unfortunate
that a profession dedicated to the objective
and nonpartisan development of knowledge
should use this position to propagandize the
unwitting recipients of this knowledge. The
concepts of the field are seldom value free,
and most could be replaced with other concepts carrying far different valuational baggage. Brown (1965) has pointed to the interesting fact that the classic authoritarian personality, so roundly scourged in our own
literature, was quite similar to the “J-type
personality” (Jaensch, 1938), viewed by the
Germans in a highly positive light. That
which our literature termed rigidity was
viewed as stability in theirs; flexibility and
individualism in our literature were seen as
flaccidity and eccentricity. Such labeling
biases pervade our literature. For example,
high self-esteem could be termed egotism;
need for social approval could be translated
as need for social integration; cognitive differentiation as hair-splitting; creativity as
deviance; and internal control as egocentricity. Similarly, if our values were otherwise,
social conformity could be viewed as prosolidarity behavior; attitude change as cognitive adaptation; and the risky shift as the
courageous conversion.
Yet, while the propagandizing effects of
psychological terminology must be lamented,
it is also important to trace their sources.
In part the evaluative loading of theoretical
terms seems quite intentional. The act of
publishing implies the desire to be heard.
However, value-free terms have low-interest
value for the potential reader, and value-free
research rapidly becomes obscure. If obedience were relabeled alpha behavior and not
rendered deplorable through associations with
Adolph Eichman, public concern would un-
doubtedly be meagre. In addition to capturing
the interest of the public and the profession,
value-loaded concepts also provide an expressive outlet for the psychologist. I have talked
with countless graduate students drawn into
psychology out of deep humanistic concern.
Within many lies a frustrated poet, philosopher, or humanitarian who finds the scientific method at once a means to expressive
ends and an encumbrance to free expression.
Resented is the apparent fact that the ticket
to open expression through the professional
media is a near lifetime in the laboratory.
Many wish to share their values directly, unfettered by constant demands for systematic
evidence. For them, value-laden concepts
compensate for the conservatism usually imparted by these demands. The more established psychologist may indulge himself
more directly. Normally, however, we are not
inclined to view our personal biases as propagandistic so much as reflecting “basic truths.”
While the communication of values through
knowledge is to some degree intentional, it is
not entirely so. Value commitments are almost inevitable by-products of social existence, and as participants in society we can
scarcely dissociate ourselves from these values
in pursuing professional ends. In addition, if
we rely on the language of the culture for
scientific communication, it is difficult to find
terms regarding social interaction that are
without prescriptive value. We might reduce
the implicit prescriptions embedded in our
communications if we adopted a wholly technical language. However, even technical language becomes evaluative whenever the science is used as a lever for social change.
Perhaps our best option is to maintain as
much sensitivity as possible to our biases and
to communicate them as openly as possible.
Value commitments may be unavoidable, but
we can avoid masquerading them as objective
reflections of truth.
Knowledge and Behavioral Liberation
It is common research practice in psychology to avoid communicating one’s theoretical
premises to the subject either before or during
the research. Rosenthal’s (1966) research
indicated that even the most subtle cues of
experimenter expectation may alter the be-
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS HISTORY
havior of the subject. Naive subjects are
thus required by common standards of rigor.
The implications of this simple methodological safeguard are of considerable significance.
If subjects possess preliminary knowledge as
to theoretical premises, we can no longer
adequately test our hypotheses. In the same
way, if the society is psychologically informed, theories about which it is informed
become difficult to test in an uncontaminated
way. Herein lies a fundamental difference
between the natural and the social sciences.
In the former, the scientist cannot typically
communicate his knowledge to the subjects
of his study such that their behavioral dispositions are modified. In the social sciences
such communication can have a vital impact
on behavior.
A single example may suffice here. It appears that over a wide variety of conditions,
decision-making groups come to make riskier
decisions through group discussion (cf. Dion,
Baron, & Miller, 1970; Wallach, Kogan, &
Bern, 1964). Investigators in this area are
quite careful that experimental subjects are
not privy to their thinking on this matter. If
knowledgeable, subjects might insulate themselves from the effects of group discussion or
respond appropriately in order to gain the
experimenter’s favor. However, should the
risky shift become common knowledge, naive
subjects would become unobtainable. Members of the culture might consistently compensate for risky tendencies produced by
group discussion until such behavior became
normative.
As a general surmise, sophistication as to
psychological principles liberates one from
their behavioral implications. Established
principles of behavior become inputs into
one’s decision making. As Winch (1958) has
pointed out, “Since understanding something
involves understanding its contradiction,
someone who, with understanding, performs
X must be capable of envisioning the possibility of doing not X [p. 891.” Psychological principles also sensitize one to influences acting on him and draw attention to
certain aspects of the environment and himself. In doing so, one’s patterns of behavior
may be strongly influenced. As May (1971)
has stated more passionately, “Each of us
313
inherits from society a burden of tendencies
which shapes us willy-nilly; but our capacity
to be conscious of this fact saves us from
being strictly determined [p. 100].” In this
way, knowledge about nonverbal signals of
stress or relief (Eckman, 1965) enables us to
avoid giving off these signals whenever it is
useful to do so; knowing that persons in
trouble are less likely to be helped when
there are large numbers of bystanders
(Latane & Barley, 1970) may increase one’s
desire to offer his services under such conditions; knowing that motivational arousal can
influence one’s interpretation of events (cf.
Jones & Gerard, 1967) may engender caution
when arousal is high. In each instance,
knowledge increases alternatives to action, and
previous patterns of behavior are modified
or dissolved.
Escape to Freedom
The historical invalidation of psychological
theory can be further traced to commonly
observed sentiments within western culture.
Of major importance is the general distress
people seem to feel at the diminution of their
response alternatives. As Fromm (1941) saw
it, normal development includes the acquisition of strong motives toward autonomy.
Weinstein and Platt (1969) discussed much
the same sentiment in terms of “man’s wish
to be free,” and linked this disposition to
the developing social structure. Brehm (1966)
used this same disposition as the cornerstone
of his theory of psychological reactance. The
prevalence of this learned value has important
implications for the long-term validity of
social psychological theory.
Valid theories about social behavior constitute significant implements of social control. To the extent that an individual’s behavior is predictable, he places himself in a
position of vulnerability. Others can alter
environmental conditions or their behavior
toward him to obtain maximal rewards at
minimal costs to themselves. In the same
way that a military strategist lays himself
open to defeat when his actions become predictable, an organizational official can be
taken advantage of by his inferiors and wives
manipulated by errant husbands when their
behavior patterns are reliable. Knowledge
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KENNETH J. GERGEN
thus becomes power in the hands of others.
It follows that psychological principles pose
a potential threat to all those for whom they
are germane. Investments in freedom may
thus potentiate behavior designed to invalidate the theory. We are satisfied with principles of attitude change until we find them
being used in information campaigns dedicated to changing our behavior. At this point,
we may feel resentful and react recalcitrantly. The more potent the theory is in
predicting behavior, the broader its public
dissemination and the more prevalent and
resounding the reaction. Thus, strong theories may be subject to more rapid invalidation
than weak ones.
The common value of personal freedom is
not the only pervasive sentiment affecting
the mortality of social psychological theory.
In western culture there seems to be heavy
value placed on uniqueness or individuality.
The broad popularity of both Erikson
(1968) and Allport (1965) can be traced in
part to their strong support of this value, and
recent laboratory research (Fromkin, 1970,
1972) has demonstrated the strength of this
value in altering social behavior. Psychological theory, in its nomothetic structure, is
insensitive to unique occurrences. Individuals
are treated as exemplars of larger classes. A
common reaction is that psychological theory
is dehumanizing, and as Maslow (1968) has
noted, patients harbor a strong resentment at
being rubricated or labeled with conventional
clinical terms. Similarly, blacks, women, activists, suburbanites, educators, and the
elderly have all reacted bitterly to explanations of their behavior. Thus, we may strive
to invalidate theories that ensnare us in their
impersonal way.
Psychology of Enlightenment
Effects
Thus far we have discussed three ways in
which social psychology alters the behavior it
seeks to study. Before moving to a second
set of arguments for the historical dependency of psychological theory, we must deal
with an important means of combatting the
effects thus far described. To preserve the
transhistorical validity of psychological principles, the science could be removed from the
public domain and scientific understanding
reserved for a selected elite. This elite would,
of course, be co-opted by the state, as no
government could risk the existence of a private establishment developing tools of public
control. For most of us, such a prospect is
repugnant, and our inclination instead is to
seek a scientific solution to the problem of
historical dependency. Such an answer is suggested by much that has been said. If people
who are psychologically enlightened react to
general principles by contradicting them,
conforming to them, ignoring them, and so
on, then it should be possible to establish
the conditions under which these various reactions will occur. Based on notions of psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966), selffulfilling prophecies (Merton, 1948), and
expectancy effects (Gergen & Taylor, 1969),
we might construct a general theory of reactions to theory. A psychology of enlightenment effects should enable us to predict and
control the effects of knowledge.
Although a psychology of enlightenment
effects seems a promising adjunct to general
theories, its utility is seriously limited. Such
a psychology can itself be invested with
value, increase our behavioral alternatives,
and may be resented because of its threats to
feelings of autonomy. Thus, a theory that
predicts reactions to theory is also susceptible
to violation or vindication. A frequent occurrence in parent-child relations illustrates the
point. Parents are accustomed to using
direct rewards in order to influence the behavior of their children. Over time, children
become aware of the adult’s premise that the
reward will achieve the desired results and
become obstinate. The adult may then react
with a naive psychology of enlightenment
effects and express disinterest in the child’s
carrying out the activity, again with the
intent of achieving the desired ends. The
child may respond appropriately but often
enough will blurt out some variation of, “you
are just saying you don’t care because you
really want me to do it.” In Loevinger’s
(1959) terms, ” . . . a shift in parentmanship is countered by a shift in childmanship
[p. 149].” In the popular idiom, this is
termed reverse psychology and is often resented. Of course, one could counter with
research on reactions to the psychology of
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AS HISTORY
enlightenment effects, but it is quickly seen
that this exchange of actions and reactions
could be extended indefinitely. A psychology
of enlightenment effects is subject to the
same historical limitations as other theories
of social psychology.
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
CULTURAL CHANGE
The argument against transhistorical laws
in social psychology does not solely rest on a
consideration of the impact of science on society. A second major line of thought deserves
consideration. If we scan the most prominent lines of research during the past decade,
we soon realize that the observed regularities, and thus the major theoretical principles, are firmly wedded to historical circumstances. The historical dependency of
psychological principles is most notable in
areas of focal concern to the public. Social
psychologists have been much concerned, for
example, with isolating predictors of political
activism during the past decade (cf. Mankoff
& Flacks, 1971; Soloman & Fishman, 1964).
However, as one scans this literature over
time, numerous inconsistencies are found.
Variables that successfully predicted political
activism during the early stages of the
Vietnam war are dissimilar to those which
successfully predicted activism during later
periods. The conclusion seems clear that the
factors motivating activism changed over
time. Thus, any theory of political activism
built from early findings would be invalidated
by later findings. Future research on political
activism will undoubtedly find still other
predictors more useful.
Such alterations in functional relationship
are not in principle limited to areas of
immediate public concern. For example,
Festinger’s (1957) theory of social comparison and the extensive line of deductive research (cf. Latan6, 1966) are based on the
dual assumption that (a) people desire to
evaluate themselves accurately, and (b) in
order to do so they compare themselves with
others. There is scant reason to suspect that
such dispositions are genetically determined,
and we can easily imagine persons, and indeed
societies, for which these assumptions would
not hold. Many of our social commentators
315
are critical of the common tendency to search
out others’ opinions in denning self and they
attempt to change society through their criticism. In effect, the entire line of research
appears to depend on a set of learned propensities, propensities that could be altered
by time and circumstance.
In the same way, cognitive dissonance
theory depends on the assumption that people
cannot tolerate contradictory cognitions. The
basis of such intolerance does not seem
genetically given. There are certainly individuals who feel quite otherwise about such
contradictions. Early existentialist writers, for
example, celebrated the inconsistent act.
Again, we must conclude that the theory is
predictive because of the state of learned dispositions existing at the time. Likewise,
Schachter’s (19S9) work on affiliation is subject to the arguments made in the case of
social comparison theory. Milgram’s (1965)
obedience phenomenon is certainly dependent
on contemporary attitudes toward authority.
In attitude change research, communicator
credibility is a potent factor because we
have learned to rely on authorities in our
culture, and the communicated message becomes dissociated from its source over time
(Kelman & Hovland, 1953) because it does
not prove useful to us at present to retain the
association. In conformity research, people
conform more to friends than nonfriends
(Back, 1951) partly because they have
learned that friends punish deviance in contemporary society. Research on causal attribution (cf. Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961;
Kelley, 1971) depends on the culturally dependent tendency to perceive man as the
source of his actions. This tendency can
be modified (Hallowell, 1958) and some
(Skinner, 1971) have indeed argued that it
should be.
Perhaps the primary guarantee that social
psychology will never disappear via reduction
to physiology is that physiology cannot account for the variations in human behavior
over time. People may prefer bright shades
of clothing today and grim shades tomorrow;
they may value autonomy during this era
and dependency during the next. To be sure,
varying responses to the environment rely
on variations in physiological function. How-
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KENNETH J. GERGEN
ever, physiology can never specify the nature
of the stimulus inputs or the response context to which the individual is exposed. It
can never account for the continuously shifting patterns of what is considered the good
or desirable in society, and thus a range of
primary motivational sources for the individual. However, while social psychology is
thus insulated from physiological reductionism, its theories are not insulated from
historical change.
It is possible to infer from this latter set
of arguments a commitment to at least one
theory of transhistorical validity. It has been
argued that the stability in interaction patterns upon which most of our theories rest
is dependent on learned dispositions of limited
duration. This implicitly suggests the possibility of a social learning theory transcending historical circumstance. However, such a
conclusion is unwarranted. Let us consider,
for example, an elementary theory of reinforcement. Few would doubt that most people
are responsive to the reward and punishment
contingencies in their environment, and it is
difficult to envision a time in which this would
not be true. Such premises thus seem transhistorically valid, and a primary task of the
psychologist might be that of isolating the
precise function forms relating patterns of
reward and punishment to behavior.
This conclusion suffers on two important
counts. Many critics of reinforcement theory
have charged that the definition of reward
(and punishment) is circular. Reward is typically defined as that which increases the frequency of responding; response increment is
defined as that which follows reward. Thus,
the theory seems limited to post hoc interpretation. Only when behavior change has occurred can one specify the reinforcer. The
most significant rejoinder to this criticism lies
in the fact that once rewards and punishments
have been inductively established, they gain
predictive value. Thus, isolating social approval as a positive reinforcer for human
behav
