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20 multiple choice questions, only need the answers. Extra articles for questions will be supplied.
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The following five questions are based on or related to Graph 1 above.
1) If the firm hires OL0 workers, the area OW0AL0 represents:
a) Total loss
b) Total costs
c) Total revenues
d) Total profits
2) Worker L1 for the firm:
a) Is the most profitable.
b) Is hired a cost of CL1
c) Contribute to revenues by an amount BL1
d) All of the above
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3) The profits generated by workers hired between L1 and L2 are given by:
a) ABD
b) L0ADL2
c) L0ABDL2
d) BCD
4) If the production function is concave, then:
a) MPL is increasing.
b) MPL is constant.
c) MPL increases and after the inflection point decreases.
d) Total production increases at a decelerating rate.
5) The demand for labor is given by:
a) the rising portion of the VMPL curve.
b) the declining segment of the value of the average product of the labor curve.
c) The declining region of the value of the marginal product of labor.
d) The maximum of the production function.
6) If a graph of a perfectly competitive firm shows that the MR = MC point occurs where MR is above
AVC but below ATC,
a) the firm is earning a negative profit and will shut down rather than producing the corresponding output
level.
b) the firm is earning a negative profit but will continue to produce where MR = MC in the short run.
c) the firm still earns a positive profit if variable costs are covered.
d) the firm is covering explicit, but not implicit, costs.
e) the firm can cover all fixed costs but only a portion of variable costs.
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7) If a competitive firm’s marginal cost curve is U-shaped, then
a) Its short-run supply curve is U-shaped too.
b) Its short-run supply curve is the downward-sloping portion of the marginal cost curve.
c) Its short-run supply curve is the upward-sloping portion of the marginal cost curve that lies above the
short-run average total cost curve
d) Its short-run supply curve is the upward-sloping portion of the marginal cost curve that lies above the
short-run average variable cost curve
8) A competitive firm faces:
a) a perfectly elastic demand curve
b) the market demand curve.
c) the market supply curve.
d) a downward-sloping demand curve
Graph 2
9) Based on Graph 2. The area BCE measures:
a) Excess unnecessary damage for producing X beyond the optimum.
b) The amount by which fishers’ losses exceed the industry’s profits.
c) Society’s deadweight loss.
d) All of the above
e) None of the above
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10) Based on Graph 2. If the industry owns the lake and produces at the private optimum, the fishers can
sway the industry to produce Xs by:
a) Paying them (the industry) BDC and keeping (the fishers) DCXPXs
b) Paying BEC and keeping BDC
c) Paying BDC and keeping BEC
d) b) and c).
11) Based on Graph 2. If the fishers own the lake, the industry can produce up to Xs by compensating
fishers paying:
a) OAB
b) BDC
c) ODXs
d) OBD
12) Based on Graph 2. Given state of the art, the optimal level of pollution is:
a) Zero
b) DBEC
c) OBD
d) OAB
13) A potential consequence of goods under the common property, for example, whales in the ocean, is:
a) Extinction of the whale species.
b) Over-generation of whales.
c) Tragedy of the commons
d) Efficient allocation of resources
e) a) and c).
f) b) and d)
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Read Pages:526-532 in “Hugo Chávez Against the Backdrop of Venezuelan Economic and Political
History” for the following two questions. The article is posted on Blackboard.
14) Producers are capable of collective action, for example, lobbying the government, because they are
less af icted than consumers by problems of:
a) Plunder
b) Regulations
c) Freeriding
d) All of the above
15) The general inability of consumers to exert collective action in order to pressure the government to
provide for a public good, like the bene ts of free trade, is commonly interpreted as:
a) A Government failure
b) A sign of irrationality
c) A market failure
d) All of the above
16) Transfers targeted to low-income families increased in real dollars from an average of $———- per
person in 1965 to $———– in 2016.
a) 3,070 to 34,093
b) 5,750 to 21,345
c) 10,000 to 30,000
d) None of the above
17) If the Census Bureau counted the missing $1.5 trillion in annual transfer payments, the poverty rate in
the United States would be less than:
a) 1%
b) 2%
c) 3%
d) 4%
fi
fl
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18) Average household in the bottom quintile has ___________ of available resources after accounting for
net transfers received. In contrast, the average top-quintile household has average resources of
___________ after subtracting net taxes paid, rendering an inequality of _________ times as much as the
bottom quintile.
a) $4,908; $295,904; 60
b) $45,389; 109,125; 17
c) $17,850; 194,906; 3.1
d) $50,901; $194,906; 3.8
19) The inequality generated by the great Air Jordan (see article) has similar consequences to society’s
welfare and income of others as the inequality caused by:
a) Carlos Slim (Well-connected Mexican businessman)
b) Steven Jobs (Founder of Apple)
c) Pepe Fanjul (Sugar producer in Florida)
d) Al Capone (Gangster in the 1930s)
20) Indicate the percentages achieved by families in the top quintile in 2017, based on the following
characteristics: education of the householder, married family couple, percent of married family couples in
which the wife works full-time, and percent of total hours supplied.
a) 92%, 64%, 69%, and 32%.
b) 69%, 32%, 92%, and 92%.
c) 69%, 92%, 64%, and 32%.
d) 70%, 64%, 92%, and 32%.
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7
Hugo Chávez Against the
Backdrop of Venezuelan
Economic and
Political History
✦
HUGO J. FARIA
V
enezuelan president Hugo Chávez is a source of irritation for the leaders of
freer countries. Financed by high oil prices, Chávez has meddled, sometimes
successfully, in the internal politics and electoral processes of Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru, among other countries. He has established
alliances with Iran and other “rogue” states of the Middle East. “An avowed Marxist,
Mr. Chávez is in the process of destroying his country. Of this there is no doubt. But
he is also an international menace, and a rich one at that. He has been using his oil
wealth to sow revolution, à la Fidel Castro, in South and Central America. Did we
mention that he’s a dear friend of the Iranian government?” (O’Grady 2007).
In short, Chávez has been a destabilizing force around the world, attempting to
subvert democratic rule and capitalism and to establish the so-called Socialism of the
Twenty-first Century in his own country and elsewhere. In Venezuela, the so-called
Bolivarian Revolution in 2007 nationalized electricity companies, renationalized the
largest fixed telephone company, and shut down a TV station with the broadest
audience in the country.
In this article, I seek to cast light on the political-economy determinants of
Hugo J. Faria is a professor of economics at the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración
(IESA).
The Independent Review, v. XII, n. 4, Spring 2008, ISSN 1086–1653, Copyright © 2008, pp. 519–535.
519
520
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HUGO J. FARIA
Chávez’s advent and popularity. I show that the Venezuelan economy produced a
growth miracle from 1920 to 1957, especially during the 1940s and 1950s. Starting
in the late 1950s, however, political leaders acting in complicity with elements of the
private sector started to undermine the institutions that protected private property.
Erosion of economic freedoms continued unabated and eventually was conducive to
Chávez’s free election. Under his regime, economic freedom has continued to decline, and now, not surprisingly, political and civil liberties are in serious jeopardy.
Thus, the Venezuelan economy went from being a growth miracle to being a growth
disaster. This story of an economy that went from riches to rags features governmentowned oil wealth that engendered perverse incentives and demonstrates a lack of
political and entrepreneurial leadership.
In this article, I provide objective information on the performance of the Venezuelan economy for the periods from 1920 to 1957 and from 1958 to 2006, respectively. Next, I offer a brief historical account that allows a comparison of the
institutions that prevailed in both of these periods. Based on evidence about the
institutional environment that prevailed between 1958 and 2006, I then characterize
today’s Venezuelan economy as socialist and mercantilist and suggest some factors
that account for its persistence. I present a public-choice perspective of the difficulties
of extricating the Venezuelan economy—indeed, most Latin American economies—
from the poverty trap of socialism and mercantilism. Emphasizing that private property is the foundation of freedoms, I argue that because patrimonial governments such
as Venezuela’s lack this foundation, their political, civil, and economic liberties are
precarious. To show the importance of entrepreneurial leadership for the promotion
of economic freedom, I marshal historical and contemporaneous evidence and highlight the absence of such leadership in Venezuela. Finally, I offer potential future
outcomes, describing possible causes of Chávez’s downfall, noting that prospects for
ousting Chávez are better than prospects for firmly establishing capitalism.
Growth Miracle
In 1960, Venezuela’s gross domestic product (GDP) per worker relative to the comparable measure for the United States was 0.837 (Jones 2002, 216–19). At that time,
the same ratio was 0.797 for Canada, 0.825 for Switzerland, and 0.788 for Australia,
which shows that each of those advanced economies was roughly equivalent to Venezuela in its average output per worker.
To reach such a high level, the Venezuelan economy must have grown rapidly
during the preceding decades, and the best available evidence is consistent with this
hypothesis. The Venezuelan Central Bank, established in 1939, began to produce
reliable national-accounts data in 1950. According to these data, Venezuelan real
output per capita grew by 5.4 percent per annum on average between 1950 and 1957,
a rate similar to the growth rates of the so-called Asian Tigers from 1960 to 2000.
Venezuela’s 87 percent increase in real output per capita between 1950 and 1957 not
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only exceeded that of any other Latin American country, but surpassed West Germany’s “miracle” increase of 76 percent.
Moreover, the best available data—estimates by Baptista (2006) and by SánchezCoviza and Olcoz (1966)—indicate that Venezuela’s GDP expanded during the
1940s at an average annual rate in excess of 10 percent. These same scholars also
estimate that the growth rate was high during the 1920s and 1930s.
Growth Disaster
Jones classifies Venezuela as a growth disaster between 1960 and 1997 because real
income per capita grew at a rate of minus 0.13 percent (2002, 4). Of 112 countries
with data for the period from 1960 to 2000, sixteen endured a negative average
growth rate (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, 4). Fourteen of those sixteen lie in the
sub-Saharan region, and two in Latin America. Of those two, Nicaragua suffered a
civil war and a socialist government, whereas the other, Venezuela—a country rich in
oil, gas, coal, and iron—experienced no major internal turmoil.
Hugo Montesinos and I, using data from the World Development Indicators
published by the World Bank, estimate that Venezuela’s real income per capita grew
on average during the 1960s by 1.46 percent per annum, during the 1970s by minus
0.76 percent, during the 1980s by minus 1.88 percent, during the 1990s by minus
0.08 percent, and under Chávez from 1999 to 2006 by minus 0.06 percent. Owing
to the great increase in oil prices recently, the growth rate has exceeded 10 percent
since 2004.
What Happened?
The discovery of oil in 1918 gave substantial impetus to the Venezuelan economy.
Private international companies handled all aspects of the oil business, however. The
Venezuelan government did not make the mistake of attempting to manage the oil
business. The central bank acted as a currency board, defending an irrevocable fixed
exchange rate with the dollar. The marginal tax rate on individual income was 12
percent in 1957, and the consolidated public sector absorbed 22 percent of GDP.
Moreover, government consumption represented only 12 percent of GDP, and the
rest was spent in building the country’s basic infrastructure. The overall fiscal budget
was generally in surplus. Tariffs were relatively high at 20 percent, but other impediments to trade, such as quotas and antidumping or safeguard laws, did not exist.
There were few state-owned companies and virtually no price, interest-rate, or exchange-rate controls. Although political and civil liberties were tightly restricted, the
judicial system administered justice impartially, particularly in the area of business and
economics. The cities were safe, and corruption was concentrated at the highest level
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HUGO J. FARIA
of government. Thus, corruption’s drag on economic growth was not as severe as it
would have been if it had pervaded the government bureaucracy.
According to Escovar and Faria (2006), the Index of Economic Freedom for
Venezuela—on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the freest—was 1.5 in 1950 and 1.6 in
1955. This evidence suggests that the Venezuelan miracle was not simply driven by
oil. Economic institutions guarded private property and helped to channel the oil
wealth efficiently. The manufacturing, construction, and service sectors grew faster
than overall GDP.
During the 1950s, however, when Venezuela still enjoyed substantial economic
freedoms, government decisions began to chip away those freedoms. In 1950, Marcos
Pérez Jiménez’s dictatorial government nationalized CANTV, the telephone company. Soon afterward it founded SIDOR, a state-owned steel company, built dams to
generate electricity, and established hotels across the country in hopes of developing
a tourist industry. In addition, the government founded a state-owned petrochemical
company called Instituto Venezolano de Petroquı́mica and set up numerous regional
“development” banks. This formation of state-owned companies was implicitly justified by the apparent success of centrally planned economies such as the Soviet
Union.
Pérez Jiménez’s government was overthrown in 1958, and a democracy with
universal suffrage and freedom of the press was established in 1959. These events are
consistent with the notion that economic freedom and the growth of wealth destabilize dictatorial regimes because citizens, having savored economic freedom, also
want to enjoy political and civil liberties (Barro 1999; Glaeser et al. 2004).
Democratic leaders, however, accelerated Venezuela’s descent into socialism and
mercantilism. Romulo Betancourt was elected in December 1958 and assumed the
presidency in 1959. One of Betancourt’s first decisions as president was to undertake
a land reform aimed at breaking up large landholdings (latifundia). New “owners” of
the redistributed land received titles of use, but not full ownership rights. Betancourt’s government established a central planning office called CORDIPLAN,
adapted to a mixed economy. During his presidency, one of his cabinet members
founded the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The government also created a state-owned oil company called Corporación Venezolana de
Petróleo and barred international oil companies from new concessions. Thus, if these
companies discovered new oil deposits, they were not allowed to extract the oil.
Betancourt devalued the currency, raising the bolivar price of the dollar from
3.30 to 4.50, and implemented exchange controls. He also increased overall government expenditures, especially consumption outlays. His government tripled the income tax rate, raising it from 12 percent to 36 percent, made the tax more complex,
and introduced numerous graduated brackets. Years of successive fiscal deficits made
their first appearance and then became a hallmark of Venezuela’s public finance.
Price controls were generalized. A notable example was rent control, which
wiped out the market for rental dwellings and helped to foster today’s slums. The
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government also limited European immigration, which had been a major source of
innovation and transformation of the Venezuelan economy.
Notwithstanding the serious wounds Betancourt inflicted on the Venezuelan
economy, the following government, headed by Raul Leoni, cemented the importsubstitution policy that ended up increasing the cost of living for Venezuelans and
misallocating resources. Leoni also fortified and augmented the syndicated labor
force. Rafael Caldera, who succeeded Leoni, not only did not reverse his predecessors’
socialist and mercantilist policies, but made the Venezuelan economy even more
inward looking, requiring all private companies to have a majority ownership by
Venezuelans.
In 1974, Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected president. His government, like
Betancourt’s, gave a big push to socialism. The central bank was 51 percent owned by
the government and 49 percent by the private sector. Pérez’s government bought the
privately owned stake and placed several of its cabinet members on the board, wiping
out the bank’s independence.
In addition, Pérez nationalized the oil and iron industries and established new
state-owned companies financed by the high oil prices that resulted from the Arab oil
embargo and the lax U.S. monetary policy. These nationalizations ended the precarious balance that had existed between the civil society and the political society and
marked the commencement of a patrimonial government. In spite of tripled fiscal
revenues owing to oil boom, the government launched into a debt rampage, the
proceeds of which were used to finance government enterprises. Finally, clear signs of
corruption surfaced in the judicial system.
The following government, headed by Luis Herrera, more than doubled external debt and in 1983 devalued the bolivar to more than 7 bolivars per dollar. Devaluation has remained a recurrent policy: today the official exchange rate is 2,150
bolivars per dollar, and in the so-called parallel market the rate hovers around 6,000
bolivars per dollar. Herrera established exchange-rate controls that, not surprisingly,
spawned a substantial amount of corruption, much of which surfaced in the following
government, headed by Jaime Lusinchi, who for the most part continued his predecessors’ socialist and mercantilist economic policies.
In the late 1980s, Venezuelans elected Carlos Andrés Pérez for the second time.
The government signed an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and under the banner of market reforms it continued to devalue the currency. The
rate of inflation never fell below 30 percent. The government also imposed new taxes,
such as the value-added tax, in spite of poorly provided government services and the
government’s ownership of the economy’s commanding heights. Unfortunately, IMF
bureaucrats never would have recommended the better approach of adopting the
value-added tax while reducing or eliminating income taxes and thereby making the
tax reform income neutral.
Although the Pérez government liberated most prices, rent controls remained in
place, and in an inflationary environment the positive impact of eliminating price
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controls is diminished somewhat. Price increases in a noninflationary environment
serve as signals of relative scarcity. With rapid inflation, people have difficulty in
disentangling the relative-price signal within the overall tendency of prices to increase.
The Pérez administration liberated international trade, reducing tariffs unilaterally. However, an environment of great uncertainties, rapid inflation, and high costs
of doing business is not a propitious setting for trade liberation, given the clout of
inefficient entrepreneurs who influence the media and of rival politicians who typically
are not friends of market solutions. In other words, the sequence of reforms is important. Inflation must be tamed, and measures must be taken to reduce the costs of
doing business, allowing economic growth to proceed unhindered. In a stabilized,
growing economy, which goes a long way toward winning popular support for reforms, unilateral trade liberalization may be pursued more successfully.
The Pérez government also sponsored gasoline price increases in an attempt to
bring the price more into line with the cost of production, phasing out the government subsidy. Like trade liberalization, this measure is also a good policy. Nonetheless, under democratic rule a timing issue must be taken into account. Average Venezuelans are reluctant to accept higher prices for gasoline when part of their implicit
contract with the government is that the state owns the oil and, in exchange, impoverished citizens get subsidized gas prices. An increase in gas prices has a better chance
of succeeding politically in an environment of sustained economic growth, where
people perceive better prospects.
To secure the people’s approval of new economic policies, it is important that
reforms induce rapid, sustained growth. The reelections of Alberto Fujimori in Peru,
Carlos Menem in Argentina, and Fernando Cardozo in Brazil were driven by rapid
economic growth and reduced rates of inflation. During the Pérez government in
Venezuela, the economy grew at a healthy pace, but the growth was fueled by high
oil prices (associated with the Gulf War) that financed greater government expenditures. When oil prices fell, growth subsided. Moreover, the beneficial effects of
growth in increasing real wages and economic well-being were substantially offset by
high inflation. Thus, growth under Pérez was not sparked by greater private investment and generally enhanced economic activity in the private sector induced by
brighter economic prospects.
The Pérez government privatized CANTV, the telephone company, and sold
half of VIASA, the airline company, to the government of Spain. However, to exact
a high price for the telephone company, it extended a ten-year monopoly to the new
owners, which kept consumers in the short run from enjoying the benefits of greater
competition. Notwithstanding the monopoly privilege, however, service quality improved substantially. VIASA eventually went bankrupt and was liquidated. Its demise
at least spared Venezuelans from financing 50 percent of the losses.
While Pérez was under house arrest for relatively minor corruption charges, I
visited him with a group of students who knew him. During the interview, I asked his
opinion about a possible privatization of PDVSA, the state owned oil monopoly. He
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answered that such a privatization would be equivalent to his selling his own home.
This personal anecdote illustrates the mindset behind his economic policies: preference for government control and ownership of the economy’s commanding heights,
as opposed to economic growth engendered by private efforts, either national or
foreign.
Needless to say, the IMF’s ill-conceived policies, some owing to content and
others to timing, were very unpopular and helped to disillusion people regarding
market reforms and to engender a constituency for price and interest-rate controls as
well as for a cessation of privatizations. These sentiments played a major role in the
second election of Rafael Caldera, who resumed many kinds of controls. The
economy was on an unsustainable path, and Caldera ended up signing another agreement with the IMF, which was characterized by inflation, devaluation, and a new tax
on bank-related financial transactions.
To summarize the problems afflicting the Venezuelan economy, we may say that
the people’s private-property rights are severely limited. Venezuelans lack the rights to
earn payments in a hard currency, to pay low taxes, to spend their income on the
cheapest goods produced in any part of the world, to convert the fruits of their labor
into any currency they wish, to pursue work and ownership in any activity deemed
legal, to charge as sellers whatever price they consider suitable for goods and services,
to charge as bankers the interest rate of their liking and to extend or deny credit to
anyone as they consider appropriate, to contract freely in the labor market, and to
have their rights safeguarded by a well-functioning judicial system that protects private-property rights and punishes violators of these rights.
In view of these systematic violations of private-property rights, it should not be
surprising that Venezuela became a growth disaster. The economy’s poor performance and the attendant increase in poverty, coupled with the idea that the IMF
recipe is equivalent to capitalism, fostered propitious conditions for the advent of
populist government and for Hugo Chávez’s autocratic tendencies. Chávez easily
won the election in 1998, campaigning against the so-called Punto Fijo Pact that
generated the “corrupt policies of the past forty years.” Projecting the image of an
outsider, Chávez banked politically on the growth disaster and the impoverishment
engendered by the perverse economic policies implemented systematically and most
prominently since 1958. Chávez promised to put an end to these policies under his
government.
Ironically, however, Chávez not only has implemented the same types of perverse policies as his predecessors, but in some instances has exacerbated past policy
mistakes. Inflation, devaluation, price controls, interest-rate controls, exchange-rate
controls, reduced independence of the central bank and of the judiciary, rampant
corruption, impunity, state-owned companies, land reform, complex tax and labor
legislation are all policies not invented by Chávez. Nonetheless, these policies are
ubiquitous under the Chávez government. The Chávez administration has recently
nationalized CANTV, the telephone company, and Electricidad de Caracas, an elec-
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tric-utility company.1 VIASA, the airline company, was liquidated, as previously mentioned, but the Chávez government in effect revived the company by founding a new
airline called CONVIASA.
Chávez has encountered fertile ground for promoting class warfare, given the
rise in poverty and the population’s rational ignorance of economic issues. He attributes the poverty to the capitalist policies of the past, which he describes as savage
neoliberal economic policies. He is extremely charismatic to the low-income people,
and the tail wind of high oil prices has allowed him to redistribute more income to
them and to spur economic growth by increased government expenditures.
A Poverty Trap
Socialism and mercantilism are clearly what ails Venezuela. An unmistakable manifestation of socialism is that the government owns the economy’s commanding
heights—the oil, steel, gas, coal, electricity, and water industries—and that it interferes pervasively in the workings of markets. Obvious expressions of mercantilism are
the prohibitions that common citizens face in their attempts to import sugar, milk,
rice, sorghum, and used cars, among other things, from most countries, including the
United States. New cars, clothes, and shoes, for example, carry a stiff tariff of 35
percent. Antidumping and safeguard laws are typically abused by inefficient entrepreneurs in connivance with government officials. Import quotas are granted to domestic
producers after the internal production has been sold.
Socialism and mercantilism reinforce each other because both destroy free markets. The philosophical tenets of socialism reject free markets as an efficient means of
allocating scarce resources. Mercantilism negates free markets for utilitarian reasons.
Entrepreneurs seek shelter from competition by manipulating the government, whose
officials grant them protection in exchange for private benefits and power. The government extends protection to entrepreneurs to enhance politicians’ control; some
officials see themselves as presiding over an industrial empire. Whether the initial
impetus for protectionism comes from government or from entrepreneurs is unclear,
but the overall consequence is transparent: increases in the cost of living for ordinary
citizens.
Because access to wealth by privileged entrepreneurs under mercantilism is based
on “know who” rather than on “know how,” accumulated riches among the privileged gall the masses, who rightly associate wealth with corruption. The ubiquitous
problem of envy linked to inequality is exacerbated under mercantilism, engendering
undesirable social conflict in which wealth is stigmatized. Further, under mercantilism, the accumulation of wealth typically does not translate into prosperity and enhanced welfare for the people at large. Hence, great potential exists for politicians
such as Chávez to deploy rhetorical weapons against riches and capitalism.
1. This is the second nationalization of CANTV; the first took place in 1950 under the dictatorship of Pérez
Jiménez.
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The interaction of socialism and mercantilism often induces inertial forces that
maintain a perverse status quo. For example, Chávez frequently disparages from a
socialist perspective the George W. Bush government’s initiative on free trade. Many
Venezuelan entrepreneurs take solace from his criticisms because they wish to retain
trade barriers that diminish competition. Similarly, when Chávez vilifies capitalism,
inefficient entrepreneurs take comfort because so long as genuine capitalism is kept at
bay, they will not have to reckon with competition.
Another case of the unholy alliance between socialism and mercantilism is the
alleged tendency for the local currency to become overvalued. Many economists
indicate that the bolivar is overvalued, which is a code word for the desirability of
devaluation—that is, for robbing people of their hard-earned income’s purchasing
power. The government benefits from devaluing the currency because dollars obtained through exports of oil can be exchanged for more bolivars, and noncompetitive
entrepreneurs benefit because of the destruction of competition associated with the
higher prices of imported goods.
Complex taxation, regulation, and labor laws also promote socialistic and mercantilist objectives. Socialists thrive in such complexity under the conviction that
complex rules achieve cosmic justice (Sowell 1999). Well-established, big companies
love such complexity because it serves as a barrier to entry, eliminating potential
competition by smaller companies that cannot survive under convoluted rules. It is
revealing that the leaders of CONINDUSTRIA, a guild of managers and owners in
the Venezuelan industrial sector, typically do not advocate reducing the costs of doing
business in Venezuela. They usually plead for a “competitive currency” and for the
reduction of imports, which are “justified” on the grounds that they create employment.
Direct beneficiaries of socialism and mercantilism are conspicuous Venezuelans
with substantial influence in the media and in the political decision-making process.
Consequently, it is very difficult to extricate the economy from such an impoverishing, self-perpetuating political equilibrium. This condition, I suggest, plagues most
Latin American countries and explains why most economies south of the Rio Grande
remain stagnant or experience only slow economic growth.
Collective-Action Problems
Public institutions are nonrival—that is, they are subject to joint consumption without exhaustion. The benefit of a good judiciary, for example, is a public good that is
not only nonrival, but also nonexcludable. By the same token, the benefits of free
trade, monetary freedom, and simple, low-rate tax laws, among others, are public
goods.
The neoclassical economic explanation for the “underproduction” of such goods
is “market failure,” from which the neoclassical economists infer a need for government intervention. The market fails because consumers cannot carry out collective
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HUGO J. FARIA
action, even though they are the ultimate beneficiaries of the public good (Olson
1977).2
Consumers are beset by problems of group size, free riding, and rational ignorance:
Group Size. Consumers are so numerous that they cannot organize themselves efficiently. They are beset by the same problems that afflict participants in the
prisoner’s dilemma game. It is difficult for them to communicate and to
