Description
The Country Report
Word Limit: 1,500 (40% of module mark)
You will write a report on ONE country in Southeast Asia, designed to brief an incoming Western ambassador about that country’s political and economic development and current situation. This assessment is designed to test your knowledge of a particular country but also to develop your abilities to present a very concise, detailed report suitable for a non-academic audience.
The country I have chosen and want you to do is the Philippines.
As with all assessments in SPIR, the Country Report will be marked using SPIR’s standard marking criteria. But here are some specific tips on how to complete this assignment successfully:
You must choose a country for which there is sufficient academic literature; for this reason, Laos may be quite difficult. You may not choose Brunei, as this is the subject of the sample report provided on QMPlus, which will help you to understand what a Country Report should be like [ATTACHED IS EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY REPORT OF BRUNEI].
You should divide the report into sections with useful sub-headings.
The report should provide an overview of the political and economic development of your chosen country and relate this to the current political situation that the ambassador will encounter. Put yourself in the position of a senior diplomat who wants to quickly grasp the most important aspects of their new posting. Topics you might want to include could be:
The country’s economic development: what has shaped it, and what are its main contours?
The evolution of the country’s political regime: how has the current regime come about, through what struggles and conflicts? What forces are dominant and what is the character of the regime?
Remember: this module offers a political economy optic on the region. Try to consider how economic and political development are related, rather than treating them as separate. Likewise, don’t approach either development or the political system in a technical manner, e.g. just describing the formal constitutional arrangements. This is a politics module: we are interested in how power, interests and conflict determine what actually happens, which might be quite different to what a constitution says on paper!
Current political and economic situation, including threats and challenges to the incumbent government.
Whatever structure you choose, please do not simply produce a historical narrative that is descriptive rather than analytical. This is a very common mistake on this assignment. You should include historical detail only when it is essential to support your analysis, and understanding the present situation. We are notlooking for a sort of “general background” of the sort you might find on a Wikipedia page. It should be a focused report on how power is concentrated and exercised in your chosen country. Always structure your work, and lead paragraphs, with argument and analysis, not historical narrative.
Another common mistake, often seen in combination with the one just mentioned, is to end the coverage of the country in the late 1990s or early 2000s. This often occurs alongside a flawed “historical narrative” approach because students narrating a country’s post-colonial history quickly run out of space. It also reflects inadequate research, relying on the first couple of weeks of reading on the module, which only take us up to the late 1990s/early 2000s.
Feel free to include charts, diagrams, tables or maps if necessary. These do not count towards your word limit. You must include a label beneath them, with a title and source, with a citation (and this label does count towards the word limit). Example: Fig. 1: Cambodian GDP Growth (Source: UNCTAD 2016: 1).
Reports that are attractively presented will score higher marks for presentation. The text should, as always, be double-spaced, but feel free to experiment with the layout to make it more like a professional report. You will not lose marks if you present it like a normal essay, though.
This is a report to a diplomat, not an essay. Given the intended audience, your report should be written clearly and concisely, avoiding jargon. There is no need to include a detailed introduction or conclusion in the same way that you would in an essay. Similarly, you should avoid engaging in debate or explicitly deploying a theoretical framework. Your goal is to conduct an analysis of the country. This will necessarily be implicitly “argumentative”, in the sense that it will draw connections between phenomena in order to explain outcomes. For instance, you might claim that economic patronage networks are responsible for a regime’s political longevity. That is an argumentative claim, because it could, for example, be argued instead that political culture explains regime longevity. But since this is a report, and a short one at that, you must quickly communicate your analysis of the situation to the reader, and not get bogged down in theoretical debates.
Useful sources, including sections for each country, are provided in Appendix A of this handbook and on QMplus. You should consult roughly seven or eight scholarly sources during your research. Always start with these sources – NOT with an Internet search! You may also reference non-scholarly sources, but these should be in addition to, and used to supplement, high-quality academic literature, which must form the core of your research.
Citations and a full bibliography must be provided as standard, according to SPIR’s Coursework Formatting and Referencing guide. You must include a citation whenever you draw on an idea, use data, or quote from a published source – this assignment is no different in this respect to any other. You will lose marks for representation of sources if you fail to cite adequately, or your references are not properly formatted.
Unformatted Attachment Preview
NOTE: this document is supplied merely as an example to help you prepare your own country report.
It is not a template to be slavishly copied – there are many possible ways of presenting the report
successfully, and the overall structure and content must be dictated by the task requirements set
out in the handbook and the specific country you have chosen. In consulting this example, then, do
not get too obsessed with the Brunei-specific information, but rather pay special attention to:
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the type of information that is included (focused on key political and economic dynamics,
and concerned to highlight the relationship between the two);
the contemporary focus (discussion is concerned to explain the situation in Brunei today, not
many years in the past – and historical information is only included to support this goal);
the analytical quality of the report (it leads with argument and analysis, not chronology or
description (see the topic sentences of each paragraph); data, facts and description are only
used insofar as it supports an analysis of what makes the country “tick” (no random
dumping of facts);
the tone of the writing (professional, but not “academic” – theory is left out; debates are not
foregrounded; the usual “scaffolding” and “sign-posting” is minimised);
the presentation (citations are provided whenever an idea, fact or text is drawn from
another source; figures are labelled and sources provided; a full bibliography is provided,
formatted according to SPIR guidelines);
the economy of language: the report contains 1,500 words, but covers a lot of ground
because each point is communicated using the fewest number of words possible.
Country Report: Brunei Darussalam
In some key respects, Brunei is more similar to the Arabian Gulf monarchies than neighbouring
Southeast Asian countries, being an absolutist sultanate whose economy and socio-political stability
is sustained by hydrocarbon exports. Despite the regime’s longevity, dwindling oil reserves raise
doubts about its long-term sustainability.
Political Background
British imperialism has strongly shaped Brunei’s political evolution. Ruled by Britain as a
protectorate, then colony, from 1888, Brunei achieved independence only in 1984. Although a 1959
constitution declared Brunei a self-governing nation, Britain retained control over foreign affairs,
security and defence, and still maintains a force of Gurkhas in Brunei today. Moreover, British
intervention in the early Cold War effectively destroyed the emergence of democratic rule. The leftwing People’s Party of Brunei (PRB) won the country’s first elections in 1962, and joined a broad
anti-British revolt in North Borneo designed to prevent the territory’s incorporation into the
Federation of Malaysia. British forces suppressed the revolt; the constitution was suspended, and
the PRB banned (Jones, 2012: 42). Brunei’s independence was further delayed by Malaysia’s desire
to incorporate the territory, which is entirely surrounded and intersected by the Malaysian state of
Sarawak (Jones, 2012: 68-9). However, following new treaties with Britain in 1971 and 1979, Brunei
became independent in 1984, joining the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and enjoying
peaceful relations with neighbouring states since.
After Britain’s crushing of Brunei’s democracy, the country has remained a personalised autocracy
under the Sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, with no real scope for representative institutions. According to
the 1959 constitution, the state’s main structures are the Executive Council (cabinet), the Legislative
Council (parliament), the Privy Council, the Council of Succession, and the State Religious Council.
However, the Legislative Council is not elected – indeed, there have been no elections since 1962 –
and was suspended from 1984-2004, when it was resurrected but stuffed with handpicked social
elites (Damit, 2007: 104). The Legislative Council thus performs a weak “advisory” function, with the
Sultan (who is also a Legislative Council member, along with his cabinet) empowered to veto or
approve laws at will (Hang, 2007: 269). Effective power is thus concentrated in the royal family,
supported by a technocratic civil service (Srinivias, 1997: 510). The Sultan has often combined the
positions of prime minister, finance minister and home minister, though Crown Prince Muhtadee
Billah has assumed growing responsibilities as senior minister since 2005 (Talib, 2013).
In the absence of democratic legitimacy, to sustain its rule the regime relies on religious-racial
ideology; repression; and economic inducements:
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Brunei’s official ideology, Melayu Islam Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy), establishes Islam
as the official religion and assigns spiritual authority to the sultan as the protector of Malay
rights and values (Talib, 2013; Müller, 2015). The Ministry of Religious Affairs maintains strict
control over religious leaders, requiring imams to obtain licenses from the sultan to preach
(Müller, 2015: 320).
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All forms of political opposition have been effectively outlawed since 1962, when martial law
was declared and never formally lifted, giving the regime continual emergency powers
(Talib, 2013). Press freedom is curtailed; only one political party, the National Development
Party, has been permitted to operate legally (since 2005); and only one trade union (for oil
workers) is permitted, with strikes outlawed (Freedom House, 2016).
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Opposition is also muted by the provision of extensive state welfare, including free
education and healthcare, subsidised fuel and food, and low-cost housing (Dao, 1996: 507;
Srinivias, 1997). Combined with the state’s wider role in economic development (see below),
this has effectively made much of the population directly dependent on the regime for their
economic wellbeing.
This strategy mirrors those used by oil-rich Gulf states, and has similarly negative consequences for
political and civil liberties (see Fig. 1). The regime passed new sedition laws in 2005 and intensified
sharia law provisions in 2013, banning criticism of the sultan and Islam and outlawing “immoral”
behaviour like adultery and homosexuality. Enforcement of these laws, however, seems relatively
light (Freedom House, 2016), suggesting either a pre-emptive move or a bid to strengthen the
regime’s religious-ideological standing (Müller, 2015), following high-profile corruption scandals (see
below).
Political Rights and Civil Liberties
7/40
0/12
• Electoral Processes
3/16
• Political Pluralism and Participation
3/ 12
• Functioning of Government
1/0
• Discretionary Political Rights
Civil Liberties
22/60
6/16
• Freedom of Expression and Belief
3/12
• Associational and Organizational Rights
6/16
• Rule of Law
• Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 7/16
Fig. 1: Brunei Rights and Liberties Scores.
Source: Freedom House (2016)
Economic Development
A further parallel between Brunei and the Gulf monarchies is the country’s overwhelming reliance
on hydrocarbon exports. Oil production, which began in 1929, and liquefied natural gas, produced
since the mid-1960s, now comprise over 60% of Brunei’s GDP and over 90% of its exports (OECD,
2013: 2). Accordingly, Brunei’s economic expansion, while generally rapid, has been highly
vulnerable to shifts in global oil prices (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2: Crude Oil Prices (orange; left axis) and Bruneian GDP (blue;
right axis). Source: Macrotrends, 2016; UNCTAD, 2016)
Hydrocarbon exports have financed the regime’s co-optation strategy, described above. While
extraction is done by a mixture of multinationals and state-owned enterprises (see, e.g. BSP, 2015;
Brunei LNG, 2010), massive royalties accrue to the state, supplying 90% of government revenue
(Prusak, 2016). The regime has used the profits to invest in economic expansion, employment and
welfare subsidies, creating the highest per capita income in Southeast Asia: US$78,369 in 2015,
adjusted for purchasing power parity (World Bank, 2016).
Due to this “Shell-fare state” (Clad, 2017: ch.3), the state has acquired a commanding role in the
economy. Government expenditure comprises around a third of Brunei’s gross domestic product
(GDP) (2013 data; IMF, 2016: 9), and 28.8% of workers are employed directly by the state (2010
data; OECD, 2013: 4), with perhaps 30-40% more employed by government-linked entities (Prusak,
2016). Alongside hydrocarbons, state-owned enterprises dominate other key economic sectors,
including telecommunications, transportation, and energy, receiving “preferential treatment when
tendering for lucrative government contracts” (Export.gov, 2016). Much of the private sector is also
indirectly reliant on the hydrocarbon sector and government spending, making it dependent on
regime protection. For example, Brunei’s Local Business Development framework compels the
hydrocarbon sector to prioritise local contractors, forcing foreign suppliers to work through them
(Export.gov, 2016). Combined with government largesse and zero taxation, this makes Brunei’s local
capitalist class an unlikely source of reformist pressure.
Current Challenges
Brunei’s most severe challenge is the economy’s overwhelming reliance on diminishing hydrocarbon
reserves amid continuing global recession. Brunei’s oil could run out as early as 2037 (Vanderklippe,
2015). The regime is now scrambling to diversify the economy, but hitherto slow progress portends
the possible collapse of the sultanate’s economy and thus the basis of continued absolutist rule. The
recent fall in global oil prices has already led to a sharp economic contraction, slashing government
revenues by 70% since 2012/13 and compelling government spending cuts of 6% in 2015/16 (Prusak,
2016). The government’s fiscal deficit now stands at almost 16% of GDP, higher than that of Greece
(Prusak, 2016). Although Brunei’s sovereign wealth fund – estimated at US$170bn (Export.gov, 2016)
– provides some cushioning, the situation is not indefinitely sustainable. A 2014 white paper, Brunei
Vision 2035, clearly recognised the urgency of diversification, but the task ahead is enormous.
Decades of public-sector dominance has “crowded out” private-sector investment and growth,
making “rebalancing” essential (OECD, 2013: 4); yet any adjustment in social spending could breed
socio-political unrest. Likewise, changes to the extremely restrictive and uncompetitive business
environment are needed (OECD, 2013: 5-10); but local businesses benefiting from such restrictions
are unlikely to welcome their demise.
A related challenge is the rise of official corruption. According to Transparency International
indicators, Brunei is not particularly corrupt, ranking thirty-eighth out of 175 countries (Export.gov,
2016). However, this is arguably because high salaries deter low-level corruption and political
centralisation means gross malfeasance is concentrated within the royal family itself. Audits in the
wake of the 1997 financial crisis found that Prince Jefri Bolkiah, the sultan’s younger brother and
Brunei’s then finance minister, had embezzled US$14.8bn (Seal, 2011). A series of embarrassing
lawsuits followed as Jefri fled into exile, returning in 2009. The extravagant lifestyles of Jefri, the
sultan, and the rest of the royal family have been widely covered in the international media (Seal,
2011; Moulton, 2015; Zeveloff, 2014).
The sultan’s phased imposition of sharia law from 2013 onwards, with harsh corporal and capital
punishments initially anticipated from 2018, can be seen as a bid to regain moral authority following
these scandals. However, in addition to attracting widespread international criticism, the move has
unsettled the one-third of Bruneian residents who do not practise Islam, plus many modernist
Muslim citizens (Ozanick, 2015). Aside from the fact that the new laws are highly unlikely to be
applied to Brunei’s ruling elite, creating a further cause for popular resentment, experts warned that
the crackdown could prompt a “brain drain”, compromising Brunei Vision 2035, which explicitly
seeks to rebase the economy on “well-educated and highly skilled people” (Ozanick, 2015). To date,
the severest sentences have not been imposed.
In the short term, the longstanding suppression of any viable political opposition and the
population’s extreme economic dependence on the state means that the regime can ride out these
challenges. However, in the longer term, these problems threaten the strategies the sultan has used
to maintain social order in Brunei since the country’s independence. Rocky times lie ahead.
References
Brunei LNG (2010) “About Us”, Brunei LNG, no date, accessed at
http://www.bruneilng.com/about_history.htm, 21 December 2016.
BSP [Brunei Shell Petroleum] (2015) “History of Oil & Gas”, BSP, no date, accessed at
https://www.bsp.com.bn/main/about-bsp/history-of-oil-gas, 21 December 2016.
Clad, J. (2017 [1989]) Behind the Myth: Business, Money and Power in Southeast Asia. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Damit, M.Y. (2007) “Brunei Darussalam: Towards a New Era,” in Singh, D. and Salazar, L.C. (eds.)
Southeast Asian Affairs 2007 (Singapore: ISEAS): 103-113.
Dao, M.Q. (1996) “Brunei: An Economy in Transition”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 26(4): 505-511.
Export.gov (2016) “Brunei Country Commercial Guide”, Export.gov, 17 October, accessed at
https://www.export.gov/article?series=a0pt00000000H3yAAE&type=Country_Commercial__kav,
21 December 2016.
Freedom House (2016) “Brunei”, Freedom in the World, no date, accessed at
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/brunei, 21 December 2016
Hang, T.T. (2007) “Brunei’s Revamped Constitution: The Sultan as the Grundnorm?” Australian
Journal of Asian Law 9(2): 264-288.
Jones, L. (2012) ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan).
Macrotrends (2016) “Crude Oil Prices – 70 Year Historical Chart”, Macrotrends, 30 December,
accessed at http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart, 2 January 2017.
Moulton, E. (2015) “Sex, Lies and Sharia Law: The Secret Life of the Sultan of Brunei”, News.com.au,
27 April.
Müller, D.M. (2015) “Sharia Law and the Politics of ‘Faith Control’ in Brunei Darussalam: Dynamics of
Socio-Legal Change in a Southeast Asian Sultanate” Internationales Asienforum 46(3/4): 313-345.
OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] (2013) “Structural Policy Notes:
Country Notes: Brunei Darussalam”, OECD, no date, accessed at
https://www.oecd.org/site/seao/Brunei%20Darussalam.pdf, 21 December 2016.
Ozanick, B. (2015) “The Implications of Brunei’s Sharia Law”, The Diplomat, 21 May.
Prusak, M. (2016) “Brunei’s Economy Running on Empty”, The Diplomat, 17 February.
Seal, M. (2011) “The Prince Who Blew Through Billions”, Vanity Fair, 23 June.
Srinivias, B. (1997) “Political Economy of Transition of Brunei Darussalam: Towards Retardation or
Development?” Global Economic Review 26(4): 45-64.
Talib, N.S. (2013) “Brunei Darussalam: Royal Absolutism and the Modern State”, Kyoto Review of
Southeast Asia 13(1), accessed at https://kyotoreview.org/issue-13/brunei-darussalam-royalabsolutism-and-the-modern-state, 21 December 2016.
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] (2016) “UNCTADstat”, UNCTAD,
no date, accessed at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx, 2 January
2017.
Vanderklippe, N. (2015) “Brunei’s Oil-Fuelled Economy Running on Empty”, Globe and Mail, 2
February.
World Bank (2016) “GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)”, World Bank, no date, accessed at
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2015&locations=BN&start=1990
&view=chart, 21 December 2016.
Zeveloff, J. (2014) “The Royals Of Brunei Lead Lives Of Almost Incomprehensible Wealth”, Business
Insider, 8 May.
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