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CHAPTER 1
What Is Morality?
efore investing yourself in the study of an academic subject, it would be useful to
first have some idea of what you are getting yourself into. One way- sometimes
the best-to gain such an understanding is by considering a definition. When you
open your trigonometry text or chemistry handbook, you’ ll likely be given, ve1y early on,
a definition of the area you are about to study. So, as a responsible author, I would seem to
have a duty now to present you with a definition of morality.
I ‘d certainly like to. But I can’t. There is no widely agreed-on definition of morality.
The absence of a definition does not leave us entirely in the dark, however. (After all, no
one has yet been able to offer informative definitions of literature, or life, or art, and yet
we know a great deal about those things.) Indeed, we can get a good sense of our subject
matter by doing these four things:
B
1. Being clear about the difference between conventional and critical morality
2. Distinguishing the different branches of moral philosophy and their central questions
3. Identifying starting points for moral thinking
4. Contrasting morality with other systems of guidance, including religious ones
Let’s get to work!
A. Conventional and Critical Morality
Suppose you take a sociology or an anthropology course, and you get to a unit on the
morality of the cultures you ‘ve been studying. You’ll likely focus on the patterns of
behavior to be found in the cultures, their accepted ideas about right and wrong, and the
sorts of character traits that these cultures find admirable. These are the elements of what
we can call conventional morality-the system of widely accepted rules and principles,
created by and for human beings, that members of a culture or society use to govern their
own lives and to assess the actions and the motivations of others. The elements of
conventional morality can be known by any astute social observer, since gaining such
knowledge is a matter of appreciating what most people in a society or culture actually
take to be right or wrong.
Conventional morality can differ from society to society. The conventional morality of
Saudi Arabia forbids women from publicly contradicting their husbands or brothers, while
Denmark’s conventional morality allows this. People in the United States would think it
immoral to leave a restaurant without tipping a good waiter or bartender, while such
behavior in many other societies is perfectly OK.
When I write about morality in this book, I am not refen-ing to conventional morality.
I am assuming that some social standards- even those that are long-standing and very
popular- can be morally mistaken. (We’ll examine this assumption in Chapter 3.B.) After
all, the set of traditional principles that are widely shared within a culture or society are
the result of human decisions, agreements, and practices, all of which are sometimes
based on misunderstandings, in-ationality, bias, or superstition. So when I talk about
morality from this point on, I will be referring to moral standards that are not rooted in
widespread endorsement, but rather are independent of conventional morality and can be
used to critically evaluate its merits.
It’s possible, of course, that conventional morality is all there is. But this would be a
very surprising discovery. Most of us assume, as I will do, that the popularity of a moral
view is not a guarantee of its truth. We could be wrong on this point, but until we have a
chance to consider the matter in detail, I think it best to assume that conventional morality
can sometimes be mistaken. If so, then there may be some independent, critical morality
that (l) does not have its origin in social agreements; (2) is untainted by mistaken beliefs,
irrationality, or popular prejudices; and (3) can serve as the true standard for detem1ining
when conventional morality has got it right and when it has fallen into error. That is the
morality whose nature we are going to explore in this book.
B. The Branches of Moral Philosophy
As I’m sure you know, there are lots of moral questions. So it might help to impose some
organization on them. This will enable us to see the basic contours of moral philosophy
and also to better appreciate the fundamental questions in each part of the field you are
about to study.
There are three core areas of moral philosophy:
1. Value theory: What is the good life? What is worth pursuing for its own sake? How
do we improve our lot in life? What is happiness, and is it the very same thing as
well-being?
2. Normative ethics: What are our fundamental moral duties? What makes right
actions right? Which character traits count as virtues, which as vices, and why? Who
should our role models be? Do the ends always justify the means, or are there certain
types of action that should never be done under any circumstances?
3. Metaethics: What is the status of moral claims and advice? Can ethical theories,
moral principles, or specific moral verdicts be true? If so, what makes them ttue?
Can we gain moral wisdom? If so, how? Do we always have good reason to do our
moral duty?
This book is for the most part devoted to issues in normative ethics, which take up the
whole of Chapters 5 through 11 . Chapter 4 focuses on value theory, while Chapter 3 is
given over largely to metaethics. Chapter 2 concerns logic and good reasoning; the lessons
of that chapter apply to all branches of moral philosophy, and well beyond.
C. Moral Starting Points
One of the puzzles about moral thinking is kn owing where to begin. Some skeptics about
morality deny that there are any proper starting points for ethical reflection. They believe
that moral reasoning is simply a way of rationalizing our biases and gut feelings. This
outlook encourages us to be lax in moral argument and, worse, supports an attitude that no
moral views are any better than others. While this sort of skepticism might be true, we
shouldn’ t regard it as the default view of ethics. We should accept it only as a last resort.
In the meantime, let’s consider some fairly plausible ethical assumptions, claims that
can get us started in our moral thinking. The point of the exercise is to soften you up to
the idea that we are not just spinning our wheels when thinking morally. There are
reasonable constraints that can guide us when thinking about how to live. Here are some
of them:
• Neither the law nor tradition is immunefi’Oln moral criticism. The law does not have
the final word on what is right and wrong. Neither does tradition. Actions that are
legal, or customaiy, are sometimes morally mistaken.
• Eve,yone is morally fallible. Everyone has some mistaken ethical views, and no
human being is wholly wise when it comes to moral matters.
• Friendship is valuable. Having friends is a good thing. Friendships add value to your
life. You are better off when there are people you care deeply about, and who care
deeply about you.
• We are not obligated to do the impossible. Morality can demand only so much of us.
Moral standards that are impossible to meet are illegitimate. Morality must respect
our limitations.
• Children bear less moral responsibility than adults. Moral responsibility assumes an
ability on our part to understand options, to make decisions in an informed way, and
to let our decisions guide our behavior. The fewer of these abilities you have, the less
blameworthy you are for any harm you might cause.
• Justice is a very important moral good. Any moral theory that treats justice as
irrelevant is deeply suspect. It is important that we get what we deserve, and that we
are treated fairly.
• D eliberately hurting other people requires justification. The default position in ethics
is this: do no harm. It is sometimes morally acceptable to harm others, but there must
be an excellent reason for doing so or else the harmful behavior is unjustified.
• Equals ought to be treated equally. Peopl.e who are alike in all relevant respects
should get similar treatment. When this fails to happen- when racist or sexist policies
are enacted, for instance- then something has gone wrong.
• Self-interest isn’t the only ethical consideration. How well-off we are is important.
But it isn ‘t the only thing of moral importance. Morality sometimes calls on us to set
aside our own interests for the sake of others.
• Agony is bad. Excruciating physical or emotional pain is bad. It may sometimes be
appropriate to cause such extreme suffering, but doing so requires a very powerful
justification.
• Might doesn’t make right. People in power can get away with lots of things that the
rest ofus can’t. That doesn’ t justify what they do. That a person can escape
punishment is one thing- whether his actions are morally acceptable is another.
• Free and informed requests prevent rights violations. If, with eyes wide open and no
one twisting your arm, you ask someone to do something for you, and she does it,
then your rights have not been violated- even if you end up hurt as a result.
There are a number of points to make about these claims.
First, this short list isn’ t meant to be exhaustive. It could be made much longer.
Second, I am not claiming that the items on this list are beyond criticism. I am saying
only that each one is very plausible. Hard thinking might weaken our confidence in some
cases. The point, though, is that without such scrutiny, it is perfectly reasonable to begin
our moral thinking with the items on this list.
Third, many of these claims require interpretation in order to apply them in a
satisfying way. When we say, for instance, that equals ought to be treated equally, we
leave all of the interesting questions open. (What makes people equals? Can we treat
people equally without treating them in precisely the same way? And so on.)
Not only do we have a variety of plausible starting points for our ethical
investigations; we also have a number of obviously poor beginnings for moral thinking. A
morality that celebrates genocide, torture, treachery, sadism, hostility, and slavery is,
depending on how you look at it, either no morality at all or a deeply failed one. Any
morality worth the name will place some importance on justice, fairness, kindness, and
reasonableness. Just how much impo11ance, and how to balance things in cases of conflict
– that is where the real philosophy gets done.
D. Morality and Other Normative Systems
We can also better understand morality by contrasting its principles with those of other
normative systems. A normative system is made up of a set of norms- standards for
how we ought to behave, ideals to aim for, and rules that we should not break.
There are many such systems, but let’s restrict our focu s to four of the most important
of them: those that govern the law, etiquette, self-interest, and tradition. The fact that a
law tells us to do something does not settle the question of whether morality gives its
stamp of approval. Some immoral acts (like cheating on a spouse) are not illegal. And
some illegal acts (such as voicing criticism of a dictator) are not immoral. Certainly, many
laws require what morality requires and forbid what morality forbids. But the fit is hardly
perfect, and that shows that morality is something different from the law. That a
legislature passed a bill is not enough to show that the bill is morally acceptable.
We see the same imperfect fit when it comes to standards of etiquette. Forks are
supposed to be set to the left of a plate, but it isn ‘t immoral to set them on the right. Good
manners are not the same thing as morally good conduct. Morality sometimes requires us
not to be polite or gracious, as when someone threatens your children or happily tells you
a racist joke. So the standards of etiquette can depart from those of morality.
The same is hue when it comes to the standards of self-interest. Think of all of the
people who have gotten ahead in life by betraying others, lying about their past, breaking
the rules that others are following. It’s an unhappy thought, but a very commonsensical
one: you sometimes can advance your interests by acting immorally. And those who
behave virtuously are sometimes punished, rather than rewarded, for it. Whistle blowers
who reveal a company’s or a government official’s com1ption are often attacked for their
efforts, sued to the point of bankruptcy, and targeted for their courageous behavior.
Though the relation between self-interest and morality is contested, it is a plausible
starting point to assume that morality can sometimes require us to sacrifice our wellbeing, and that we can sometimes improve our lot in life by acting unethically. Unless this
is shown to be mistaken-something that would require a lot of complex moral thinking,
if it could be done at all- we are right to think that the standards of morality are not the
very same as those of self-interest. (We will see a challenge to this view when considering
ethical egoism in Chapter 3.A.)
Finally, morality is also distinct from tradition. That a practice has been around a long
time does not automatically make it moral. Morality sometimes requires a break with the
past, as it did when people called for the abolition of slavery or for allowing women to
vote. The longevity of a practice is not a foolproof test of its morality.
E. Morality and Religion
Because many people look to religion for moral guidance, it is important to understand the
relation between morality and religion, and to explain why, in the pages to follow, I will
not be relying on religious commitments to present and assess the views under discussion.
Many people have the following thought: if God does not exist, then morality is a
sham. The only legitimate source of morality is God’s commands. On this view, atheism
– the belief that God does not exist- spells the doom of morality.
The underlying idea seems to be this: because morality is a set of norms, there must be
someone with the authority to create them. Without God, there is no one but we human
beings to make up the moral law. And we lack the needed authority to do the work. Our
say-so doesn’t make things right; our disapproval cannot make things wrong. We are
limited in understanding and bound to make mistakes. A morality built upon our
imperfections would lack credibility.
This vision of God’s role in morality-as its ultimate author, the one who makes up
the moral code- rests on a crncial assumption: that morality must be created by someone.
Personal confession: I don’t understand why this assumption is appealing. But that may be
just one of my many limitations. In any event, those who do like the view I’ve just
sketched will find themselves embracing the Divine Command Theory:
An act is morally required just because it is commanded by God, and immoral
just because God forbids it.
I think that this is the natural, default view for a religious believer when thinking of God’s
relation to morality. It first received an airing in Western philosophy in a short dialogue by
Plato called the Euthyphm, where Socrates interrogates the title character and asks the
following question: “Do the gods love actions because they are pious, or are actions
pious because the gods love them?”
With a few substitutions, we can get a newer version of Socrates’s question that is
more relevant to our topic: “Does God command us to do actions because they are
morally right, or are actions morally right because God commands them ?” The Divine
Command Theory answers our new question by affirming the second option. But this
view is not without its problems.
There are two of them. The first is obvious. The Divine Command Theory makes
morality depend on God’s commands. Yet God may not exist. For the moment, though,
let’s just assume that God does exist, and see what follows.
To appreciate the second problem, imagine the point at which God is choosing a
morality for us. God contemplates the nature of rape, torture, and treachery. What does He
see? Being omniscient (all-knowing), God sees such actions for what they are. Crucially,
He sees nothing wrong with them. They are, at this point, morally neutral. Nothing, as yet,
is right or wrong.
But God did, at some point, make a decision. He forbade rape, theft, and most kinds of
killing. If the Divine Command Theory is correct, then He didn’t forbid them because
they were immoral. Did God have reasons for His decisions, or not?
If the Divine Command Theory is true, then there is trouble either way. If God lacks
reasons for His commands- if there is no solid basis supporting His decisions to prohibit
certain things and require others- then God’s decisions are arbitrary. It would be as if
God were creating morality by a coin toss. But that is surely implausible. That sort of God
would be capricious, and thus imperfect.
So a perfect God must have had excellent reasons for laying down the moral law as
He did. But then it seems that these reasons, and not God’s commands, are what makes
actions right or wrong. Actions are not right because God commands them. Whatever
reasons support God’s choices also explain why actions have the moral status they do.
Suppose, for instance, that God really did forbid us from torturing others, and that God
had very good reasons for doing so. Although we can’ t presume to know God’s thoughts,
let’s just assume for now that God based His decision on the fact that torture is extremely
painful, humiliating, and an attack on a defenseless person. Assuming that these are the
relevant reasons, then these reasons are enough to explain why torture is immoral. Torture
is wrong because it is extremely painful, humiliating, and so on.
God’s condemnation does not turn a morally neutral action into an immoral one.
Rather, God recognizes what is already bad about torture. There is something in the very
nature of torture that makes it morally suspect. To avoid portraying God as arbitrary, we
must assume that He issues commands based on the best possible reasons. And here are
the best possible reasons: God sees that an action such as torture is immoral, sees, with
perfect understanding, that such things as kindness and compassion are good, and then
issues the divine commands on the basis of this flawless insight. This picture preserves
God’s omniscience and integrity. But it comes at the expense of the Divine Command
Theory, and God’s authorship of the moral law.
And after all, what is the alternative? If there is nothing intrinsically wrong with rape
or theft, then God could just as well have required that we do such things. He could have
forbidden us to be generous or thoughtful. But this makes a mockeiy of morality, and of
our view of God as morally perfect.
This point is expressed by
The Divine Perfection Argument
1. If the Divine Command Theory is true, then a morally perfect God could have created
a flawless morality that required us to rape, steal, and kill, and forbade us from any
acts of kindness or generosity.
2. A morally perfect God could not have issued such commands-anyone who did so
would be morally imperfect.
Therefore,
3. The Divine Command The01y is false.
The first premise is certainly true. The Divine Command Theory says that God ‘s
choices wholly determine morality, and that nothing determines God’s choices. And the
second premise is highly plausible. A moral code that required such horrific acts, and
forbade such good ones, could not be authored by someone worthy of love and worship,
someone fit to serve as a model of moral perfection.
Now suppose that God exists but is not the author of the moral law. God could still
play a crucial role in morality-not by being its inventor, but by being its infallible
reporter and our expert guide. God knows everything-including every single detail of the
moral law. And if God is all-loving, then God will want to share some of that wisdom with
us. How will He do it? By means of revelation, either personal and direct (say, by talking
to you or giving you signs of certain kinds), or by indirect means (say, by inspiring the
authors of a sacred scripture).
God doesn’t have to be the author of morality in order to play a vital role in teaching
us how to live. We can see this by considering an analogy. Imagine a perfectly accurate
thermometer. If we wanted to know the temperature, we’d look to this device. But the
thermometer is not creating the temperature. It is recording it in an e1Tor-free way. If we
reject the Divine Command Theory, then God is playing a similar role regarding morality.
He is not creating the moral law. He is telling us what it is, in a way that is never
mistaken.
There are some worries, of course. Here are some wo1ih considering:
• Those who are not religious will need to look elsewhere for moral guidance.
• And they may be right to do so, because God may not exist.
Even if God exists, there are still two serious problems for those who seek divine
guidance:
• We must select a source of religious wisdom from among many choices.
• We must know how to interpret that source.
These two problems can be illustrated by working through the popular
Argument from Religious Authority
1. If the Bible prohibits abortion, then abortion is immoral.
2. The Bible prohibits abortion.
Therefore,
3. Abortion is immoral.
The first premise asserts the moral authority of the Bible. But which bible? Different
religions offer us different sacred texts, whose details sometimes contradict one another.
So we must choose. There is presumably one right choice and many wrong ones. The
odds are stacked against us.
Premise l is plausible only if God has authored the Bible or has dictated its terms.
Religious believers therefore have to make a case that this is so. They must justify the
claims that God exists, that God has communicated with humanity, and that their favorite
sacred scripture is the one that contains God’s wisdom. It won’t be easy to do this.
If God is all-powerful, then He could provide some exh·emely clear, undeniable
evidence to settle these matters, evidence that would convince agnostics, atheists, and
members of competing religions. But God has thus far chosen not to do this. That makes
defense of premise l especially tricky.
And the challenges don’t end there. Even if theists-those who believe that God
exists-can adequately defend the first premise, and so justify the selection of their
preferred bible, there is the further matter of how to interpret the sacred text. Neither the
Hebrew nor the Christian scriptures, for instance, ever explicitly mentions abortion, much
less prohibits it. Thus, even if you wanted to adopt a literal reading of those scriptures,
problems will arise. There will be many important topics (such as abortion) that are never
mentioned in the crucial text. Those that are mentioned may receive contradictory
treatments (consider, as an early example, the literally incompatible creation stories of
Genesis chapters l and 2). There may also be morally troubling advice on offer (think of
the passages in Leviticus that permit slave1y and the subordination of women, or those
that require killing adulterers and disrespectful children).
Yet if we move away from a literal reading, we are faced with countless possibilities
for interpreting the biblical texts. Believers must choose among them, and justify their
choice in the face of a wide number of conflicting approaches. A defense of premise 2 is,
therefore, no easy matter.
To summarize: those who seek divine guidance in trying to lead a moral life may
succeed. But several conditions must be met. It must be the case that (1) God exists, and
(2) that we can be justified in believing this. (3) Theists must be justified in selecting a
particular source of religious and moral wisdom, such as the Koran, the Book of Mormon,
or the Christian scriptures. Theists must also (4) defend specific interpretations of those
sources.
This is a daunting list. Yet philosophy is full of such lists, and the difficulty of a
project is not, by itself, proof of its failure. Religious believers have their work cut out for
them, no doubt of it. But then so does eve1yone else.
In the rest of the book, I do not make use of specifically religious claims. There are
two reasons for this. First, we have seen the many challenges to the assumption that
morality is based on religion, and it is w011hwhile seeing how far we can get without
having to rely on that assumption. Second, there is important precedent among religious
philosophers for thinking that God gave us reason and understanding in order to make the
fundamental tmths of morality available to everyone. After all, a caring God would want
even nonbelievers to understand the immorality of rape and genocide, and to appreciate
the goodness of generosity and loving kindness.
F. Conclusion
Although it has proven difficult to come up with a sharp definition of morality, we can
take several steps to help us get a better understanding of what we’ll be focusing on for
the remainder of this book. There is first of all the distinction between conventional and
c1itical morality, where the fom1er includes the moral views and practices that are actually
accepted by a society or culture, and the latter represents moral standards that are free of
the e1Tors that sometimes infect conventional morality. Understanding the three branches
of moral philosophy- value theory, normative ethics, and metaethics- can also help us to
focus on our target. Identifying a set of plausible starting points for moral thinking can do
the same. We can also come to appreciate what morality is by seeing what it is not-here,
the contrast with other normative systems, such as the law, etiquette, self-interest, and
tradition, may be helpful. Finally, while many people look to religion for moral guidance,
there are some problems with doing so on the basis of the divine command theory, and
there are, in any event, several hurdles that theists need to overcome in order to assure
themselves that such reliance is appropriate.
Key Terms and Concepts
Atheism
Conventional morality
Critical morality
Divine command theory
Metaethics
Normative ethics
Normative system
Nonn
Omniscient
Theist
Value theory
CHAPTER 2
Moral Reasoning
oral reasoning, like all reasoning, involves at least two things: a set of reasons,
and a conclusion that these reasons are meant to support. When you put these
two things together, you have what philosophers call an argument. This isn’t a
matter of bickering or angrily exchanging words. An argument is simply any chain of
thought in which reasons (philosophers call these premises) are offered in support of a
patiicular conclusion. Watch for such words as therefore, hence, thus, or so- a claim that
follows these words is usually the conclusion of an argument someone is offering you.
Not all arguments are equally good. This is as true in ethics as it is science,
mathematics, or politics. It is easy to mistake one’s way when it comes to ethical thinking.
We can land at the wrong conclusion (by endorsing child abuse, for instance). We can also
arrive at the right one by means of terrible reasoning. We must do our best to avoid both
of these mistakes.
In other words, our moral thinking should have two complementary goals-getting it
right, and being able to back up our views with flawless reasoning. We want the truth,
both in the starting assumptions we bring to an issue and in the conclusions we eventually
arrive at. But we also want to make sure that our views are supported by excellent
reasons. And this provides two tests for good moral reasoning: (1) we must avoid false
beliefs, and (2) the logic of our moral thinking must be rigorous and error-free.
There is no surefire test for determining when a belief is true or false. This goes for all
beliefs, not just moral ones. Many people are firmly convinced by beliefs that turn out to
be false; indeed, this probably describes you, me, and eveiyone we know. Of course we
aren’t aware of which of our beliefs are false, or else we’d change them. Still, none of us
is omniscient. We all have our blind spots and intellectual limitations.
This isn’t meant to be a counsel of despair. Though each ofus is likely to have at least
a few false beliefs, we also have lots of true ones. And while there is no surefire test to
sort the true from the false, we can always seek to support our views by means of
evidence and argument.
Importantly, it is possible to develop moral arguments that fail, even though every
single one of their premises is true. The failure is of the second sort mentioned earlier: a
failure of logic. Since logical reasoning is a key to successful reasoning, let’s take some
time to consider some of the basic elements of logic.
M
A. Validity and Soundness
Consider this argument:
1. Heroin is a drng.
2. Selling heroin is illegal.
Therefore,
3. Heroin use is immoral.
This is a moral argument. It is a set of reasons designed to support a moral conclusion.
Both of the premises are trne. But they do not adequately support the conclusion, since
one can accept them while consistently rejecting this conclusion. Perhaps the use of illegal
drugs such as heroin really is immoral. But we need a further reason to think so- we
would need, for instance, the additional claim that all drug use is immoral.
The argument in its present form is a poor one. But not because it relies on false
claims. Rather, the argument’s logical structure is to blame. The logic of an argument is a
matter of how its premises are related to its conclusion. In the best arguments, the truth of
the premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. When an argument has this feature, it
is logically valid.
The heroin argument is invalid. The truth of its premises does not guarantee the trnth
of its conclusion-indeed, the conclusion may be false.
Since the best arguments are logically valid, we will want to make sure that our own
arguments meet this condition. But how can we do that? How can we tell a valid from an
invalid argument, one that is logically perfect from one that is logically shaky?
There is a simple, three-part test:
1. Identify all of an argument’s premises.
2. Imagine that all of them are true (even if you know that some are false).
3. Then ask yourself this question: supposing that all of the premises were true, could
the conclusion be false? If yes, the argument is invalid. The premises do not
guarantee the conclusion. If no, the argument is valid. The premises offer perfect
logical support for the conclusion.
Validity is a matter of how well an argument’s premises support its conclusion. To test
for this, we must assume that all of an argument’s premises are true. We then ask whether
the conclusion must therefore be true. If so, the argument is valid. If not, not.
Note that an argument’s validity is a matter of the argument’s structure. It has nothing
to do with the actual h-uth or falsity of an argument’s premises or conclusion. Indeed,
valid arguments may contain false premises and false conclusions.
To help clarify the idea, consider the following argument. Suppose you are a bit shaky
on your US history, and I am trying to convince you that John Quincy Adams was the
ninth president of the United States. I offer you the following line of reasoning:
1. John Quincy Adams was either the eighth or the ninth US president.
2. John Quincy Adams was not the eighth US president.
Therefore,
3. John Quincy Adams was the ninth US president.
In one way, this reasoning is impeccable. It is logically flawless. This is a valid
argument. If all premises of this argument were true, then the conclusion would have to be
ttue. It is impossible for l and 2 to be tlue and 3 to be false. It passes our test for logical
validity with flying colors.
But the argument is still a bad one-not because of any logical error, but because it
has a false premise (number l; Quincy Adams was the sixth US president) and a false
conclusion. The truth of an argument’s premises is one thing; its logical status is another.
The lesson here is that truth isn’t everything; neither is logic. We need them both.
What we want in philosophy, as in all other areas of inquiry, are arguments that have two
features: (l) they are logically watertight (valid), and (2) all of their premises are true.
These arguments are known as sound arguments.
Sound arguments are the gold standard of good reasoning. And it’s easy to see why.
They are logically valid. So if all of their premises are tlue, their conclusion must be tlue
as well. And by definition, sound arguments contain only true premises. So their
conclusions are true. If you can tell that an argument is valid, and also know that each
premise is correct, then you can als