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APPLE INC.: MANAGING A GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN1
Ken Mark wrote this case under the supervision of Professor P. Fraser Johnson solely to provide material for class discussion. The
authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised
certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com.
Copyright © 2014, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation
Version: 2017-03-13
INTRODUCTION
Jessica Grant was an analyst with BXE Capital (BXE), a money management firm based in Toronto.2 It
was February 28, 2014, and Grant was discussing her U.S. equity mandate with BXE’s vice-president,
Phillip Duchene. Both Grant and Duchene were trying to identify what changes, if any, they should make
to BXE’s portfolio. “Apple is investing in its next generation of products, potentially the first new major
product lines since Tim Cook took over from Steve Jobs,” she said. Apple Inc., the world’s largest company
by market capitalization, had introduced a series of consumer products during the past dozen years that had
transformed it into the industry leader in consumer devices.
Apple managed a global supply chain with creative development in the United States, outsourced
manufacturing in Asia and components sourced from suppliers around the world. Apple was in the centre
of a complex ecosystem that produced market-leading consumer devices. With $160 billion3 in cash in
February 2014, the company was well-capitalized. Despite its commercial success, Apple’s stock was at
$524.47 on February 28, 2014, 25 per cent below the $700 level it had reached in 2012. Cook reassured
investors that the firm was focused on the future, and it had a solid pipeline of new products. This was his
way of signalling to stakeholders that he would be able to run the firm following the death of Steve Jobs,
one of Apple’s co-founders and the man responsible for rebuilding the firm. “We’re working on some things
that are extensions of things you can see and some that you can’t see,” Cook said at Apple’s annual
shareholders’ meeting on February 28, 2014.4
Industry observers were skeptical that the company could deliver new product successes:
It is unclear whether the spread-sheeting-loving, consensus-oriented, even-keeled Cook can
successfully reshape the cult-like culture that Jobs built. Though Cook has deftly managed the
iPhone and iPad product lines, which continue to deliver enormous profits, Apple has yet to launch
a major new product under Cook; talk of watches and televisions remains just that . . . in the dayto-day at Apple, Cook has established a methodical, no-nonsense style, one that’s as different as
could be from that of his predecessor. Job’s bi-monthly iPhone software meeting, in which he
would go through every planned feature of the company’s flagship product, is gone. “That’s not
Tim’s style at all,” said one person familiar with those meetings. ‘He delegates.’5
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Nevertheless, it was clear to Jessica that Apple’s product range would get more complex in the next few
years. As part of her analysis of Apple’s stock, she wanted to take a look at the company’s supply chain to
see if she could gain some insight into whether to continue with Apple as a key holding in BXE’s fund.
APPLE INC.
Apple Computer was founded on April 1, 1976, by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and Mike Markkula to
manufacture and distribute desktop computers. Both Jobs and Wozniak started tinkering with computing
devices in a time when enthusiasts who wanted a fully functioning computer had to assemble the parts by
themselves from individual components. They struck a deal to sell an initial order of 50 units of their “Apple
I” computer to a local computer shop, and negotiated a 30-day credit term to pay for the parts, effectively
using their suppliers to fund the startup. After selling 200 units of the Apple I, Wozniak improved the design
and showcased the Apple II in April 1977. Needing capital for the next phase of their company, they brought
on Markkula, a marketing manager at Intel who had retired after making millions on his stock options. The
company became the largest private manufacturer of personal computers in the United States and held its
initial public offering in December 1980, thereby creating 300 millionaires.
Although it had a great product, the team at Apple soon found that IBM’s entry into the market in 1981
would change the industry. By 1983, IBM’s personal computer (PC) became the best-selling computer in
the United States, heralding the beginning of its domination of the PC market. Even Apple’s popular 1984
Superbowl commercial,6 combined with a heavy marketing campaign, was not enough to stop IBM’s
growth. Jobs left Apple in 1985. The company stumbled along for the next decade, and even though it
launched a line of Macintosh computers, such as Quadra, Centris and Performa, it failed to gain traction in
the marketplace. Worse, its retail partners, such as CompUSA and Sears, did not devote resources to
displaying its products properly. Apple also suffered from a perception that its machines were more
expensive than comparable Windows PCs. The company had poor operating controls and inventory
management, failing to properly estimate demand for its products and leading to both stock-outs and excess
inventory.7
Apple squandered its goodwill from the 1980s Macintosh era. In 1996, Microsoft was one year into the
launch of Windows 95, which was turning out to be a very popular operating system. Apple’s sales of
Macintosh computers fell dramatically and Apple, in an attempt to reverse the trend, began licensing the
Mac operating systems to third-party manufacturers. From 1993 to 1996, Apple went through three CEOs:
John Sculley, Michael Spindler and Gil Amelio.8
In 1996, Jobs returned to the company as CEO at a time when Apple’s future was in question. Apple’s
market capitalization had fallen from $11.6 billion in 1987 to $3.1 billion at the end of 1996. In 1996, sales
were $9.8 billion. In the early 1990s, Apple had begun licensing its Mac operating system to third-party
manufacturers who would produce their own lines of devices powered by Mac’s operating system. Its
licensing model was similar to that employed by Microsoft, allowing the operating system producer to earn
additional revenues by selling copies to generic computer manufacturers. With the objective of reasserting
control over its product, one of Jobs’ first decisions was to stop licensing Apple’s Mac operating system.
This resulted in a fall in computer unit market share from 10 per cent to 3 per cent. Throughout this time,
Apple continued to manufacture its own devices. In 1997, Jobs announced a partnership with Microsoft
that would see the latter invest $150 million in Apple and release the dominant office software — Microsoft
Office — for Macintosh. At the time of the announcement, Apple’s market capitalization had continued to
fall to $2.5 billion.
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Between 1998 and 2001, Apple launched iMac computers as a line of revamped PCs that focused on design.
The computer body was made from bright colours, such as green, blue and purple. The line sold well and
provided the spark for Apple’s return to prominence. In May 2001, Apple announced that it would be
opening its own retail stores to enable it to educate consumers and to grow its market share. In October
2001, it introduced the iPod portable digital audio player. Supporting the iPod was the iTunes music store,
which was stocked with downloadable songs. At a time when the biggest record labels were worried about
pirated songs being downloaded to MP3 players, Apple negotiated a deal with the five largest labels to be
part of iTunes. The success of the iPod helped to revitalize Apple’s prospects, building a strong financial
base from which the firm could grow.
By 2004, Apple was able to gain better control over its supply chain by working with new suppliers on
proprietary parts for which Apple would provide upfront capital in return for volume commitments and a
lower overall price per unit. Apple’s growing clout allowed it to work with its suppliers to launch a series
of new products containing significant technological advancements, such as iPod Video, iPod Touch and,
by 2007, the iPhone. Concurrently, Apple expanded its retail store base beyond the United States, opening
its first Japanese store in 2003.
From 2007 to 2013, Apple’s success with its music players allowed it to upgrade its iPhone and iPod lineup, introduce new Mac computers and other products such as Apple TV, and develop its application (app)
store, where third party developers listed their apps for consumers to download. In April 2010, Apple
reinvented the tablet computer market by launching its iPad. With its slim design, multi-touch screen and
touch-sensitive keyboard, the iPad was an instant commercial success. For consumers, the iPad was a
portable computer and entertainment device, allowing them to respond to emails, watch videos, play games,
and browse the Internet, among other things. While Apple still used retail partners to distribute its products,
it sold 70 per cent of its products and services directly to consumers and businesses (see Exhibit 1).
Jessica had seen many reviews stating that Apple’s success was due to a combination of design,
functionality, marketing and an ability to modify production to meet spikes in demand. She read an article
about Apple’s launch of its iPhone 5 in September of 2012, including a demonstration of the new phone by
the vice-president of marketing for Apple, Phil Shiller. Nine days away from that product’s official launch,
Apple was confident enough in its just-in-time supply chain that it had not yet begun to ramp up production.
The company had an aggressive schedule to meet as the iPhone 5 eventually sold at a rate of 3.7 million
units per week for the first three months. In addition, it was available in 100 countries from 240 mobile
phone carriers. 9
Intrigued by Apple’s ability to coordinate its supply chain on a real-time basis, Jessica started to dig further
for details of the firm’s operations. She decided to focus on one product, the iPhone, and understand how
Apple managed to bring that product to market.
The iPhone’s Supply Chain
Apple’s iPhone supply chain was global, tying together a research and development base in the United
States, 156 suppliers, assembly operations in China and retail stores, some of which were its own Applebranded stores. Jessica began to trace the path of Apple’s iPhone from inception to delivery to customer.
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New Product Development
Apple’s management team kept a short new product development cycle. Whereas a traditional product
lifecycle – for a new car model, for example – might span four to five years, Apple’s iPhone lifecycle was
closer to one year. Exhibit 2 provides a list of iPhone models since the first version was launched in June
2007, and Exhibit 3 shows iPhone unit sales by the quarter.
The new product development department coordinated a wide variety of stakeholders, including internal
groups, such as hardware, software and production. For example, the industrial design team headed by
senior vice-president, Jony Ive, worked with the production team to ensure that products could be built in
large volumes. Instead of outsourcing its manufacturing to third-party service providers — as in the case of
Samsung10 — Apple preferred to control the entire supply chain internally. 11
Unlike other electronics manufacturers that might outsource the entire production — and management — of
their supply chain to a third-party service provider, such as Solectron or Flextronics, Apple designers worked
in close proximity with suppliers. Quite literally, the designers would often spend “months living out of hotel
rooms in order to be close to suppliers and manufacturers, helping to tweak the industrial processes that
translate prototypes into mass-produced devices.”12
Creative design and engineering was managed in California, where Apple developed new technologies,
acquired licenses for intellectual property and made bolt-on acquisitions of technology firms whose products
could be used in Apple’s ecosystem of products and services. Concurrently, Apple conducted market
research and product-testing to refine the upgrade being considered. Cost data were put together, including
a list of parts and suppliers, and an estimate of what it would cost to assemble the iPhone. Potential quality
defects were identified and plans were drawn up to mitigate risk. In 2013, Apple continued to invest heavily
in research and development (R&D) to ensure that it would have innovative products in its pipeline. R&D
spending was $4.5 billion in 2013, up from $3.4 billion in 2012 and $2.4 billion in 2011.
Apple’s devices — unlike Dell’s — were available in a limited number of configurations, a deliberate
product strategy that allowed its supply chain processes to be streamlined. Apple’s technology competitors
typically had separate R&D departments and separate profit and loss accountability for each product
segment. In contrast, Apple was highly integrated, with centralized R&D and accounting for the entire
company.13
Procurement
Apple products contained key components that were often sourced from a single manufacturer. Because
the different mobile phone firms often used the same components, key parts from a single, popular supplier
were regularly out of stock due to overwhelming demand. To counteract this supply issue, part of Apple’s
procurement strategy was to purchase suppliers’ production capacity in advance in order to ensure the
steady supply of key parts (see Exhibits 4 and 5). In addition, Apple had a program that allowed it to buy
capital equipment for suppliers in exchange for both supply assurance and achieving cost targets.14
As a percentage of the selling price of an iPhone, Apple captured approximately 60 per cent as gross margin,
and suppliers such as LG and Samsung captured another 5 per cent to 7 per cent as revenues (see Exhibit 6
for a breakdown of the distribution of value from the sale of an iPhone). Product demand was forecast 150
days in advance and updates were continually sent to suppliers to allow adjustments in production
schedules. Apple’s procurement team used sales targets to manage production ramp-up issues and place
material purchase commitments, making pre-payments if necessary.15 It reacted to changes in sales
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forecasts by altering the orders, often at a moment’s notice. Depending on forecast demand, Foxconn was
known to wake up its workers – even at midnight – to meet sudden spikes in orders from Apple:
One former executive described how the company relied upon a Chinese factory to revamp iPhone
manufacturing just weeks before the device was due on shelves. Apple had redesigned the iPhone’s
screen at the last minute, forcing an assembly line overhaul. New screens began arriving at the plant
near midnight. A foreman immediately roused 8,000 workers inside the company’s dormitories,
according to the executive. Each employee was given a biscuit and a cup of tea, guided to a
workstation and within half an hour started a 12-hour shift fitting glass screens into beveled frames.
Within 96 hours, the plant was producing over 10,000 iPhones a day. “The speed and flexibility is
breathtaking,” the executive said. “There’s no American plant that can match that.”16
These alterations had an impact on both components and assembly labour requirements. Every quarter, for
its current slate of products, Apple reviewed its inventory levels, adjusted its demand forecast, and
monitored its cost of components. New products in the development pipeline were added to the review as
well.
An analyst estimated that the bill of materials for the iPhone 5 ranged from $199 to $230 for sub-models
that retailed for $649 to $849 (see Exhibit 7). The production of the iPhone began with orders placed to 156
component suppliers around the world. It was normal for Apple to sign exclusivity agreements with key
suppliers. For example, when Ive found a U.S. laser equipment supplier that made $250,000 machines to
cut precision holes, an agreement was signed to secure hundreds of the machines for manufacturing Apple’s
products. According to observers, maintaining control over suppliers was important. Apple’s decision to
manage a “closed ecosystem” enabled it to negotiate large discounts on components. This gave the company
access to flexible manufacturing volume in the event that demand was high, and savings on other supply
chain costs, such as air-freight.17
Apple engineers worked closely with suppliers to update manufacturing processes and technology. For
example, new tooling equipment was designed to cut the MacBook’s unibody shell. Apple’s insistence on
exclusivity and its high volume of purchases meant that competitors often had to wait for key components,
such as screens. “To manufacture the iPad 2,” for example, “Apple bought so many high-end drills to make
the device’s internal casing that other companies’ wait time for the machines stretched from six weeks to
six months, according to a manager at the drillmaker.”18 These delays had a material impact on competitors.
In May 2005, news about Apple ordering DRAM chips sent Samsung’s stock price tumbling in one day,
erasing a staggering $10 billion of the electronics giant’s market cap.19
For suppliers, Apple’s high-volume orders and offers to invest in capital equipment had both benefits and
drawbacks. While suppliers enjoyed profits due to the high volumes ordered by Apple, the latter expected
detailed breakdowns of suppliers’ costs for manufacturing labour, materials and even projected profit.
Suppliers were also expected to keep two weeks of parts inventory in close proximity to assembly plants.
In addition, the cost to carry parts was borne by suppliers as Apple stretched out its payables to as long as
90 days after the parts were used. 20
Apple’s offer to pay for machinery and its firm commitments to future supplier volume were not typical for
the electronics industry, which traditionally preferred to negotiate the lowest possible combination of price
and volume commitments per order. The following is an example of a deal negotiated by Apple with a key
supplier:
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Apple struck a deal with GT Advanced Technologies Inc., a maker of furnace equipment that is
used to produce sapphire materials that cover smartphone lenses and home buttons. Apple received
an exclusivity agreement from GT Advanced for the furnaces in exchange for making a prepayment
of $578 million. GT Advanced said it would pay Apple back over five years starting in 2015. The
deal has “limited our ability to take additional” business, Thomas Gutierrez, GT Advanced’s CEO,
said in a conference call with analysts. GT Advanced said in its announcement that revenue from
the division that includes the kinds of machines Apple is buying will increase to 80 per cent of the
company’s total business, predicted to be $600 million to $800 million, up from 31 per cent
previously.21
To maintain their independence, some suppliers chose to decline Apple’s orders and capital, realizing that
Apple’s negotiating tactics would leave them with slim profits. A major parts manufacturer declined to
commit its manufacturing capacity to Apple’s products, even refusing a $1 billion upfront payment from
Apple. The manufacturer was worried that Apple’s insistence on committed capacity and low prices would
have an impact on sales to its other customers. 22
Product Assembly
Final assembly of the iPhone 5 occurred in China, at Apple subcontractor Hon Hai Precision Industry Co.,
better known as Foxconn, at a cost to Apple of $8 per unit. Foxconn, founded in 1974, was an original
design manufacturer for clients such as Apple, Sony, Nintendo, and BlackBerry. Based in Taiwan, it was
the world’s largest electronics manufacturer with 1.23 million workers in 2012. In 2012, Foxconn generated
$2.7 billion in net income from $4.2 billion in revenues. Foxconn had factories in Asia, Europe, Mexico
and South America. Apple’s competitors, in contrast, tended to outsource production of their smartphones:
In June 2011, it was reported that Nokia outsourced its Windows Phone handset production to Compal
Electronics.1
In December 2013, BlackBerry, in an attempt to turn around its business, outsourced its hardware
production to Foxconn,2
Even Samsung, a large conglomerate, announced in December 2013 that it would be outsourcing the
production of its low-end smartphones.3
Several iPhone components required labour-intensive assembly operations with complex quality control
processes. For example, Apple had run each iPhone camera module through a battery of tests before it could
be inserted into an iPhone. One of the key tasks for subcontractors was coordinating the sourcing and hiring
of the temporary labour used in testing and assembling individual components. For example, for a group of
24 companies with 28 plants in Malaysia that were supplying assembly services to Apple’s component
suppliers, receiving assembly orders meant that they had to focus efforts on hiring thousands of temporary
workers. These firms looked to draw workers from developing Southeast Asian countries such as Indonesia,
Cambodia, Mynamar, Vietnam and Nepal.
When the iPhone 5 forecasts were developed, one of Apple’s top component manufacturers, Flextronics,
put out a call for 1,500 additional temporary workers to assemble a camera component. Labour was hired
1
www.slashgear.com/nokia-outsources-windows-phone-production-to-compal-tip-insiders-24161238/; accessed June 4,
2014.
2
Will Connors, “At BlackBerry, Stock Jumps Despite Big Loss”, The Wall Street Journal Online, December 20, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303773704579269901455159052; accessed June 4, 2014.
3
www.sammobile.com/2013/11/13/samsung-to-outsource-production-of-low-end-devices-focus-its-own-manufacturingplants-on-premium-models/; accessed June 4, 2014.
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via a network of recruiters and subagents, all of which were tasked with finding people on short notice. For
a job that paid approximately $178 per month, temporary workers paid as much as $1,000 in fees — to
recruiters. Flextronics arranged for workers to board scheduled flights from their home countries to
Malaysia, where they were transported to the company compound. Housing was provided, and workers
were expected to work 12-hour shifts per day. Flextronics accounted for the fluctuations in orders by hiring
or terminating temporary workers as needed. In the example cited above, 4,500 temporary workers began
assembling iPhone 5 camera components in October 2012.
But the workers were laid off in mid-January 2013, eliciting comments from the public that they had been
unfairly treated. In response, Apple pointed to its supplier code of conduct, which had clear policies
governing abusive practices such as harassment, involuntary labour and human trafficking.23 Due to
Apple’s just-in-time supply chain, which placed significant responsibility on the shoulders of suppliers,
component delays had an impact on Apple’s inventory projections. Sharp Corp, a supplier of iPhone
displays, notified Apple that its output had fallen behind schedule as it struggled with high costs and debt
servicing obligations.24 Finished components were consolidated at Foxconn’s China factories, where
thousands of workers assembled the components into iPhones.
Aside from the general labour required to test components and assemble devices, another critical advantage
for Apple was that global suppliers provided engineers at a scale that its U.S. suppliers could not match.
Apple’s executives had estimated that about 8,700 industrial engineers were needed to oversee and guide
the 200,000 assembly-line workers eventually involved in manufacturing iPhones. The company’s analysts
forecasted that it would take as long as nine months to find that many qualified engineers in the United
States. In China, it took 15 days.
On the assembly side, managing a huge workforce and keeping to tight schedules was difficult. A Foxconn
factory was closed in Taiyuan, China in September 2012, following a riot among its 2,000 employees. In
the summer of 2013, Foxconn began restricting workers to nine hours of overtime per week.25 To ensure
that secrecy was maintained throughout the assembly process, Apple placed electronic monitors in select
boxes of parts and followed the components remotely — from Cupertino — in case there were leaks.
Logistics
In 1997, Jobs’ return brought Apple a renewed focus on revamping its supply chain management
capabilities. That year, Apple was facing a $1 billion backlog of orders that frustrated the management
team. The firm looked at innovative ways to speed up the supply chain, even using expensive air-freight
when most computer firms were relying exclusively on shipments by sea. In 1998, Jobs even pre-purchased
all available holiday air-freight, paying $50 million to ensure that Apple’s new iMacs could be delivered to
stores for the holiday sales rush. The move had the added benefit of shutting out rivals — such as Compaq
Computer — from using air-freight as a transportation option. In fact, when it came time to ship its new
iPod products in 2001, Apple discovered it was cheaper to ship them directly to consumers from its
suppliers’ assembly plants in China. 26
Apple relied on intermediate warehouses at UPS and Fedex and had its own warehouses in Elk Grove,
California. It had to ensure that its many sales outlets — online stores, retail stores, direct sales force,
wholesalers and retail network — had the product stock they needed according to the demand forecast.
In addition, the company had a reverse logistics system as well, encompassing the management of warranty
claims, trade-ins and Apple’s recycle and reuse program. Managing reverse logistics effectively contributed
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to Apple’s success, both on a cost level and on a customer service experience level. Traditionally, when a
customer sought to return an electronic product, he or she would have to bring it back to the store with a
receipt, and the store would take the item back, issue a refund, then hold the presumably defective item
until it could be delivered back to the manufacturer. In contrast, Apple allowed consumers to enter data
about the defect on the Apple website, adding the unit’s serial number to identify purchase details (including
date of purchase, location and information about the customer).
Within half a day, Apple would send the customer an email indicating if the product was still under warranty
and providing details about how it would be returned. Within 48 hours, a pre-addressed, pre-stamped box
would arrive at the customer’s door-step, sent by express parcel service. A shipping label and a receipt for
the return were both included in the box, along with secure foam packaging and even packaging tape. By
calling a central dispatch number, Apple’s assigned courier — UPS, FedEx or DHL — would come and
pick up the item directly from the customer’s house or office.27
By providing rapid service through its reverse logistics function, Apple improved customer satisfaction,
lowered the number of calls to its technical support services and eliminated the likelihood of customer error
when processing a return (by using an incorrect address, for example). Getting the electronic product back
into Apple’s service depots allowed them to diagnose and return the item to the customer rapidly, or fix the
issue and sell the refurbished product as an “Apple Certified. Good as New” product in its Apple Store.28
Apple’s close management of its logistics system extended to packaging devices in plain boxes to “avoid
detection,” and monitoring “every handoff point — loading dock, airport, truck depot and distribution
center — to make sure each unit was accounted for.”29
Retail Experience
Apple had 424 retail stores in 16 countries around the world. In addition, its online Apple Store was
available in 39 countries. The company’s retail stores were typically located at high-traffic locations in
quality shopping malls and urban shopping districts. By operating its own stores in desirable high-traffic
locations, Apple was positioned to ensure a high-quality buying experience and attract new customers. The
stores were designed to simplify and enhance the presentation and marketing of the company’s products
and related solutions. The retail stores employed experienced and knowledgeable personnel who provided
product advice, service and training and offered a wide selection of third-party hardware, software, other
accessories and peripherals that complemented Apple’s products.
Apple could monitor product sales by store by the hour and it relied on this information to tweak its
production forecasts on a daily basis. According to one article: “If it becomes clear a given part will run
out, teams are deployed and given approval to spend millions of dollars on extra equipment to get around
the bottleneck.”30
The company also invested in programs to enhance reseller sales by placing high-quality Apple fixtures,
merchandising materials and other resources within selected third-party reseller locations. Through the
Apple Premium Reseller Program, certain third-party resellers focused on the Apple platform by providing
a high level of product expertise, integration and support services. A side-by-side comparison of Apple’s
iPhone 5 with devices from key competitors can be found in Exhibit 8.
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Looking Forward
At the end of fiscal year 2013, Apple had $171 billion in sales, with market capitalization of $457 billion.31
There were rumours that Apple was going to announce a stock split, something it had only done three times
in its history: on June 15, 1987, on June 21, 2000 and on February 28, 2005.32
Jessica noticed that Apple continued to invest in its supply chain. At the end of 2013, Apple was investing
$10.5 billion in new technology — including assembly robots and milling machines — to ensure that its
products could be made more quickly and more cost effectively. In fact, Apple’s supply chain was ranked
number one in a list prepared by Gartner Group, an analytics firm (see Exhibit 9). Selected financial
information from three competitors – Samsung, BlackBerry and Nokia – is shown in Exhibit 10. One
observer noted that:
Apple is increasingly striking exclusive machinery deals . . . outspending peers on the tools that it
then places in the factories of its suppliers, many of which are in Asia. ‘Their designs are so unique
that you have to
