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COUC 506
JOURNAL ARTICLE REVIEW ASSIGNMENT INSTRUCTIONS
OVERVIEW
For this Journal Article Review Assignment, you will read one of the articles from the
professional, peer-reviewed journal articles provided in the Learn section of Module 1, Week 1.
You will then write an article review based on your chosen article.
INSTRUCTIONS
Your Journal Article Review Assignment must be approximately 4–5 double-spaced pages
(not including the title and reference pages) and must be created in a Microsoft Word document.
Use the following guidelines to create your Journal Article Review Assignment:
1. Provide a title page in current APA format. Divide your summary into sections with
the following Level One headings: Summary, Interaction, and Application (review the
current APA Manual for guidance on levels of headings if needed). An abstract is not
needed for this assignment. For more information on how the title page should look
according to Liberty University Standards, please reference this website:
https://www.liberty.edu/online/wp-content/uploads/APA-7th-Sample-PaperGraduate.pdf
2. Develop a summary of the main concepts from the article. Do not duplicate the
article’s abstract. If the article describes a research study, include brief statements about
the hypotheses, methods, results, discussion, and implications. If any test measures or
statistical methods used are given in the article, do not provide detailed descriptions of
these. Short direct quotations from the article are acceptable, but avoid long quotations in
a paper this size. This section is the foundation of your Journal Article Review
Assignment (at least a third of your paper). Make sure that you include the core points
from the article, even if it means a longer section.
3. In your own words, interact (in approximately 2 pages) with the article. Appropriate
comments for this part of the Journal Article Review Assignment should include, but
are not limited to: your initial response to the article, comments regarding the study’s
design or methodology (if any), insights you gained from reading the article, your reasons
for being interested in this particular article, any other readings that you may plan to do
based upon having read the article, and other thoughts you have that might further
enhance the discussion of your article. Your subjective comments in this section must be
clearly tied to main points from the article, not peripheral ideas. You are highly
encouraged to consider any other information from previous articles or textbooks you
may have read in previous courses, or in other places you have encountered information
relating to the themes in the article you are reviewing. For example, does the ACA Code
of Ethics have anything to say about the themes being discussed in your journal article?
Are there passages of Scripture that directly relate to the article? Are there ideas and
concepts from previous courses you have taken in your program here at Liberty or
elsewhere that relate to the article you have chosen? You are encouraged to include them,
and make sure you include proper citations and references at the end of your Journal
Page 1 of 2
COUC 506
Article Review Assignment. The best papers from this assignment will be from students
who share other ideas from at least two other academic sources (with proper citations) in
this section, along with Scriptural insight.
4. In your final section (in approximately 1 page) write how you would apply the
information you have learned from this article to a particular counseling situation. This
could be in a church or clinical session. Develop this section as if you are a clinician, or
even a pastor, and your parishioner or client has come to you with a problem—grief,
depression, substance abuse, infidelity, etc.—and is needing your help. Adequately
describe the counseling scenario, including the presenting problem. Draw out concepts
from the article and apply the concepts from this article to the scenario. Show the reader
how you are expressly drawing from the journal article in this application section; be sure
to cite correctly in current APA format.
5. Provide the proper APA formatted citations in this assignment, as well as proper
references on the last page. Make sure that all in-text citations match the references of
your final reference page.
Remember that all papers in this program follow current APA format and are written per APA
Professional (not APA student paper) standards.
Be sure to review Journal Article Review Grading Rubric before beginning this Assignment.
Note: Your assignment will be checked for originality via the Turnitin plagiarism tool.
Page 2 of 2
Copyright 2014 by Rosemead School of Psychology
JOURNAL OF PSYCHOL OG Y & TH EOL OG Y
Biola University, 0091-6471/410-730
2 0 1 4 , V o l . 4 2 , N o . 3 , 26 0 –2 6 8
A Theological and Psychological
Defense of Self-Forgiveness:
Implications for Counseling
Jichan J. Kim and Robert D. Enright
University of Wisconsin-Madison
similar to interpersonal forgiveness directed toward
the self (Luskin, 2002), that is, a willingness to give
up one’s right to resentment (self-resentment in this
case) in the face of injustice (self-offense in this case)
while developing compassion, generosity, and love
toward the self (Enright & the Human Development
Study Group, 1996). Self-forgiveness is also seen as a
series of cognitive changes that gradually diminish selfcondemnation, cease retaliation against the self, and
lead to the offering of benevolence to the self (Hall &
Fincham, 2005). Further, it is seen as a coping strategy particularly dealing with feelings of grief (Jacinto,
2010a; 2010b) and a psychological mechanism of reducing shame and promoting self-esteem (Greene &
Britton, 2012).
In recent years, self-forgiveness as a potential therapeutic tool for helping persons struggling with negative
attitudes toward the self such as guilt, shame, self-anger,
self-condemnation, and self-hatred has attracted more
forgiveness scholars to examine its clinical utility (Hall
& Fincham, 2008; Ross, Hertensein, & Wrobel, 2007;
Wohl, DeShea, & Wahkinney, 2008). Such attempts
are found with cases of domestic violence survivors
(Turnage, Jacinto, & Kirven, 2003), caregivers who
lost those for whom they were caring (Jacinto, 2010a;
2010b), alcohol abusers (Scherer, Worthington,
Hook, & Campana, 2011), women with eating disorders (Watson et al., 2012), and soldiers with complex
trauma and moral injury (Worthington & Langberg,
2012). Despite its promising research as a therapeutic
tool, there have been some scholars concerned about
the legitimacy of self-forgiveness as a viable construct
(see for example, Murphy, 1998; Vitz & Meade, 2011).
The cautionary views on self-forgiveness have been
In the burgeoning literature of forgiveness, self-forgiveness is an aspect that has not received as much attention
as other areas of research on forgiveness. Self-forgiveness
is important in dealing with negative feelings toward the
self when one violates the conscience. However, because
criticisms have emerged against this construct, we attempt
a theological and psychological defense of self-forgiveness
by addressing following four questions: (a) Is self-forgiveness the same as or different from divine forgiveness? (b)
What is the nature of self-forgiveness? (c) Can we rationally address the criticisms of self-forgiveness? (d) How
does self-forgiveness interact with divine and person-toperson forgiveness? After addressing these questions, we
delineate four implications for counselors working with
clients struggling to forgive themselves. Self-forgiveness,
as one form of the virtue of forgiveness, now needs to be
opened up more widely and deeply for more clients, and
their emotional health may be further enhanced by this
experience that frees them from self-condemnation when
guided by a counselor who knows the essence of what selfforgiveness is and is not.
In the philosophical literature, self-forgiveness is
perceived as a form of restoring self-respect (Dillon,
2001; Holmgren, 1998), a necessary part of the process of seeking forgiveness (North, 1998), or even a
moral prerequisite for receiving forgiveness from others (Williston, 2012). In the psychological literature,
self-forgiveness is perceived as one’s healing journey
from estrangement to a sense of arriving at home in the
sense that one is now comfortable with the self (Bauer
et al., 1992). It is generally conceived to be a construct
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Ki m a nd Enright
largely for two reasons: its lack of theological justification (Gassin, 2001; Vitz, 1999; Vitz & Meade, 2011)
and its tendency for narcissistic pseudo self-forgiveness
that occurs when the self-forgiver claims to have forgiven himself without acknowledging his self-offense
and accepting responsibility (Hall & Fincham, 2005).
Interpersonal forgiveness always occurs in the context
of another’s wrongdoing. If a forgiver believes that the
offender did not do anything wrong, forgiveness is not
necessary. Likewise, a self-forgiver must also realize
his self-offense and be willing to accept consequences.
For example, a study with smokers (n = 181) showed
that increased self-forgiveness was found to be associated with decreased motivations for changing smoking
behaviors (Wohl & Thompson, 2011). If smokers in
the study first acknowledged smoking as a self-offense
against them, then they might have responded differently. Thus, genuine self-forgiveness is different from
pseudo-forgiveness in that the former accompanies a
sense of remorse and responsibility for wrongdoing,
self-acceptance without excusing, and reaffirmation
of offended values that result in positive outcomes for
participants (Fisher & Exline, 2006; Wenzel, Woodyatt, & Hedrick, 2012; Woodyatt & Wenzel, 2013).
Given the academic contention surrounding this
construct, we attempt here to resolve the controversies by defending self-forgiveness as a viable option for
those who need it. We reason that self-forgiveness is a
construct similar to person-to-person forgiveness. We
define self-forgiveness as a moral virtue of forgiveness
practiced toward the self, which involves not only giving up one’s negative feelings toward the self but also
offering unconditional love to the self even though the
self-forgiver might not necessarily deserve such love.
In defense of our view of self-forgiveness, we pose and
attempt to answer four questions in this article: (a) Is
self-forgiveness the same as or different from divine
forgiveness? (b) What is the nature of self-forgiveness?
(c) Can we rationally address the criticisms of selfforgiveness? (d) How does self-forgiveness interact
with divine and person-to-person forgiveness? Finally,
we offer practical implications for counselors working
with those struggling to forgive themselves. Let us turn
to the first question.
How Does Self-Forgiveness Differ from Divine
Forgiveness?
When one forgives, the forgiver, without denying
her right to resentment, gives up her right to resentment and offers kindness, compassion, and even love
toward the offender who does not necessarily deserve
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such gifts (Enright, 2001). Forgiveness does not deny
what has happened but clearly recognizes that there is
someone to be blamed for the offense directed toward
another person (Smedes, 1996). Then, it logically follows that there is only one party who can offer forgiveness: the wronged.
When persons forgive an offender, however, they
do not forgive the offender’s sins (distinct from interpersonal offenses) because only God can forgive
sins (Luke 5:21; Johansson, 2011). This distinction
is crucial because in forgiving, both God and humans
offer unconditional forgiving love toward the sinners/
offenders (Romans 5:8; John 13:34–35). In other
words, God draws everyone in love through Jesus
Christ’s work on the cross, and humans in forgiving
other persons attempt to emulate such sacrificial love.
However, God does something more than humans do
in forgiving; God waits for individuals to have faith in
Jesus, returning to Him in remorse and repentance for
the removal of sins and then reconciling (Acts 2:38;
Romans 5:1–11; 2 Corinthians 5:18–21; Colossians
1:19–23; Enright, & the Human Development Study
Group,1991; Erickson, 1998; Grudem, 1995).
Some scholars might argue that repentance is not
necessary for divine forgiveness because it is the recognition of what has been already done by God (See for
example, Volf, 2005). We disagree. First, repentance
is more than being grateful for God’s action. If repentance is something real and meaningful, it must lead to
something—an action by God. Second, God who unconditionally draws sinners in His forgiving love does
not automatically grant universal salvation to all sinners. If this is the case, repentance as the mere recognition of God’s forgiveness has no meaning in salvation.
Instead, we argue that Jesus Christ’s work on the Cross
gives us the offer to be forgiven, not the action of being forgiven of sins. Sinners recognize the action of the
Cross that has already taken place, but they still need
to respond with the action of repentance that leads to
the action of God’s forgiveness of sins.
Therefore, in divine forgiving, unconditional offering of forgiveness of sins and conditional reconciliation preceded by removing of sins are not the same
because the latter requires that persons have faith in
Jesus and return to Him in remorse and repentance.
Perhaps, this distinction is confusing for some because
God, who freely offers forgiveness of sins based on His
unconditional love, has a clear purpose of canceling the
sins of those who would return to Him and then reconciling with those whose sins are removed. However,
it is clear that in human forgiving, the cancelation/re-
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moval of sins that leads to reconciliation between God
and humans is not part of what forgivers do when forgiving other persons.
Then, in the case of self-forgiveness, is the person
forgiving his own sins? The principle of forgiveness
should not be altered for self-forgiveness. Self-forgiveness is for the wrong done against oneself (the violation
of one’s own moral standards—namely conscience),
and God alone forgives sins against Him. Therefore,
when a person feels guilty and shameful (the evidence
for one’s sense of justice violated), the person can seek
emotional healing by deciding to pursue the journey
of self-forgiveness by offering unconditional forgiving love toward the self. Yet, because persons do not
forgive sins, the person still needs Jesus Christ for the
removal of sins.
In answer to our first question, self-forgiveness, as
in person-to-person forgiveness, mirrors God’s forgiveness only in one way, that of offering unconditional
love to another, and the major difference between selfforgiveness and divine forgiveness lies in that only God
can forgive sins. We now turn to our second question.
What Is the Nature of Self-Forgiveness?
Some have made the claim that self-forgiveness is
an act of judgment toward the self (see Gassin, 2001;
Vitz & Meade, 2011). As an act of judgment, self-forgiveness would be an irrational act precisely because
from a theological perspective God is the Judge of our
sins and we cannot be (Matthew 7:1–5; 1 Corinthians
4:4). Therefore, to claim that we judge our own sinfulness would be to contradict who we are and who
God is. Yet, as we stated above, only God forgives
sins. Does this then deny the premise that when we
self-forgive we are judges of ourselves? Perhaps we are
still judging not our sins but our moral character; we
are making judgments of our moral turpitude (1 Corinthians 11:31). We have a built-in measure—our
conscience—that we often depend on when evaluating others and ourselves. We are not the judge of our
sins, but however imperfect, we are still a judge for our
moral standards (which might or might not be congruent with God’s standards). Even if this were the case,
this could not be the entire story of what self-forgiveness is because if it is a moral virtue it is not only about
judgments. Even justice, which is directly concerned
with moral right and wrong, does not stop at the point
of making a judgment. It goes further and tries to right
wrongs (Matthew 7:5). There is action that accompanies cognition, in this case, the judgment of right and
wrong.
To this point, self-forgiveness appears to be of such
quality that people who self-forgive make moral judgments about themselves. What else are they doing?
What else constitutes the construct of self-forgiveness?
To answer this question, let us turn to person-toperson forgiveness for some clues. Person-to-person
forgiveness is generally seen as a moral virtue by both
philosophers and psychologists (North, 1987; Holmgren, 1993; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000). As a
moral virtue, which is a sense of goodness that first develops within oneself and then flows to others for their
good, forgiveness is always and without exception unconditional (Holmgren, 1993; Simon, 1986). It is unconditional because all other moral virtues (such as justice, kindness, respect, and love) can be expressed prior
to any condition set up by another. Self-forgiveness as a
moral virtue is a response of unconditional love to the
self when one breaks one’s own standards, thus offending the self.
A moral virtue can be practiced toward the self.
One can be kind to oneself regardless of how others
treat him or her. One can be patient, merciful, and
just to oneself without any prior condition. If forgiveness is a moral virtue, as are kindness, patience, mercy,
and justice, why does forgiveness have to be the grand
exception and be applied differently? Is it not cruel
if one is not allowed to love oneself because he or she
violated his sense of justice by breaking his or her own
moral standards? Does not loving others “as we love
ourselves” imply that loving ourselves is a valid objective and practice in loving relationships with others
(Leviticus 19:18; Matthew 22:39)? How can we try to
love our enemies if we are not allowed to love ourselves
(Matthew 5:44)? If we can love ourselves only when we
are lovable then it contradicts the very core of forgiveness, that is, unconditional love.
As a moral virtue, however, forgiveness does not
work alone; it should work side by side with other virtues such as patience, kindness, love, and even justice.
Love is never practiced in isolation of patience and
kindness. To seek justice without harboring resentment, one needs to be forgiving. Likewise, forgiving
oneself is one thing, and seeking justice by taking responsibility is another, but they are not practiced in
isolation of each other. Thus, genuine self-forgiveness
should lead to responsibility acceptance (Wenzel,
Woodyatt, & Hedrick, 2012; Woodyatt & Wenzel,
2013) and might even make it necessary to receive or
ask for forgiveness from others and from God (Enright
and the Human Development Study Group, 1996;
Worthington, 2013).
Ki m a nd Enright
As a final point regarding the essence of self-forgiveness, we turn to the theme of reconciliation. Divine
forgiveness of sins has a dual nature as we have examined above: (a) unconditionally drawing humanity in
love through the Cross of Christ and (b) conditionally removing sins from those who have faith in Jesus
and return to Him in remorse and repentance that
leads to reconciliation with God. Reconciliation in human relationships, on the other hand, requires restoring trust between the offending and offended parties
(Worthington, 2003). It requires efforts from both
parties because it is a mutual action rather than a moral
virtue. If the offender is deemed dangerous, reconciliation is not likely because the person is not yet trustworthy. If the offender is deceased, reconciliation is not
possible because the person is not available to join in
the mutual action of reconciliation.
In conjunction with divine forgiveness and in contrast to person-to-person forgiveness, self-forgiveness
may lead to a sense of self-reconciliation between the
self-forgiver and the self-offender (Enright and the
Human Development Study Group, 1996). We say
that self-reconciliation is necessary in self-forgiveness
because unless a person receives his own love to the self
and intends to behaviorally change accordingly (similar to the process of restoring trust in person-to-person
reconciliation), it is evident that he has not fully offered nor received the moral gift of re-established selflove (in its proper use of that term; we are not implying narcissism here). Here, we are not saying that the
offer of self-forgiveness is conditional; instead, we are
pointing out a distinction in self-forgiveness that the
offender is the self who also needs to receive his offer
of forgiveness toward the self, thus, leading to self-reconciliation. In other words, self-reconciliation is conditional (you receive your offer of self-forgiveness to
the self and then you have to restore your trust in you)
while self-forgiveness is not. This means that some necessary changes from the self-forgiver are expected as
evidence of receiving self-forgiveness.
Can We Rationally Address the Criticisms
of Self-Forgiveness?
Now that we have explicated the construct of selfforgiveness, let us address the criticisms of it as a viable
construct. There are five criticisms to be addressed.
The first criticism is that we cannot be the defendant and the judge/jury over our own moral failings
(Vitz & Meade, 2011). Yet, this criticism appears to be
a confusion of the essence of self-forgiveness. As shown
above, when we self-forgive we do not judge our sins.
263
Only God does that. We do judge the rightness and
wrongness of our actions and so perhaps the criticism
seems valid in this context. We, however, think not,
because to self-forgive is not in the context of jurisprudence. It instead is the exercise of a moral virtue, apart
from a judiciary hearing toward the self. As one judges
the self, one then loves the self over time through a process not unlike that of forgiving others (Enright and
the Human Development Study Group, 1996).
The second criticism falls into the category of condonation of one’s own imperfections. These kinds of
questions can ensue: Is it not too narcissistic to forgive oneself? Where is goodness in self-forgiveness if
it just lets people off the hook? It must be made clear
that pseudo-forgiveness is not forgiveness at all. When
we forgive, we do not condone, excuse, pardon, or
justify what has happened that wronged us (Smedes,
1984; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000). Instead, we are
to clearly recognize what has been done that deeply
hurt us. Thus, assessing what has been done and uncovering the corollary anger are required in the process
of forgiveness prior to making a decision to forgive
(Fitzgibbons, 1998; North, 1998). Likewise, when we
forgive ourselves, we do the same—we have to clearly
recognize what we have done wrong and how we violated our sense of justice (which may or may not involve God or others). Yet, self-forgiveness as a moral
virtue should not just stop there because forgiveness is
more than ceasing to be angry or tolerating any injustice (Enright, 2001; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000). Responsibility acceptance and necessary steps to right the
wrong should ensue because the self-forgiver is offering love to the self, not without justice, but in spite of
the self-offense that first invited him to the journey of
self-forgiveness (Fisher & Exline, 2006; Worthington,
2013). Self-forgiveness then remains a moral virtue because something good is expressed toward the self and
possibly toward others as a result of acknowledging
one’s own self-worth as someone to be unconditionally
loved.
A third category of objection to self-forgiveness is
this: It is possible that the sources of one’s own moral
standards might be problematic (Vitz & Meade, 2011).
The sources might be unhealthy because of abusive, authoritarian relationships, for example. In other words,
the conscience is malformed and cannot adequately
discern moral injury when it occurs. As a result of
moral trauma against the person, the standards might
be unrealistically too high. One’s pride or psychological defense against failure might be also contributing
to the high standards (Worthington, 2013). Whether
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under-recognizing wrong or being overly sensitive to
perceived wrong, it is necessary to remember that forgiveness is not justifying or excusing on the one hand,
nor is it condemning others (or the self) on the other
hand (Enright, 2001; Enright & Fitzgibbons, 2000).
We must remember that defects of conscience are
not the problem of forgiveness, nor does it mean that
they can stop us from practicing forgiveness, whether
toward others or the self. Instead, forgiveness that begins with an attempt to objectively recognize what has
happened might assist the self-forgiver in seeing more
clearly his wrongdoing for which he is reasonably responsible. One is anticipated to have a healthy or at
least reasonable conscience for either kind of expression of forgiveness, and so this discussion may be beyond the scope of this article.
A fourth criticism takes this form: When we violate
our own moral standards, what we need is the forgiveness of sins from God. When we have residual negative
feelings after confessing our sins and receiving forgiveness from God, those feelings are a symptom of our not
fully accepting divine forgiveness (Gassin, 2001). We
think this is an excellent point and one which psychologists should take seriously when working with faithbased clients. At the same time, this view does not seem
to capture the entire cause of the inner discontent. To
put our counter point simply, we are a person as God
is a person. Therefore, there are at least two persons
who have been offended by the sin that involves one’s
moral injury (the offender and God). When a person
has reconciled with God, he may not have done so yet
with that other person, the self. Self-forgiveness, then,
makes possible this necessary reconciliation with the
self, which as we have seen is part of the construct of
self-forgiveness.
A final criticism is that self-forgiveness is not a
moral virtue but instead is an act of self-acceptance
(Vitz & Meade, 2011). Worthington (2013) states
that self-acceptance is acknowledging who we are as
flawed but precious. Our high expectations of ourselves might get in the way of accepting who we are—
our failure and values. Accepting ourselves, including
those of us who need to forgive ourselves, as precious
in the eyes of God is crucial; thus, we are not arguing
against the idea of self-acceptance itself. Instead, we
argue that self-forgiveness is not the same as, as some
seem to argue, but instead is more than self-acceptance.
Self-acceptance is a psychological construct because
acceptance can be accomplished without any moral
qualities such as respect or love. Acceptance can be
morally neutral and therefore passive from a moral per-
spective. Is self-forgiveness of this quality? We think
not because we have to once again fall back onto the
essence of what self-forgiveness is. We can once again
rely on what person-to-person forgiveness is for some
clues. Person-to-person forgiveness is a form of unconditional love and thus is always a gift—meaning
not based on our own merit. Then, when we forgive
ourselves, we do more than passively accept ourselves
(Smedes, 1996).
Rather than being somewhat morally docile, as acceptance can be, we give the gift of love to ourselves
in an active sense as someone unconditionally loved
despite our wrongdoing. Self-forgiveness can allow
us to flourish, focus on God and others, increase our
health, and experience better quality of life and peace
(Worthington, 2013). For example, in the Freedman
and Enright (1996) research with incest survivors,
once the women forgave, they became quite active in
a self-loving and an other-loving sense. One woman,
once she shed her depression, ended up taking her
dream job outside of the city in which she was living.
Another fed her dying father in the hospital and began
to love him and herself to a greater degree. They were
showing more than a passive acceptance of themselves.
We do see the place of self-acceptance in self-forgiveness. A theological way to perceive self-acceptance
in the context of self-forgiveness might be that the
self-forgiver accepts—different from accepting what
has happened or accepting who she is as the selfoffended—the unconditional forgiving love offered
to her based on the unceasing love of God. Yes, we
need to acknowledge that we are flawed but precious
(Worthington, 2013). This seems to be in line with
Cooper’s (2003) recognition that self-acceptance is
something to be encouraged by God’s grace when our
underlying insecurity leads us to self-contempt and
pride. These are excellent points about self-acceptance.
However, this does not mean that all of self-forgiveness
(a specific response to a moral injury) is contained in
this action of accepting God’s forgiveness. Our point
here is that acceptance, as an important entity itself,
does not encompass the whole of what we mean by
self-forgiveness that specifically deals with our own
moral injury.
In addressing our questions in this section the answer is yes—we can counter each criticism of self-forgiveness in a rational way. We are not our own judge
and jury when we self-forgive. We do not condone
our own actions. We are not prohibited from making
determinations of right and wrong toward our own
behavior because we do have consciences. If one experi-
Ki m a nd Enright
ences the accident (to use an Aristotelian word to signify that this does not typify the prototype of humanity) of a deformed conscience, this does not invalidate
the general observation that we all have consciences
and therefore can assess whether to forgive ourselves.
In self-forgiveness, we do not forgive our sins; thus,
self-forgiveness does not make it unnecessary to seek
God for the forgiveness of sins. Finally, self-acceptance
cannot replace the construct of self-forgiveness. Otherwise, we are left with the philosophical conundrum
of not being able to offer to the self other moral virtues such as kindness, self-respect, and the Biblically
exhorted virtue to love oneself.
How Does Self-Forgiveness Interact with Divine
and Person-to-Person Forgiveness?
Divine, self-, and person-to-person forgiveness, as
distinct as they are, do not occur exclusive of one another. Several scholars have noted that self-forgiveness
should be practiced alongside divine forgiveness because some people, even after sincerely repenting of
their sins, might continue to experience residual feelings of guilt and shame (Enright and the Human Development Study Group, 1996; Worthington, 2003).
One such example is found in the case of postabortion
men who, after feeling confident that God had forgiven them, continued to struggle with self-condemnation (Coyle, 1999; Coyle & Enright, 1997). Such
a discussion seems to assume that divine forgiveness
comes first and then people, who so choose, engage
in self-forgiveness. Is this the proper sequence from a
theological and a psychological perspective?
To answer this question, we have to remind ourselves that divine forgiveness of sins and human forgiveness are not identical. Thus, there are at least two
distinct persons involved in each kind of forgiveness
as pointed out earlier: God for divine forgiveness and
the self-forgiver for self-forgiveness. Then, it seems
logical to conclude that self- and divine forgiveness
do not occur simultaneously (as one entity), nor does
one of them always occur prior to the other. Instead,
they should be viewed as occurring with different paces
while facilitating the process of each other. In a recent
study, it was shown that one’s sense of receiving divine
forgiveness facilitated the process of self-forgiveness
(McConnell & Dixon, 2012). Therefore, for some, a
sense of receiving divine forgiveness might allow them
to forgive themselves (and seek forgiveness from others when possible). Yet, it is also feasible that for others, a sense of unconditional love toward the self that
came first might awaken them to seek divine forgive-
265
ness from God, who availed such love in the first place.
This distinction is important because as a moral virtue,
forgiveness can be practiced toward the self even if the
person has not yet cultivated a sense of faith.
Regarding the interplay of self- and person-toperson forgiveness, by the same log
