Description
This analysis should focus on a topic covered in Modules 4 – 6.
Students are required to write a brief analysis of a recent article (articles from reputable news sources, blogs, magazines or even academic journal articles) that relates to a class topic discussed the previous week or two. These should be 2-3 pages typed (12-point font, 1” margins, double-spaced).
Each article analysis must contain two parts:
The first part should summarize the article you read (1-2 paragraphs). You should summarize using your own words and not the words of the author of the article. This is worth 10 points.
The second part is the analysis must explain exactly how that article relates to what we discussed in class (3-4 paragraphs). This is worth 30 points – this should be much more in depth than the summary part.
Your analysis must include explicit reference to the material we covered in lecture and/or in the assigned readings and videos- i.e., you should be supporting what you say with direct citations to the assigned readings in order to get full credit. Thoroughly explain the relevant class concept(s) that is illustrated in the article, in plain, non-technical language.
Your analysis must explain how your article is related to what we discussed in class or an assigned reading –it can be an example, a challenge to what we discussed, or simply related to class discussions or assigned readings in some other way.
This is an independent assignment. Each student should submit their own article analysis. This should be treated as a formal writing assignment. It will be graded for content as well as grammar/spelling. I will also be running these assignments through Turnitin to check for plagiarism, so be sure to use your own words, paraphrase and provide proper quotations and citations where necessary.
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Module 4: Transaction
Costs and Political
Exchange
WHOSE PREFERENCES ARE GETTING EXPRESSED IN PUBLIC POLICY OUTCOMES,
WHOSE ARE NOT, AND WHY?
Demand-Side of the Political
Exchange Process
Up to this point, we’ve only discussed the demand side of the political
exchange process – and only one small part of that demand side – the
voters.
The demand side of the political market has more than just individual
voters trying to obtain the political outcomes that satisfy their preferences
Lobbyists
Special interest groups
Industry groups
These other demanders of public policy make their preferences known
through lobbying, political advertising, campaign donations, and more.
Supply-Side of the Political Exchange
Process
Politicians will try to get elected by campaigning in a way that targets what
the Median Voter wants. However, this doesn’t tell us what politicians do once
they are elected.
Rational ignorance of voters means that voters are not paying close attention
to what politicians actually do, so they don’t have to supply what the median
voter demanded once in office.
Otherwise, we’d see more political turnover
Legislators are also not the only ones supplying political outcomes. Legislation is
implemented by bureaucracies. Bureaus and agencies also issue and enforce
regulations.
These individuals have an incentive to shirk their responsibilities (as we will discuss later
in the semester)
Transaction Costs
Transaction costs are the costs associated with exchange of goods or
services or incurred in overcoming market imperfections. They are
essentially the costs involved in making a trade.
Communication/bargaining costs, negotiation costs, search costs, information
costs, transportation costs, etc.
Transaction costs reduce the number of exchanges that take place in a
market.
Transaction costs can also affect our ability to make political exchanges.
People with high political transaction costs will be less likely to see their
preferences expressed in the political outcomes we observe.
Question
What do you think affects the transaction costs of making an exchange?
Think about any exchange/trade and identify what might make striking a
bargain more challenging for the people trying to trade.
Write your answer on a piece of paper, and sit tight until we discuss it together
as a class.
Coase Theorem
In the absence of transaction costs, the allocation of resources is independent of the
initial assignment of property rights.
If there are no transaction costs (or if these costs are very low) resources will be allocated
toward their most highly valued uses.
Coase’s example: The Confectioner vs. The Doctor
Confectioner and doctor have neighboring businesses – they share a wall
Have co-existed peacefully for many years until the doctor added another examination
room.
The examination room shares a wall with a large piece of machinery that causes noise and
vibrations rendering the examination room unusable.
It is a negative externality
The Doctor sued the Confectioner, but both sides have a decent case.
Poll Questions
Confectioner vs. Doctor
The doctor won the case, but according to Coase’s theorem, it doesn’t
matter who wins. We should still get the efficient allocation of resources
regardless
The judgement just determines who has the property right to start with.
Assume the Doctor can make $80 per hour using the exam room
Assume the Confectioner can make $100 per hour using the machinery.
Can we bargain to a more efficient outcome than what the court has
provided?
What if the Confectioner had won the case instead?
Transaction Costs and Political
Exchange
In politics, if transaction costs are low, people in the group can bargain to
maximize the value of the political decision to themselves.
They will be able to have their preferences reflected in the policy decision.
Like in the case with the Confectioner and the Doctor, we have a reciprocal
problem in politics
Doctor and Confectioner are vying for the same right and only one can win
In politics, the majority wins and the minority loses
In politics, when transaction costs are high the outcome is determined by
aggregating votes
In politics, when transaction costs are low, resources will be allocated to the
outcome most highly valued by the members of the low transaction cost group
This MAY be what the median voter supports, but it very often is not.
Large Numbers Create High
Transaction Costs
The size of the transaction cost depends heavily upon the number of
people who are participating in or who are affected by the decision.
In elections, the large number of voters creates high transaction costs. It is
difficult for politicians to bargain with individual voters.
There are lower transaction costs between members of Congress, thus
making bargaining among politicians much easier. Much smaller numbers
make favor trading much easier
535 people total vs. about 158 million registered voters
Hidden Information Creates High
Transaction Costs
It is difficult to make a bargain and enforce it if you cannot determine whether the other side
has upheld their end of the agreement. Political institutions (like secret ballots vs. public ballots)
can affect transaction costs involved in making a political exchange.
Secret ballots for elections further increase transaction costs of politicians bargaining with
individual voters.
I could promise to pay you $20 if you vote for me, but I would never be able to tell whether or not you kept
your promise.
Proposed changes that allow people to vote remotely via internet raise concerns that this will encourage
vote selling
Ballots for members of Congress are a matter of public record. We can see whether a politician
kept their promise to vote in favor of any bill.
This reduces transaction costs and makes it easier for logrolling to occur
What is the point of trading votes if you can’t enforce the agreement
This also helps party leadership enforce party positions – they can see who is not “towing the party line”
Other Factors Influencing Transaction
Costs
1.
Size of the group/number of people
2.
Monitoring costs
Secret vs. public information
3.
Physical distance
4.
How well you know the person you are bargaining with
5.
Do you have regular interactions?
Credibility/reputation of the person you are bargaining with
Value of what you are bringing to the exchange
Doesn’t affect transaction costs, but can be high enough to overcome them
Membership in the Low-Transaction
Cost Group
Members of the legislator are part of a small, low-transaction cost group.
The see each other regularly
Small number of people
Votes are a matter of public record
Close proximity to one another (at least part of the time)
This allows them to be able to strike bargains with each other via logrolling
Membership in the Low-Transaction
Cost Group
The general public is NOT part of the low-transaction cost group
Too many people, geographically dispersed, too many different viewpoints, secret ballots…
cannot bargain effectively
We should NOT expect the general public’s views to be represented in policy outcomes.
Other people can also become members of the low-transaction cost group
Establish relationships with legislators
Join a special interest group
Lobbyists do this
Allows politicians to bargain with a smaller set of people who represent the interest of a much larger
group.
Interest groups and lobbyists are continually proposing policies to legislators. They must be
part of the low transaction cost group (or be connected to someone in such a group) in
order to gain a hearing.
Special Interest Groups
Special Interest Groups are well-organized groups of individuals who are united
around a particular issue (or set of issues). They are trying to get policies past that
benefit their group but are paid for via general taxation. In exchange for these
policies, they offer politicians the support of their group.
Highly informed about the issues they care about and highly motivated to
advocate for them since the benefit they stand to obtain is quite high per
group member.
Can mobilize a large number of voters to support a candidate who promises to
support their cause
Can provide resources to help with political campaigns (monetary donations;
political endorsements/advertisements)
Can also mobilize resources to harm the campaign of anyone that threatens
their benefits.
Special Interest Groups Compete with
Each Other
US Steelworkers Union will support candidates who promise to implement
protective tariffs on foreign steel. In exchange, they offer support of their
members as well as run advertisements supporting their preferred candidates
Business that use steel as an input into their production may have different
preferences about tariffs. This policy will raise their production costs and hurt
their profitability. They will donate to opposing candidates and run
advertisements expressing their views to voters.
Legislators must weigh the costs and benefits of supporting steel tariffs and
adjust their policy proposals and campaign platforms accordingly.
This may result in making a choice to support the demands of one group over
the other, or proposing a policy that represents a compromise.
But a majority of legislators must agree in order for a policy to pass. This is where
logrolling comes into play.
Logrolling (This Week’s Tullock Chapter)
Logrolling is favor trading, which most often takes the form of vote trading. It is one
tool that politicians often use to gain majority support for policies and programs
they want to pass. It is a form of political bargaining that is facilitated by low
transaction costs among legislators.
Explicit Logrolling is when there is a verbal agreement to exchange votes. Senator
A promises to vote for a bill proposed by Senator B that brings benefits to Senator
B’s constituents in exchange for the promise that Senator B will vote in favor of a
bill that would benefit Senator A’s constituents.
Implicit Logrolling is when a bill is written in such a way that it combines many
programs and projects that are desired by different legislators in order to “build in”
support for the bill. This often results in unrelated items being “tacked on” to the
end of a bill that has not been able to gain majority support previously.
The Distribution of Costs and Benefits
of Government Policies
Concentrated Benefits
Concentrated
Costs
Dispersed Benefits
More likely to adopt
Likely to reject
efficient projects and
efficient projects.
reject inefficient projects
Dispersed costs Likely to adopt inefficient More likely to adopt
projects.
efficient projects
and reject
inefficient projects
Depending on the
way costs and
benefits are
distributed, logrolling
may be required to
obtain a majority
support.
When benefits are
concentrated and
costs are dispersed,
logrolling becomes
necessary.
Logrolling Helps Certain Types of
Projects Gain Funding
Pork Barrel projects are ones that provide benefits over limited geographical
locations. Politicians have a strong desire to support these projects because it
demonstrates to their constituents that they have been successful obtaining
Federal funds that benefit them directly. Voters tend to be aware of the pork
barrel projects that benefit them, but uninformed about pork barrel projects
happening elsewhere.
Special Interest projects are ones that have concentrated benefits and
dispersed costs. Benefits are concentrated on a well-organized group of
voters who have demanded certain programs or legislation from Congress.
Costs are widely dispersed on the general population of uninformed voters.
Rational ignorance helps facilitate this process, as voters do not punish
legislators for engaging in this behavior.
An Example of Productive Logrolling
A
B
C
D
E
Suppose each legislator (1, 2, 3, 4, & 5) represents
a different district (A, B, C, D & E, respectively).
1
9
-1
-1
-1
-1
2
-1
9
-1
-1
-1
3
-1
-1
9
-1
-1
They each propose a bill that will bring their
district $10 in benefits and cost tax payers only $5
total. The funds will be raised via general taxation
of all districts – each bill costing $1 for each
district.
4
-1
-1
-1
9
-1
All five projects have benefits in excess of costs
5
-1
-1
-1
-1
9
Without logrolling, will these bills pass?
With logrolling, will these bills pass?
Large- scale infrastructure projects are one
example of bills that provide benefits in excess of
costs, but might not get approved without
logrolling.
An Example of Socially Unproductive
Logrolling
A
B
C
D
E
Suppose each legislator (1, 2, 3, 4, & 5) represents
a different district (A, B, C, D & E, respectively).
1
7
-3
-3
-3
-3
2
-3
7
-3
-3
-3
They each propose a bill that will bring their
district $10 in benefits and cost tax payers $15.
3
-3
-3
7
-3
-3
The funds will be raised via general taxation of all
districts – each bill costing $3 for each district.
4
-3
-3
-3
7
-3
All five projects have costs in excess of benefits.
5
-3
-3
-3
-3
7
Without logrolling, will these bills pass?
With logrolling, will these bills pass?
Many special interest projects and pork barrel
projects fit this description: turtle tunnels in Florida,
peanut festivals in Georgia, airports in the middle
of nowhere Pennsylvania, etc.
Logrolling
Logrolling does not necessarily need to be an exchange of votes. It can
be a promise to vote in exchange for a future favor.
Over time, senior legislators may accumulate a large number of IOUs that
they can call in when they have an important piece of legislation to pass.
Junior legislators might want a policy passed but has not political capital
built up, they can ask a senior legislator for assistance calling in past favors.
In this way senior legislators can act as middlemen to facilitate political
exchanges, and in doing so will accumulate even more IOUs from new
colleagues.
Logrolling in the COVID-19 Relief Bills
$1.3 billion in military aid for Egypt.
$1 billion to establish an American Women’s History Museum and a National Museum of the American Latino in
Washington, D.C.
$505 million in foreign aid to reduce income inequality in Central American nations.
$40 million for the Kennedy Center for the Arts in Washington, D.C., which has been closed since March 2020.
$10 million for gender-equity and democracy programs in Pakistan.
$5 million to help build a National Coast Guard Museum in New London, Connecticut.
$696 billion in military appropriations: $23.3 billion to build 10 warships, $9.6 billion for 96 F-35 fighters
“Three-martini lunch” tax deduction that allows businesses to write off two full years’ worth of business meals.
$15 billion of aid for live performance venues and independent theaters.
$1,375 billion for the border wall
Extends a tax break for NASCAR racetrack owners
See these sources for additional information:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/12/24/covid-stimulus-spending-bills-business-lunch-tax-breaksforeign-aid/4028584001/
Interest Group Size and Effectiveness
Large Interest Groups
Potential to have greater influence and
command a lot of political pull
More members to promise as voters
More resources at their disposal
AARP- American Association of Retired
People
NRA – National Rifle Association
NEA- National Education Association
AFT – American Federation of Teachers
Small Interest Groups
Might be more effective than larger
groups due to transaction costs within
the group itself
Interest Group Size and Transaction
Costs
As the size of the group gets larger, there are two factors may reduce the
effectiveness of the group when it comes to bargaining.
1.
Monitoring costs of each group member increases
With a larger group, the incentive to free ride off of the efforts of other members is much
stronger because the risk of getting caught is lower
2.
A shirker in a group of 25 people reduces effort by 1/25
A shirker in a group of 1,000 people reduces effort by 1/1000 – hardly noticeable
Benefits per group member falls
The benefits per member in larger groups are less concentrated than in small groups. So
the incentive to fight for your benefits is weaker.
For a fixed amount of benefit, a group that is 10 times larger will result in a share that
is 10 times smaller for each member.
Interest Group Size and Transaction
Costs
As such, smaller groups have some organizational advantages over larger
groups. HOWEVER, there are two things that may help larger groups
overcome these organizational issues.
1.
There may be private benefits that group membership can offer based on
their level of effort. This can solve the free-rider problem to a degree
2.
AARP has membership discounts; NRA sells branded merchandise; WWF allows
you to “adopt” an endangered species and get a stuffed animal
There may be a member, or a few members, that get a larger portion of
benefits beyond what the average member receives
Archer Daniels Midland benefits disproportionately from policies that increase
demand for US corn
Coase Theorem and the Public
Interest
We cannot expect the allocation of resources as determined by the political
exchange process to flow towards the most highly valued uses –OVERALL.
The general public has high-transaction costs, we should not expect the
allocation of resources to reflect their preferences.
Instead, we expect resources to flow to the most highly valued uses as
determined by the preferences of members of the low transaction cost
group.
The allocation of resources will reflect the preferences of those people with
whom legislators can bargain at a low transaction cost.
Coase Theorem and the Public
Interest
General/Public Interest implies policies with widespread benefits
people tend to free-ride when the benefits are widely dispersed, making it
unlikely that interest groups will lobby for general/public interest issues
What about joining interest groups that lobby for things like environmental
protection; funding for the arts; consumer protection group; mothers
against drunk driving; etc.?
Coase Theorem and the Public
Interest
General/Public Interest implies policies with widespread benefits
people tend to free-ride when the benefits are widely dispersed, making it unlikely
that interest groups will lobby for general/public interest issues
What about joining interest groups that lobby for things like environmental
protection; funding for the arts; consumer protection group; mothers against
drunk driving; etc.?
Even in these cases, the general interest is not being truly represented by these
groups because opportunity costs of the proposals they lobby for are never
considered.
E.g., environmental protections tend to have regressive effects (i.e. impose costs on
low-income individuals). Arts programs tend to go towards higher-income groups as
well
No everyone agrees on exactly what is in the public interest.
Conclusions
The preferences of special interest groups, political elites, economic elites
and other political insiders will be disproportionately represented in policy
outcomes.
These groups have lower transaction costs than the general public, making it
easier to bargain with suppliers of political outcomes.
These groups do not have the ability to consider opportunity costs (time is
limited, political information is imperfect – no prices)
These groups will fight for programs and policies that benefit their members and
the costs of these programs are widely-dispersed to the general public via
taxation.
Many of these policies will have regressive effects.
$$$ Who
wants to win
my money?
$$$
Rules:
• The highest bid will win the $20
• Anyone can bid and you can bid multiple times
• You must pay the value of your highest bid even if you do
not win
• Your payoff function is:
• If you win: $20 – bid
• If you lose: -bid
Special Interest Groups (Factions) and
Rent Seeking
Madison
Federalist #10
Factions are citizens who have a common impulse of passion
or interest who opposes the rights of other citizens or
opposes the collective interests of the community (i.e.,
opposes the public interest).
• They can be large enough to count as a majority of voters
or they can be a minority (essentially special interest
groups
Madison was worried about factions but thought that what
would be necessary to limit factions/eliminate them would
be worse than allowing them to exist.
How to cure
the mischief
of factions
1. Remove the causes of factions
• Destroy the liberty of factions
• Force everyone to hold the same opinions, passions,
and interests
2. Control their potential effects
• Republic form of government instead of direct
democracy
• Large vs. small republics
• Avoid tyranny of the majority
• Rent – in economics, a rent refers to an above average rate
of return. This can refer to the return on owning an asset,
the return to running a particular kind of business, the
return to how you spend your time, etc.
Rent Seeking –
What is it?
• Rent Seeking refers to the act of allocating scarce
resources in order to influence the political process to
obtain an above average rate of return.
• This above average rate of return typically is the result
of obtaining some government privilege
• Barriers to entry into your industry
• A transfer of tax dollars to your group
• Obtaining a lucrative government contract
• A legal mandate that helps increase the demand
for your firm’s product
• Tullock’s Definition of Rent Seeking: the use of resources
for the purpose of obtaining an above average rate of
return that is the result of some activity that has negative
social value.
Rent Seeking
• Tullock’s preferred definition takes into consideration
whether the activity the rent seeker is engaged in will be
socially productive (like obtaining NSF funds for cancer
research) or socially destructive (like erecting a barrier to
entry in your industry).
• Essentially, it is an attempt to obtain wealth for yourself
without having to generate wealth/value for others. To get
a “profit” without engaging in productive activities.
Why Does
Rent Seeking
Occur?
• Without the government’s ability to use force rent seeking
would be very difficult
• Compel citizens to pay taxes which raises the funds
that rent seekers are trying to obtain
• Compel citizens to obey regulations which rent seekers
actively try to get implemented to help their
businesses.
• Politics is an exchange process whereby people (or groups
of people) can demand certain policies or programs to be
supplied by legislators and regulators.
• Special interest groups, lobbyists, industry groups,
even wealthy or motivated individuals will offer
benefits to politicians in exchanged for policies that
provide them with rents.
• These groups also have lower transaction costs of
bargaining with political providers.
Rent Seeking:
The Former
Orthodox
View
• Rent Seeking was simply viewed as a transfer between two
groups.
• One group pressures the government into providing
them with a benefit
• Another group that pays for the benefit in some way
(via higher prices or higher taxes).
• Since both groups are part of society, the costs to one
group are canceled out by the benefit to the other group
and there is no net effect on society for this action.
• This assumes that there is no cost involved in obtaining the
privilege. As Tullock demonstrated in “The Monopoly Cost
of Tariffs” the act of obtaining such a privilege is a costly,
and often competitive, process.
A Graphical
Representation
of Rent Seeking
Costs
1. Monopoly profit/Rent Seeking Cost: Opportunity cost of the
resources used in rent seeking
2. Deadweight Loss/Monopoly Cost: The trades that did not take place
despite MB > MC
3. Cost of the Lobbying Establishment: There are theaters, hotels, fine
dining establishments, and other businesses that exist solely to
provide lobbyists with ways to rent seek.
The Costs of
Rent Seeking
4. Cost of the Gamble/Tullock Lottery: Winning the privilege is not
guaranteed. You are competing with other groups and only one can
win. Often the total resources spent on rent seeking far exceed the
value of the privilege
5. Distortion of the Voting Process: Logrolling must occur in order to
gain majority support for granting a privilege. Moves political
outcomes away from what the general public wants. Imposes large
social costs on most of the community
6. Indirect Cost/Opportunity Cost: All of the energetic and talented
people who could have been engaged in productive activities are
pulled towards rent seeking
• This is unmeasurable but likely massive
An Estimate of
the Cost of
Rent-Seeking
Activities in
Terms of
Economic
Growth
More
Evidence of
Increased
Rent-Seeking:
Occupational
Licensing
• In 2016, the BLS found that occupational licensing requirements have increased
fivefold since the 1950s.
• In the 1950s about 5% of all workers in the US needed some form of
occupational licensing, by 2008 that has increased to 25% of all workers, and
today it’s closer to a third of all occupations.
• These requirements now exist for many low-skilled positions, not just jobs that
require high skill levels (like doctors, lawyers, dentists, etc.)
• Demanders of these kind of restrictions will argue that the requirements protect
consumers and workers.
• This is true for some highly skilled jobs, but is it also true for barbers (who need
more than 2 years of training in some states), tree trimmers, interior designers,
cosmetologists, florists, psychics (in NJ), home entertainment installers, travel
agents, people who pack boxes (in Arizona and Kentucky), furniture
upholsterers, funeral attendants, manicurists, security guards, gas station
attendants (NJ), or hair braiders?
• These requirements protect people who are already in the industry.
• A 2013 study by Kleiner and Krueger found that workers with licenses earn
18% more than unlicensed workers
• A 2016 Brookings report found that licensed workers also have a much easier
time finding employment (as supply is limited)
The Effects of
Occupational
Licensing on
the Economy
• The costs to unlicensed workers, consumers, and the economy
are significant
• A 2017 study by Johnson and Kleiner found that licensing reduces the
geographical mobility of labor, making it 36% less likely that you will move to
another state if you have a license.
• A 2000 study of dentists by Kleiner and Kudrle found that licensing did not
increase the quality of care.
• A similar study of nurses found that in some cases licensing may reduce
quality, and it raised prices of exams by 3-16%
• They also have regressive effects – i.e., they impose high costs on low-income
populations
• Requiring years of schooling, paying to pass an exam, paying for continuing
education, paying to renew your license on time, paying fines if you do not,
etc.
• Prevents people from entering in many low-skilled fields that are lucrative i.e.,
reduces income mobility
• A 2017 study by Meehan, Timmons, and Meehan of the Archbridge Institute
found that growth in the number of occupations requiring a license is
associated with a 1.7% -6.7 reduction in income mobility
• “Cadillac Effect” – term coined by Milton Friedman – reduces the existence of
low-cost service making it unavailable to low-income consumers.
How much rent seeking occurs in a society depends on the
relative costs and benefits of engaging in rent seeking
What Affects
the Rate of
Rent Seeking?
• The higher the potential benefit on the table, the more
attractive rent seeking will become.
• In the US, we allocate about 40% of GDP through the
political process (in 2019 it was 35.74%; in 2020 it was
44%).
• Other developed nations spend at similar levels.
• When large stimulus packages are up for debate, lots
of people engage in rent-seeking in order to get a
piece of it.
• The lower the costs involved in rent seeking; the more
attractive rent seeking will become.
• Raising transaction costs may help reduce the rate of
rent seeking
1.
2.
What are Some
Potential
Solutions to the
Problem of Rent
Seeking?
3.
4.
Bicameral Legislative Branch – increases transaction costs by
making bills pass a majority in more than one house.
Generality Amendment – prohibiting Congress from making laws
that do not apply equally to all citizens.
Competitive Governance – having multiple government suppliers
of the same service
Direct Democracy – no elected representatives, individuals vote
on policy issues directly.
• creates lots of other problems
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Minarchy – reducing the scope of government to what is called the
“night watchman” state. Only focuses on protective functions of
government.
Higher Voting Thresholds – raising the transaction costs of striking
an agreement
Registration of Lobbyists – requiring lobbyists to formally register
with the government prior to lobbying
Epistocracy – a system in which the votes of people who can prove
their political knowledge count more than the votes of people who
can’t.
Sunset Clauses – letting special privileges expire after a certain
time limit. This reduces expected value of any given privilege
• more effective for zoning, licensing, local monopolies
2022 Top
Spending on
Lobbying
Activities by
Industry
Industry
Pharmaceuticals/Health Products
Electronics Mfg & Equip
Insurance
Securities & Investment
Real Estate
Business Associations
Hospitals/Nursing Homes
Oil & Gas
Electric Utilities
Health Services/HMOs
Air Transport
Telecom Services
Misc Manufacturing & Distributing
Civil Servants/Public Officials
Health Professionals
Internet
Education
Automotive
Chemical & Related Manufacturing
Commercial Banks
Total
$373,743,282
$221,523,270
$158,454,609
$137,779,163
$135,572,239
$131,458,961
$124,661,121
$124,378,864
$124,028,671
$122,008,218
$118,131,273
$117,540,160
$116,135,527
$108,453,083
$95,715,934
$94,603,591
$90,832,939
$81,307,605
$65,907,144
$64,822,888
Recipient
Top
Congressional
Recipients of
Special Interest
Contributions ,
2022 Cycle
Charles E Schumer (D-NY)
Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif)
Maggie Hassan (D-NH)
Tim Ryan (D-Ohio)
Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev)
Patty Murray (D-Wash)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
John Thune (R-SD)
Tim Scott (R-SC)
Ron Wyden (D-Ore)
Cathy McMorris Rodgers (R-Wash)
Katie Britt (R-Ala)
Liz Cheney (R-Wyo)
Mark Kelly (D-Ariz)
Robert Menendez (D-NJ)
Todd Young (R-Ind)
Alex Padilla (D-Calif)
Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn)
Chris Van Hollen (D-Md)
Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)
From Lobbyists
$723,967
$552,543
$483,212
$464,898
$428,494
$399,950
$392,976
$347,128
$320,054
$316,153
$298,221
$295,838
$281,840
$275,431
$267,535
$257,660
$248,170
$246,658
$239,407
$230,305
From Lobbyists + Family
$787,867
$556,543
$500,862
$490,695
$450,129
$414,050
$415,216
$351,628
$341,704
$330,753
$302,221
$311,178
$295,140
$290,413
$277,235
$262,560
$263,370
$253,158
$243,907
$234,705
Rank
Top Interest
Groups Giving
to Members
of Congress,
2022 Cycle
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Interest Group
Retired
Securities/Invest
Lawyers/Law Firms
Real Estate
Health Professionals
Leadership PACs
Repub/Conservative
Education
Insurance
Democratic/Liberal
Lobbyists
Pro-Israel
Oil & Gas
Pharm/Health Prod
Business Services
Electronics Mfg/Eqp
TV/Movies/Music
Crop Production
Non-Profits
Commercial Banks
Dem GOP
Pct
Pct
$295,752,432 54% 46%
$94,807,398 60% 39%
$75,370,529 80% 20%
$68,323,149 54% 46%
$54,007,650 62% 38%
$49,726,046 46% 54%
$41,552,799 0%
100%
$35,828,953 89% 9%
$34,545,536 48% 52%
$32,792,553 96% 4%
$29,035,669 55% 45%
$23,389,668 64% 36%
$22,383,634 23% 77%
$21,883,375 58% 42%
$21,099,132 74% 26%
$19,046,853 70% 29%
$17,522,834 82% 18%
$17,417,087 33% 67%
$16,990,607 72% 27%
$16,623,402 43% 57%
Total
Top Recipient
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Charles E Schumer (D-NY)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Charles E Schumer (D-NY)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Steve Scalise (R-La)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Charles E Schumer (D-NY)
Shontel Brown (D-Ohio)
Joe Manchin (D-WVa)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
John Boozman (R-Ark)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Raphael Warnock (D-Ga)
Top Interest Groups Giving to Each Major Party
Opensecrets.org → Influence & Lobbying → Interest Groups → Top Interest Groups to Congress
Democrats
Republicans
1. Retired
2. Lawyers/Law Firms
3. Securities/Investment
4. Real Estate
5. Health Professionals
6. Education
7. Democratic/Liberal Groups and PACs
8. Leadership PACs
9. Insurance
10. Business Services
1. Retired
2. Republican/Conservative Groups PACs
3. Securities/Investment
4. Real Estate
5. Leadershi
