Description
This first assignment is a short position paper. You are given two readings from the publication Great Decisions. The readings for this assignment deal with China and the United States. Your objectives are as follows: A. You will evaluate sources with events or topics of the modern world for this paper. B. You assess 21st Century world events and link them to the past – historically, culturally, economically and politically. This assignment has two parts, and you will need to access the APUS library for two scholarly/academic articles for the second part of your position paper.
For this position paper, the information you will be reading comes from one author David Lampton. Mr. Lampton wrote about China in two (2) separate periods. you will discuss China and the United States. The articles, which are attached below in PDF are:
“China Looks at the World, The World Looks at China” by David Lampton, 2010.
“China and America” by David Lampton, 2018.
Please make sure you read the directions and paper mechanics below, they are your guides to this assignment.
Directions are as follows:
Once you have finished reading the articles, you have two sections you need to complete. In the first section of your paper, in two (2) pages, you will answer the following question based upon your reading of the articles: How has the relationship changed overtime between the United States and China? For the second half of your paper, in two pages, (2), you will take a stand/position. You will need to answer this question: Who emerges as the most powerful economically and militarily over the next decade – China or the United States? Explain. In short, you are taking a stand and defending it in the second half of this paper.
It is important that you back up your position with two (2) scholarly/academic sources from the APUS library. You will be graded based upon the rubric that is in the assignment section. Please make sure you use the rubric as your guidance.
Assignment Paper Mechanics Instructions:
Your essay should be at least four double-spaced pages of text (Times New Roman, font size 12). You will need a cover page and a bibliography. Your paper must be written in a Word Document. You must consult a minimum of two scholarly/academically credible sources from the university library. This means not only are you reading the two articles I have given you, but you will also seek out two scholarly/academic articles to back up your stand on this issue. Your bibliography and citations may be in APA, MLA, or Chicago Style format based upon the formatting used in your degree field. Your formats need to be in order.
If you use any of the information from your sources word-for-word, you must cite the source by using endnotes, footnotes, or parenthetical citations. If you read the information and write it in your own words and it is not common knowledge, you must cite the source because you are paraphrasing someone’s information. Why? This is paraphrasing. You are using someone’s information. This is plagiarism.
So, to rehash one more time, your essay will include the following:
A cover page with your name, course number and course title, instructor’s name, and date. (disregard, I’ll edit this myself)
Four to five (4-5) pages of writing.
A bibliography, formatted correctly, at the end of your paper.
Total count of your paper including cover page and bibliography will be six to seven (6-7) pages.
While composing your paper, use proper English. Do not use abbreviations, contractions, passive voice, or first/ second person (I, you, we, our, etc). You need to submit your paper in a Word document.
The APUS library is full of resources to assist you.
To help you research Population, access the following link.
Research @ APUS
To help you with writing your paper, access the following link
Writing @ APUS
If you have any questions dealing with this assignment, please ask. I’ve attached everything you should need, let me know if you have questions. Thank You!
Unformatted Attachment Preview
Foreign Policy Association
China and America
Author(s): David M. Lampton
Source: Great Decisions , 2018, (2018), pp. 35-46
Published by: Foreign Policy Association
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26593695
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to Great Decisions
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3
China and America:
the new geopolitical equation
by David M. Lampton
Xi, Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive
for the Great Success of Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”
The Great Hall of the People of Beijing,
October 18, 2017. Available free online:
.
In this speech, delivered to over 2,000
Communist Party members at the 19th
Party Congress, Chinese President Xi Jinping lays out plans for Chinese economic
and political development by 2050.
U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands at a joint news conference held after their meeting in
Beijing on November 9, 2017. (ARTYOM IVANOV/TASS/GETTY IMAGES)
T
he U.S. and China were on an increasingly frictionladen path even before China’s President Xi Jinping
took office five years ago. Problems have grown
since. Developments following the inauguration of U.S.
President Donald Trump have compounded uncertainties
and risks, though two presidential summits in 2017 had a patina of cooperation. For the last decade and a half, China has
implemented an expansive strategy of economic outreach
and growth of national capacities, including of military and
diplomatic power. What are the challenges and opportunities
for the U.S. in its relations with China? What can be done to
improve prospects for productively managing differences,
as the tectonic plates of global power shift?
During the 71 years spanning 1945–2016, the U.S. used
its dominant economic, military and ideological power,
along with that of its allies, to conceive of, build and support
global institutions, alliances and regimes that have contributed to international growth and tolerable peace. Ironically,
in so doing, the U.S. fostered the emergence of other power
centers. Predictably, these increasingly capable countries
now have growing ambitions and ability to pursue their
interests. China is notable in this regard as a geopolitical,
economic and security competitor with whom the U.S. will
increasingly have to negotiate cooperation. Still, Beijing is
not Washington’s biggest threat, and there are many potential
gains to be had from collaboration.
DAVID M. LAMPTON is Hyman Professor and Director of
China Studies at Johns Hopkins University—SAIS in Washington, DC. He is current Chairman of The Asia Foundation,
and past President of the National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, and his most recent book is: Following the Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (University of California Press, 2014). With two colleagues, he
is writing a book on Beijing’s railway building effort aimed
at connecting southern China to Southeast Asia. The views
expressed are his own and he wishes to thank Jill Huang and
Ji Zhaojin for their research assistance.
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!
G R E A T
Power is relative, not absolute. In
2013, China’s global share of gross domestic product (GDP) exceeded that of
the U.S. for the first time, as measured
by the World Bank. As late as 1990, the
U.S. could act more unilaterally than it
can today. At that time, it commanded
almost 21% of global GDP, compared
to today’s approximately 15.5%; China, by contrast, possessed less than 4%
of global GDP compared to today’s
nearly 18% and growing.
External perceptions of power and
strength are also germane, particularly
in periods of crisis and transition. A
spring 2017 poll by the Pew Research
Center found that although more countries globally still name the U.S. as “the
world’s leading economic power” over
China, the gap is narrowing. Meanwhile, perceptions of U.S. economic
power have declined among most key
allies and trading partners, and a majority of EU countries surveyed put the
U.S. in second place after China. Australians believed that “China leads the
U.S. by a two-to-one margin.”
After years of protracted and costly entanglements all over the world,
there is evidently a dwindling supply
of political will in the U.S. for a global
leadership role. Nonetheless, the U.S.
possesses unique strengths, potential
and resilience that many Chinese populists and nationalists underestimate.
Considering the U.S.’s modestly sized
population (about 323 million, compared to China’s nearly 1.4 billion),
the country controls a remarkably outsized share of global GDP. In per capita
GDP terms (reflecting standard of living for average citizens) the U.S. leads
China by a very considerable margin.
Moreover, as Arthur Kroeber, managing director of the global economic
research firm Gavekal Dragonomics,
points out, “In terms of [technology]
licensing value…the U.S. tech sector
is 60 times stronger than China’s.”
Before you read, download the companion Glossary that includes definitions
and a guide to acronyms and abbreviations
used in the article. Go to www.great
decisions.org and select a topic in the
Resources section on the right-hand side
of the page.
D E C I S I O N S
2 0 1 8
China vs. US Percentage of Global GDP
US share of GDP
20%
SHARE OF GLOBAL GDP* (IN TRILLIONS US DOLLARS)
3
2016:
17.83%
15%
2016:
15.46%
10%
2016 World GDP:
$120.139 trillion
5%
China share of GDP
0%
’90
’92
’94
’96
’98
’00
’02
’04
’06
’08
’10
’12
’14
’16
YEARS
SOURCE: World Bank, International Comparison Program database
The image of China as an unstoppable
leviathan is overstated, and Beijing’s
leaders run the risk of overestimating
their own strength. Security anxieties
among China’s neighbors, engendered
by Beijing’s growing power, further
diminish the country’s economic in-
*as measured in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
fluence. Washington’s challenge now
is to maintain its power share and play
its cards shrewdly. The wisest path
forward is for both countries to negotiate cooperation. The first step for
the U.S. is to get its domestic house
in order.
The state of play in Washington
S
oon after taking office in January
2017, President Trump backed
off several elements of his campaign
rhetoric, at least temporarily, including: protectionism expressed as threats
of dramatic tariff hikes; an inclination
to alter the long-standing “One China”
policy, by which the U.S. recognizes
Beijing as the official government of
China, rather than Taiwan’s government, over which Beijing claims sovereignty; and impulses toward conflict
in the South China Sea, where regional
states maintain competing territorial claims. In addition, though Trump
continues to call for greater security
contributions from U.S. allies, he has
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conveyed reassurances to partners that
Washington still values its alliances, in
particular the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The first summit between President
Trump and President Xi was held in
April 2017 at Trump’s private Mar-aLago resort in Florida. The two leaders rejiggered the Barack Obama-era
(2009–17) Strategic and Economic
Dialogue by agreeing to establish four
parallel consultation mechanisms focusing on core economic, diplomatic,
security, cyber, and cultural and human rights frictions. A 100-day negotiation period was initiated to address
economic disputes in finance and trade
C H I N A
under the framework of the U.S.-China
Comprehensive Economic Dialogue,
and the presidents made efforts to
establish personal rapport and direct
communication.
There were less positive developments as well. Trump’s withdrawal from
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (the
massive trade pact negotiations between the U.S. and 11 other Pacific Rim
countries) three days after being sworn
into office, and his stated intention to
withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, frayed the U.S.’s mantle as leader
on international institution-building
and interdependence issues. Washington’s partners in the TPP negotiations,
notably Japan, were left high and dry,
having made domestically painful
concessions to meet U.S. demands
that Washington then scuttled. Japan’s
Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (2006–07;
2012–present) soon sought to resurrect
the TPP without Washington, and major
progress in this direction was made in a
meeting of trade ministers in November
2017 in Danang, Vietnam, at which the
U.S. was not represented. In Germany,
Chancellor Angela Merkel (2005–present) has sought to forge trade and other
relationships not based in U.S. centrality. In May 2017, following a Group of
Seven (G-7) summit, Merkel told one
audience that: “The era in which we
[Europeans] could fully rely on others
is over to some extent.”
In short, abundant chances to enhance China’s international leadership
have fallen into Beijing’s lap. President
Xi has already moved into the void to
champion economic globalization and
ecological responsibility. This was evident in a headline-grabbing speech at
the World Economic Forum in January
2017, in which he emphasized commitment to “growing an open global
economy,” and noted that “no one will
emerge as a winner in a trade war.” In
his lengthy speech to China’s 19th National Party Congress of the Communist
Party (hereafter, the Party Congress)
in October, he reaffirmed dedication
to environmental issues and a model
of sustainable development guided by
“harmonious co-existence between man
and nature.”
A N D
A M E R I C A
The North
Korea problem
When he left office in January 2017,
President Obama told President-elect
Trump that the most pressing national
security challenge he would face would
be North Korea’s efforts to advance its
nuclear and missile programs and to
threaten Asia-Pacific allies, U.S. regional bases and even the continental
U.S. Moreover, this effort could energize a new round of nuclear proliferation in Asia, perhaps featuring the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan
and South Korea. This would multiply
the number of such weapons, foster an
arms race and compound instabilities.
Pyongyang’s nuclear effort became
highly visible during the Bill Clinton
administration (1993–2001), continued
through the George W. Bush (2001–09)
and Obama periods, and landed in the
lap of President Trump. Not even a
year into Trump’s presidency, North
Korea has already tested missiles over
Japan and conducted its sixth nuclear
test, in September 2017. Over the last
two decades, there has been an unceasing stream of conferences, multilateral
sanctions, interim deals, threats and
joint military exercises involving various countries, but none of these efforts,
including periodic shows of disapproval from Beijing, have deflected North
Korea from its chosen course. The ruling Kim dynasty has demonstrated an
unshakeable commitment to acquiring
weapons of mass destruction, believing
that this is its “insurance policy” against
forcible removal from power. There
have been occasional glimmers of hope
that some formula for denuclearization
might be found and faithfully implemented, but these efforts have failed
to get off the figurative launch pad, or
have blown up shortly after lift-off.
President Trump has communicated
that he believes his White House predecessors were right to press Beijing to
ramp up pressure on North Korea, and
correct in their assessment that Beijing
had sufficient means to do so. However, Trump also came into office feeling
strongly that past administrations had
not taken a sufficiently transactional approach with Beijing. He therefore suggested that Washington would give Beijing concessions in other areas—trade
and Taiwan among them—in exchange
for cooperation on North Korea. In one
post on the social media platform Twitter, he wrote: “The United States is considering, in addition to other options,
stopping all trade with any country doing business with North Korea.”
Presidents Trump and Xi initially
labored to reach economic accommodations and cooperate on North Korean
(AMMER/WIENER ZEITUNG/VIENNA, AUSTRIA)
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3
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denuclearization, but the burden of
accumulating frictions soon weighed
more heavily. In June 2017, Washington sold Taiwan weapons and equipment valued at $1.4 billion. The U.S.
Department of State’s 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report “downgraded”
China (in human rights terms) and
the U.S. slapped secondary economic
sanctions on Chinese trading and certain financial entities (and individuals)
for directly or indirectly aiding North
Korean weapons programs. China’s
ambassador to the U.S., Cui Tiankai,
responded: “[Attempts] to create leverage against China on the Korean
nuclear issue by challenging China on
Taiwan and the South China Sea are
equally destructive.” The ambassador
went on to say that “secondary sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Chinese
entities and individuals according to
U.S. domestic laws are also not acceptable.” In both Congress and the
executive branch, moves were made
and are now underway to subject Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in
the U.S. to more scrutiny, to constrain
technology flows to China and to fight
forced technology transfer provisions
imposed on U.S. firms seeking market
access in China. The White House has
called on the U.S. Trade Representative to “investigate” China’s practices
in these regards. In August 2017, more
secondary sanctions were imposed on
Beijing with respect to North Korea.
In early September, the United Nations (UN) Security Council (UNSC)
imposed additional sanctions on North
Korea with the backing of China and
Russia, though they watered down U.S.
proposals before agreeing.
One reason for this seesaw in relations with Beijing is that the Trump
administration effectively attempted
to outsource its North Korea policy
to China. The fundamental obstacle
to this approach remains that China
opposes actions that would destabilize, much less topple, the regime in
Pyongyang. Beijing has consistently
shown that two principles govern its
North Korea policy. First, it opposes North Korea becoming a nuclear
weapons-capable country. Second,
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2 0 1 8
it will not put sufficient pressure on
Pyongyang to risk North Korea’s collapse. Beijing does not want unrest in
North Korea spilling into northeast
China. It wants a buffer state between
itself and South Korea (and U.S. forces there), and leverage over Washington. Successive Chinese leaders have
adhered to these priorities despite
periodic slaps in the face by the Kim
dynasty. Beijing sustained this posture
during the November 2017 Trump-Xi
summit: Vice Foreign Minister Zheng
Zeguang told reporters that China
wanted to “maintain [note: not increase] pressure regarding the nuclear
activities” of North Korea and “promote peaceful resolution of the issue
through dialogue and negotiation.”
While Beijing did in fact interrupt
North Korean currency-earning coal
exports to China in the first quarter of
2017, its overall trade with Pyongyang
grew 37.4% over the same period in
2016. Though Beijing joined the other
four members of the UNSC in imposing new sanctions, it carefully avoided
affecting its ongoing deals and exports
to Pyongyang. China’s northeastern
provinces have interests in North Korea and resist shutting down their trade
there. Shipping through Hong Kong to
North Korea continues to be an important hole in the sanctions dike.
In short, China is doing just enough
to avoid rupture with Washington,
without doing so much as to endanger
North Korea’s survival. With the limits
to China’s will and capacity to change
North Korea’s behavior revealed, what
will the White House do? What happens if Beijing comes to be seen by
Washington as proactively undermining U.S. efforts?
In a remarkable June 2017 tweet,
the U.S. president conceded that depending on China to bring North Korea to heel had not worked: “While I
greatly appreciate the efforts of President Xi & China to help with North
Korea,” he wrote, “it has not worked
out. At least I know China tried!” U.S.
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson put a
more hopeful cast on things, saying:
“We have not given up hope” and expressing the intention of the U.S. to
C H I N A
wage a “peaceful pressure campaign
[on North Korea].” Shortly thereafter,
the president ratcheted up pressure.
“I am very disappointed in China,”
he tweeted. “Our foolish past leaders
have allowed them to make hundreds
of billions of dollars a year in trade,
yet they do NOTHING for us with
North Korea…We will no longer allow this to continue.” During President Trump’s first trip to China in November 2017, he took a more conciliatory tone, proclaiming the “mutual
commitment” of the two presidents to
the denuclearization of North Korea.
Of the numerous reasons that
Trump’s approach has not borne fruit,
three are dominant. First, Pyongyang
is able to resist potentially lethal pressure from China. Second, for Beijing,
a nuclearized peace on the Korean Peninsula is preferable to war there. And
third, while President Trump has gyrated on whether the U.S. approach to
Pyongyang should rely on force or dialogue, the Chinese have never wavered
in their aversion to the use of force to
denuclearize North Korea.
Consequently, the current U.S. administration is left with the same stark
choices as its predecessors, except
that Trump has staked even more on
the issue and North Korea is further
down its deliverable nuclear weapons
path. Washington has never attacked
a nuclear-capable country. The U.S.’s
options—none of them ideal—fall into
three categories:
n 1. Implicitly or explicitly accept that
North Korea has nuclear weapons and
deter Pyongyang from using them, as
was done with the Soviet Union and
China. This approach has two variants:
One is to seek to negotiate a freeze in
North Korean warhead and missile
levels and testing (with verification),
and negotiate a peace agreement. The
second option is simply to establish a
deterrent relationship without official
agreements—just the promise of certain destruction if weapons are used or
proliferated.
n 2. Persist in a policy of tightening
sanctions, knowing that there are limits to the pressure China will apply on
North Korea and that North Korea has
A N D
3
A M E R I C A
(KAL/THE ECONOMIST/LONDON, ENGLAND)
a seemingly endless capacity to endure
such punitive measures. In this scenario, Pyongyang continues to build more
warheads and develop their means of
delivery.
n 3. Use force to try to destroy North
Korea’s nuclear capacity (or the regime
entirely), knowing that Pyongyang’s
death throes could take hundreds of
thousands (possibly millions) of South
Korean and other lives with it.
It is time for Washington, in close
consultation with its South Korean and
Japanese allies, to seriously consider
either explicitly or implicitly acknowledging that North Korea has a modest
nuclear deterrent, and to prevent North
Korea’s use of these capabilities (and
proliferation) just as Washington did
with the Soviet Union and China. The
wisdom of such a policy partially hinges on whether or not one conceives of
North Korean leaders as rational; that is,
whether one believes that their instinct
for survival outweighs their impulsiveness. A principal downside to adopting
an overt approach of deterrence is that
it would likely encourage others in Asia
(not least South Korea and Japan) to
obtain their own “deterrent,” thereby
multiplying regional nuclear actors and
the attendant dangers. Of course this
would also stimulate Beijing to further
boost its capacities, thereby fueling a
regional arms race.
In sum, President Trump initially
put other contentious issues with China
on the back burner, hoping to achieve
his primary goal—North Korea’s denuclearization. When that failed, the
front burner of the U.S.-China relationship became crowded with previously
repressed issues: U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China
Sea, talk of steel and aluminum tariffs,
weapons sales to Taiwan, the threat of
tightened restrictions on technology
and investment flows, and secondary sanctions on Chinese institutions
and individuals. Some of these threats
have been pursued, others downplayed
or delayed, and still others seemingly
abandoned, leaving Beijing, Washington’s allies and many others confused.
This brings us to executive branch
decision-making.
Executive branch
decision-making
White House personnel, not least those
involved in national security, have been
in continual flux since Inauguration
Day. Deep divisions on trade policy
persist among the president’s senior advisors. Across all agencies, nomination
and confirmation of officials has been
painstakingly slow. As of mid-November 2017, only 469 out of over 600 key
positions requiring Senate confirmation had been nominated—249 had
been confirmed and 144 posts still had
no nominee. In the State Department,
only 56 out of 152 slots had been filled;
at the Defense Department, 26 out of
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3
G R E A T
54; and, at the Commerce Department,
10 out of 21. This leaves key agencies staffed with politically insecure
(“acting”) personnel. Although many
of these individuals are very capable,
foreign governments do not know with
whom they can engage with confidence, and the risks of ill-considered
policy, spotty implementation and inaction increase.
President Trump initially gave members of his own family notable roles in
dealing with Beijing: His son-in-law
Jared Kushner and daughter Ivanka
liaised with the Chinese and advised
the president. This blurred lines with
the State Department and other agen-
T
D E C I S I O N S
cies and dimmed what should have
been a bright line between family and
national interests. In the run-up to the
president’s November trip to Beijing,
family members became less involved
as far as China was concerned, at least
publicly.
Looking ahead, the U.S. Congress
is already moving into campaign mode
for the pivotal 2018 midterm elections.
The upcoming struggle for Capitol
Hill is unlikely to improve the climate
for dispassionate debate about China
policy. Alternatively, Congress may
become so preoccupied with domestic
politics that it does not focus on China
at all.
The state of play in Beijing
he driving consideration in Chinese political life for Xi Jinping’s
first term (2012–17) was the 19th Party
Congress (October 18–24, 2017). The
Party Congress is held only once every five years, and is used to set the
party’s foreign and domestic policy
agendas and select its leadership. Prior
to this conclave, President Xi—who
also serves as general secretary of the
Communist Party (CCP) and chairman of the Central Military Commission—had two desires, each in tension with the other. First, he sought
to cultivate stable relations with the
Obama administration and thereafter
the Trump administration, looking to
keep U.S.-China relations on an even
keel. At home, however, he wanted to
appear tough on the U.S: Xi remains
determined to be seen domestically as
a staunch guardian of China’s equities:
Taiwan, the South and East China Seas,
North Korea, economic interests and
“national dignity.” He stated his driving aspiration succinctly when he first
took office: “great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation.”
In April 2017, at the Mar-a-Lago summit, Xi therefore held out to
Trump the prospect of the aforementioned 100-day negotiation aimed at
producing quick, politically satisfying and visible trade gains. Yet when
the first Comprehensive Economic
Dialogue discussions in Washington
rolled around 100 days later, Beijing
gave very little. Xi’s principal concession was U.S. beef exports—dear to
ranchers in the American West, but not
a game changer. In short, Xi was preoccupied with consolidating power up
until the conclusion of the 19th Party
Congress. Being soft on the U.S. was
inconsistent with the logic of building
his nationalistic coalition at home.
Domestically, Xi has restored
key aspects of strongman politics
and moved the CCP to center stage
in society and governance. The 19th
Party Congress was less a pro forma
reappointment than a coronation. Xi
augmented his already considerable
power by building a more pliable
seven-person Standing Committee of
the Politburo. He put a close confidant
in charge of anti-corruption work (Li
Zhanshu), disposed of opponents and
potential competitors (Sun Zhengcai),
weakened competitive factional networks (the Communist Youth League),
embedded his “Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New
Era” in the CCP Constitution—as only
Chairman Mao Zedong, China’s revolutionary communist leader (1949–76)
and paramount leader Deng Xiaoping
(1978–92) had done before—and made
possible (though not inevitable) his retention of power beyond his second
five-year term, heretofore an evolving retirement norm in Beijing. Even
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2 0 1 8
before the recent Party Congress, Xi
had achieved the exalted status of “core
leader.”
Despite his political achievements,
however, President Xi faces constraints
and is deeply insecure about the forces
roiling below the surface in Chinese society. Ministries, provinces, localities,
corrupt individuals and interest groups
cannot be counted on to comply with
orders from the top. The sweeping anticorruption campaign that Xi launched
at the close of the 18th Party Congress
in 2012 has won him popular support,
but also created enemies among its actual and potential targets. Demographically, China’s median age is increasing rapidly, as is the dependency ratio,
meaning that health and retirement
costs associated with an aging population will grow and the working-age
population will decline.
The Chinese economy is awash in
corporate debt (though it has huge financial assets), and there is a shadow
banking and irregular financial sector
creating enormous uncertainties. Economic efficiency (total factor productivity) in the state-owned enterprise
sector has been declining for years. Excess production capacity in key sectors
weakens the economy, requiring endless central subsidies. It also motivates
dumping products abroad. All this, in
combination with political uncertainties, periodically stimulates large-scale
capital movements from China abroad.
These are sometimes so large that Beijing imposes capital controls, as was
done in 2015–16. Tightened capital
controls, in turn, slow Chinese foreign
investments. Most fundamentally, Xi
must worry that the growing middle
class and already disaffected intellectuals may not remain quiescent forever.
Xi’s foreign policy
When it comes to national strategy and
dealing with the U.S., President Xi is
in charge. Washington will be dealing
with him as the leader of an increasingly capable China for the foreseeable future. Some issues to consider include:
What can we expect the contours of
Xi’s future foreign policy to be? How
can Washington influence them and
C H I N A
A N D
3
A M E R I C A
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how should it respond? And, most fundamentally, how can the U.S. increase
its own comprehensive power?
Under Xi, Beijing has become
progressively more assertive in safeguarding national interests and winning
more say for China abroad. Beijing
views Washington as simultaneously
gridlocked at home and increasingly
alienated from its traditional friends
in the international arena. As a former
Chinese vice-minister of foreign affairs wrote recently: “We have entered
a `Post-American Era,’ meaning that
the so-called `Pax Americana’ and the
American century is over…The most
obvious characteristic of a Post-American Era is a reconfiguration of the
global power balance, with developing
nations gaining strength year by year.”
This assessment reinforces Beijing’s
current course. Americans should be
concerned when People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the CCP, carries a
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piece ridiculing Trump’s Washington
as “a bizarre soap opera,” and saying
that “U.S. foreign policy is in total
disarray, and world regard for the U.S.
has plummeted.” The piece goes on to
say, “China cannot afford to play such
political games. As a country with 1.4
billion people, China must focus on
economic development, and a strong
central leadership is needed.” Broadminded Chinese who see a progressive
and successful U.S. as being advantageous to China’s political reform and
long-term interests are alarmed at developments in the U.S.
Xi has expansively asserted sovereignty in the South China Sea, pressured India on its shared border in the
Himalayas, pushed along the median
line separating Japan and China in the
East China Sea and punished South
Korea economically over defensive
missile deployments. This muscular
trend is also evident in Xi’s July 2017
Hong Kong
South
China Sea
0
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announcement of a “red line” for dissidents in Hong Kong who are pushing
for more autonomy and electoral reform, as well as his warning to outsiders not to seek to “infiltrate” and “sabotage” the mainland from Hong Kong.
Xi has ratcheted up political, economic
and surveillance pressures on Taiwan
since the independence-leaning Democratic Progressive Party formed a government there in May 2016.
Xi’s muscularity is also a reflection of China’s more than three-decade
trend of modernization in its military
structure, operations and equipment—
particularly its naval, air force, missile,
space and cyber components. A major
reorganization of the military launched
in 2015 signals accelerated efforts to
boost capacities and Xi’s personal
control over the armed forces. China’s
civilian R&D and manufacturing industries are making increasing contributions to the People’s Liberation
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3
G R E A T
D E C I S I O N S
Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews the armed forces as part of the commemorations to
mark the 90th founding anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army at Zhurihe military
training base in north China’s Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, July 30, 2017. (XINHUA/
LI GANG/GETTY IMAGES)
Army’s (PLA) arsenal, and in the process
