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What is problem-oriented policing (POP)? What is the SARA process? Using the assigned readings, describe examples of POP to address crime and disorder at budget motels and robberies of convenience stores. Answer must be 2.5 pages, 5 paragraphs essay format, and apa format. I have attached the articles needed to answer the question.
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21
ROBBERIES OF CONVENIENCE
STORES IN HOUSTON, TEXAS
Nancy G. La Vigne and Nkechi Erondu
Introduction
In 1979, policing scholar Herman Goldstein published an article that offered a
solution to those seeking a redefnition of policing in America (Goldstein, 1979).
He observed that policing was largely focused on process, centering on the means
to crime control and reduction rather than the ends. Examples of process-focused
policing include measuring performance based on metrics such as response times
and the volume of arrests, contraband confscations, and vehicle stops made.
Such means-based practices, which remain in wide use today, have fueled biased
policing (Gates, 1995; Gaines, 2002; Meehan & Ponder, 2002; Tomaskovic-Devey,
Mason & Zingraff, 2004; Gelman, Kiss & Fagan, 2006; Michalowski, 2010), mass
incarceration (Austin & Irwin, 2000; Pattillo, Weiman & Western, 2004), and
low levels of trust in the police among residents of communities experiencing
high crime and a heavy police presence (Lundman & Kaufman, 2003; Tyler &
Huo, 2002; Gelman, Kiss & Fagan, 2006; Warren, 2011; Russell, 2002; La Vigne,
Fontaine & Dwivedi, 2017).
By contrast, outcomes-based policing focuses on the ends, such as reducing the opportunities for the commission of some crimes through preventive
patrol and other measures, aiding individuals who are in danger of physical harm,
resolving confict, and identifying and apprehending those who had engaged in
criminal activities. Rather than repeatedly reacting to crime problems with the same
process-oriented approach day after day, Goldstein framed a role for police in which
they identify the underlying precursors to crime and develop solutions to address
them. This was the birth of problem-oriented policing (POP), also termed by others problem-solving policing—a concept that has been tested and found effective to
address a wide array of policing problems (Goldstein, 1990; Sherman & Weisburd,
1995; National Research Council, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2008).
236 Nancy G. La Vigne and Nkechi Erondu
While POP is by no means a single, comprehensive solution to public safety—
a place exists for basic police functions such as routine patrolling, responding to
calls for service, controlling crowds, and investigating crime—it offers a new lens
through which police can view and address the types of problems they encounter
on a routine basis. Moreover, POP recognizes that police are on the frontlines of
all manner of societal ills—mental health issues, substance abuse disorders, interpersonal violence, homelessness—and lack the resources to solve all those problems
alone. Goldstein noted this reality in his seminal article as well, putting forth an
elegant solution: use police authority to enlist other state and nonstate actors to
address the underlying factors driving crime and disorder problems.
This chapter describes a POP project that employs the use of regulatory measures to tackle the common and persistent problem of convenience store crime. In
the feld of criminology’s relatively short history of focusing on the intersection
of crime and place (see Weisburd et al., 2016), convenience stores—small shops
typically operating around the clock to sell gas, food, and sundries—have featured
prominently. Convenience stores have long been magnets for all manner of crime
and disorder, from robbery to loitering, and are so well known for their criminogenic traits that the stores are sometimes referred to as “stop-and-robs” in American
parlance.
Studies of convenience store crime have shown that the probability of robberies
is signifcantly affected by factors related to both the external environment (e.g.,
community maintenance, land use, street patterns) and the internal environment
(e.g., business practices, such as the cash control policies and number of employees)
(Crow & Bull, 1975; Jeffery et al., 1987; Callahan & Clifton, 1987; La Vigne, 1994;
Dario, 2016). This is demonstrated by the relative success of various convenience
store crime-prevention measures related to location/number of cashiers, number
of mirrors, exterior lighting, vehicular traffc, use of security devices, and clear visibility both within and outside the store (Jeffery et al., 1987; Callahan & Clifton,
1987; La Vigne, 1994; Bellamy, 1996). Research generally supports the theory that
a few minor changes in business practices or store design have the potential to
reduce convenience-store crime dramatically, with some studies concluding that
these interventions are most effective for repeatedly robbed stores or “risky facilities” (Bellamy, 1996; Eck, Clarke & Guerette, 2007).
Scanning
In 2007, the city of Houston, Texas, experienced an all-time high volume of
violent crimes occurring at convenience stores, with 1,100 robberies, 400 aggravated assaults, and 10 homicides occurring on store properties. These crimes
led to frustration on the part of owners, fear for safety among employees, and
a reluctance of customers to shop at convenience stores. Meanwhile, residents
in areas surrounding the stores lamented the generation of crime in their communities. Police were keenly aware of the problem and also recognized that their
routine approach of repeatedly responding to calls for service and investigating
Robberies in Houston, TX
237
the crimes was having little impact on crime reduction. The problem of convenience-store crime in Houston was so pronounced that then-Mayor Bill White
established a Convenience Store Task Force, with the Houston Police Department
(HPD) at the core of the task force along with the Greater Houston Retailers
Association (GHRA), individual store and convenience-store-chain owners, and
petroleum companies such as Exxon and Valero, given the volume of gasoline
sold at convenience stores.
An initial step of the task force was to codify what defned “convenience
store”—deciding on the size and determining the dividing line between gas stations that sell convenience items and convenience stores that have gas pumps—and
then identify all businesses meeting that defnition. Defning “convenience store”
was a necessary precursor both to ensure the scope of the task force was suffciently
focused and that the correct businesses were targeted for intervention.
Analysis
Once defned, crime analysts in HPD examined the distribution of crimes by store,
geography, time of day, day of the week, and various types of offending behavior
patterns. In accordance with the robust literature on crime concentration (Sherman,
Gartin & Buerger, 1989; Clarke & Weisburd, 1990; Brantingham & Brantingham,
1995; Eck, Clarke & Guerette, 2007; Weisburd, 2015), this analysis revealed that a
small share of stores was responsible for a large share of convenience-store crimes.
The vast majority of robberies occurred at smaller individually owned stores,
whereas large chain stores had comparatively few violent crimes at their locations,
despite the volume of business that transpired there.
HPD offcers solicited input from store owners and learned that whereas the
larger stores had already implemented many of the best practices in crime prevention cited in the literature, proprietors of smaller stores—often family-run
businesses—lacked an understanding of crime-prevention measures, along with the
resources to implement them. Interviews with owners of these stores revealed that
many were immigrants, originating from countries where the principles of crime
prevention were less well developed. In addition, because the stores were owned
and typically operated by owners and their family members, convenience-store staff
were less likely to comply with demands for money during attempted robberies,
escalating the violence associated with such crimes.
A fnal component of the analysis was to learn about the people who were
engaged in convenience-store crime to understand their demographics, motivations,
and modus operandi. HPD offcers learned that young men in their twenties were
the most common perpetrators of convenience-store crimes, motivated by the perception that stores represented easy targets with quick rewards and a low likelihood
of getting caught. The perception that convenience-store crime could be committed with impunity was reinforced by the observation that people engaged in drug
dealing, panhandling, and prostitution on and around convenience-store properties
were typically tolerated by store owners and management.
238 Nancy G. La Vigne and Nkechi Erondu
Response
HPD offcers approached the response to the problem in a collaborative manner, developing partnerships with store owners and enlisting the support of the
mayor and the city council to pass an ordinance mandating that all retailers meeting the defnition of convenience store register with the city. As described below,
the ordinance prescribed a number of crime-prevention measures consistent with
the principles of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP). In addition, offcers visited
each store to encourage owners to register, educate them about the reasons for and
importance of crime-prevention measures, and convey that noncompliance would
result in a fne. Once registered, stores received a crime-prevention packet containing guidance and training materials, and offcers followed up by visiting stores to
educate owners and inspect stores for compliance.
Table 21.1 illustrates the prescribed measures of Houston’s convenience-store
ordinance in the context of SCP principles. A theoretical close cousin to POP, SCP
TABLE 21.1 Mandated convenience store crime-prevention measures in accordance with
SCP*
Increasing Perceived
Effort
Increasing Perceived
Risks
Reducing Anticipated Removing Excuses
Rewards
Target hardening
Formal surveillance
Target removal
Rule setting
Annual safety training
for employees and
owners on
cash handling
Trespass affdavit
to facilitate police
enforcement of
loitering
Limiting cash
on hand, with
accompanying
signage
“No Trespassing” signs
in English and Spanish
Requirement of drop
safe
Surveillance by
employees
Signage indicating
existence of drop
safe and inability of
employees to open
safe
Surveillance camera
system
Silent alarm system
with accompanying
signage
Annual safety training
for employees and
owners on robbery
prevention/response
Height strip at store
entrance/exit
Natural surveillance
Unobstructed
windows and public
access doors
* SCP also includes a “Reducing Provocations” column. However, this method was not employed as
part of Houston’s response to convenience store crimes.
Robberies in Houston, TX
239
is a framework for closing off criminal opportunities that assumes that people who
are likely to engage in crime can be deterred, distracted, or disincentivized from
offending by increasing the effort, enhancing the risk, reducing the reward, reducing the provocations, or removing the excuses associated with criminal acts (Clarke,
1997; Clarke & Homel, 1997).
Increasing the perceived effort of convenience-store crime was addressed by
mandating the use of a drop safe and requiring annual safety training of all employees on how to use it.
Increasing the perceived risks of convenience-store crime was accomplished
through a series of measures designed to enhance formal, employee, and natural surveillance. Formal surveillance was enhanced by requiring the execution of a signed
trespassing affdavit from each store owner allowing police to enforce loitering on
store property, as drug dealing was commonplace at many high-crime establishments. Employee surveillance was bolstered by mandating that all stores have at
least two digital high-resolution surveillance cameras, one with a view of the cashregister area and the other of the store entrance/exit. Stores are required to maintain
video footage for a minimum of 30 days and provide it to the police department
on request. Surveillance was further enhanced by the requirement of a silent alarm
system at the cashier’s counter and the installation of height strips next to the store’s
entrance/exit. The height strip is primarily designed to prompt employees to make
note of distinguishing characteristics of people who commit crimes at stores as they
are exiting the premises, but its presence may also serve as a deterrent. The ordinance also aimed to enhance natural surveillance, requiring store owners to keep
their doors and windows clear of signs and other obstructions so that police and
passersby can have a clear view of what is transpiring inside the store.
To reduce the anticipated rewards of convenience-store crime—and specifcally
robbery—the ordinance coupled the requirement of a drop safe with a directive
that stores must develop a policy of restricting the amount of cash in the register
and routinely depositing excess cash into the drop safe. This message was underscored through mandated signage indicating that the volume of cash in the register
is restricted and that employees do not have access to the safe.
A fnal measure of the ordinance pertains to the SCP category of removing
excuses. By requiring stores to erect “No Trespassing” signs in both English and
Spanish, the message is conveyed that the store has no tolerance for loiterers and
people engaging in drug dealing. This message, in turn, affords staff more confdence in requesting loiterers to exit the property.
This compilation of crime-prevention measures was mandated of all stores.
Enforcement of the ordinance fell primarily on police shoulders: offcers frst had
to ensure all stores were complying with the mandate to register with the city as a
convenience store, which required an extensive outreach and education campaign.
Once registered, police set about ensuring the stores were adhering to the prescribed crime-prevention measures, conducting inspections, issuing warnings, and
leaving behind a report to store owners on any observed violations, a copy of which
was sent to HPD’s command offce. Persistent failure to comply with aspects of the
ordinance resulted in a fne of $500.
240 Nancy G. La Vigne and Nkechi Erondu
Assessment
Initial analyses of the impact of HPD’s multi-faceted response to conveniencestore crimes demonstrate a resounding success. Convenience-store crimes of all
types began declining at the onset of the initiative in 2007, then plummeted following the passage of the ordinance in 2009, with an 80% reduction in homicides,
a 77% reduction in robberies, and similar declines in other violent crimes along
with burglaries between 2007 and 2012 (see Figure 21.1). These positive results
were attributed to high levels of ordinance compliance across all stores; interviews with owners indicated that they felt safer as a result of the ordinance and
viewed the crime-prevention effort as a partnership rather than something that
was imposed on them in an adversarial manner. While some anecdotal evidence
indicated modest displacement of crime to retail stores, HPD offcers viewed that
as a signal that the convenience store crime-prevention measures were working
as intended.
Discussion
This case study of Houston’s efforts to prevent convenience-store crime presents
a shining example of police leveraging civil authority to enlist compliance with
crime-prevention measures. As outlined in La Vigne (2018), such regulatory measures are most likely to yield their intended impacts when they are consistent with
principles embodied in the acronym AGILE (adaptable, germane, incentive-based,
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2007
2008
Robbery
2009
Agg. Assault
2010
Burglary
2011
2012
Total
FIGURE 21.1 Part 1 crimes at Houston, Texas, convenience stores, 2007–2012
Robberies in Houston, TX
241
legitimate, evaluated). In the context of this Houston case study, the measures
were adaptable to the specifc context of convenience-store crime and relatively
crime-specifc given their focus on violence reduction. They were germane to the
intended audience of convenience stores, retail associations, and petroleum companies that represent the key stakeholders associated with the problem. The measures
were also incentive-based, in that the education, training, and enforcement components of the ordinance appealed to the concerns and business interests of the
store owners. The fact that the measures prescribed in the ordinance were developed with the input of a task force composed of key stakeholders and focused on
building trust and shared public-safety goals made the response legitimate, further
enhancing the likelihood of compliance. And importantly, the initiative was evaluated to examine the impact of the ordinance on crime, potential displacement, and
perceptions of safety.
Despite these best practices, the impact of Houston’s response was not fully sustained over time. As illustrated in Figure 21.2, while the initial drop in crime was
very likely associated with the passage of the ordinance, its impact waned over time
and in later years crime at Houston convenience stores crept up again—not to
preintervention levels but a meaningful increase all the same. This begs the question, Why were the crime-prevention impacts of Houston’s ordinance not better
sustained over time?
Communications with an HPD offcer who spearheaded the POP project suggest a variety of factors might explain the lack of sustainability of the ordinance’s
crime-prevention impact, including implementation fatigue, the emergence of new
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
Robbery
2011
2012
Agg. Assault
2013
2014
Burglary
2015
2016
Total
FIGURE 21.2 Part 1 crimes at Houston, Texas, convenience stores, 2007–2017
2017
242 Nancy G. La Vigne and Nkechi Erondu
crime problems and public-safety initiatives, and changes in leadership (Watson,
2018). A key component of the success of the ordinance was the fact that a dedicated unit in HPD was tasked with routine inspections of stores and ongoing
education of store owners—a time-consuming effort that dropped in priority following the crime decline. Another likely explanation for the uptick in crime is
that key staff in charge of the POP project were promoted and reassigned to other
units, leaving behind others who perhaps approached the inspection and education
activities with less enthusiasm and vigilance. It is important to recognize that the
large volume of convenience stores in Houston—roughly 1,000—makes ongoing
inspection of stores a monumental and arguably infeasible task, particularly given
competing public-safety priorities.
Conclusion and implications for alternative POP strategies
The Houston case study demonstrates the effcacy of employing POP in the context
of convenience-store crime. However, in hindsight, the response developed by the
task force could have been enhanced and better targeted by drawing from Scott
and Goldstein’s (2005) escalated response model, whereby the intervention begins
by focusing on the least invasive (and burdensome) types of corrective actions and
gradually escalates to more toothsome enforcement. Such an approach may have
been a better use of police resources, although still would be burdensome given the
number of stores. Perhaps an even more effective approach is akin to the Chula Vista
Police Department’s efforts to get motel owners to comply with crime-prevention
measures, which focused on motels with crimes and calls for service that were
above a certain threshold (Chula Vista Police Department, 2009). This approach
essentially fips the Houston convenience-store response on its head: instead of identifying stores that are not following prescribed crime-prevention actions, which
requires inspection of all establishments, offcers single out businesses that exceed
acceptable crime levels—a much smaller share of establishments. In the context of
Houston’s convenience store crime-prevention ordinance, perhaps compliance with
crime-prevention mandates could only be required of stores that exceed a specifc
volume of crime as a proportion of total retail sales. This concept can be an effective
means of passing the cost of crime back onto the businesses that are responsible for
generating it (Eck & Eck, 2012).
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