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Read the article provided by Marquardt on Prison Staff and Physical Coercion. Answer the following questions related to the completion of this study. Answer each question with 6-8 sentences. ONLY use article as sources, cite all work NO PLAGIARISM! What role of the researcher was utilized in this study? (Choose one and explain why you chose that particular role: Complete participant, participant as observer, observer as participant or complete observer)What was the purpose of the research? Does field research seem like a good way to explore this phenomenon? Why or why not?The author was in the field for 19 months. His first data collection created the typology he was to utilize for the second half of his study – the part that is analyzed in the paper you are reading. Do you think this typology could have been created through a survey of guards and inmates or do you think it could only have developed through work in the field? After reading the entire paper – do you think the depth of information collected and presented could have been done through interviews alone?How important was the cultivation of relationships between the author and his “key informants” to the end result of this research?
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James W. Marquart, Prison Guards and the Use of
Physical Coercion as a Mechanism of Prisoner Control,
24 Criminology 347 (1986)
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PRISON GUARDS AND THE USE OF
PHYSICAL COERCION AS A MECHANISM
OF PRISONER CONTROL*
JAMES W. MARQUART
Mississippi State University
This paper examines the dynamics of the use of unofficial force by
prison guards in a Texas penitentiary. The findings suggest that rather
than being idiosyncratic or sporadic, guard use of physical coercion was
highly structured and deeply entrenched in the guardsubculture. Upperranking guards served as mentors and socialized younger nonranking
guards into the process of using physical coercion. These nonranking
guards actually served as apprentices. Most importantly, guards who used
physical force were rewardedfor their behavior with improved duty posts
or even promotions.
In the past 40 years, the study of social control in prisons has generated a
considerable body of research. Most of these studies have primarily focused
on the formal prisoner control structure wherein internal order is achieved
through such mechanisms as official rules and regulations (Clemmer, 1940;
McCleery, 1960; Goffman, 1961; Cressey, 1968); formal disciplinary procedures involving “write-ups” and adjudication before disciplinary courts (Carroll, 1974; Gobert and Cohen, 1981); and the prison staff’s use of such
punishments as loss of privileges or solitary confinement (Cloward, 1960;
Wright, 1973; Hawkins, 1976; Berkman, 1979). In addition, other researchers have examined the staff’s official use of inmate elites as convict guards to
maintain order (Mouledous, 1962; Marquart and Crouch, 1984).
Although most prisoner control research centers on formal measures, several studies have been conducted on the informal system. This line of inquiry
typically shows that order is based on “trade-offs”; illegitimate rewards;
guard accommodations with inmate elites (Cloward 1960; Carroll, 1974;
Davidson, 1974; Jacobs, 1977); or concessions in which the staff overlook
minor inmate rule violations (Sykes, 1958; Thomas, 1984). No research, to
date, however, has examined the internal institutional order that is based on
the guards’ use of physical coercion.
In theory, the threat of force by guards is always present, but the literature
* Revised version of a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, 1984. The assistance of Julian B. Roebuck, Bradley Anderson,
and Sheldon Ekland-Olson in reading earlier drafts is gratefully acknowledged. I also
appreciate the Social Science Research Center for support during the preparation of this
draft.
CRIMINOLOGY
VOLUME 24
NUMBER 2
1986
MARQUART
lacks any systematic analysis of violence as a mechanism of social control in
this setting. This neglect leaves an unbalanced picture of the structure and
process of prisoner control. The present research documents with participant
observation data how and why guards in one Texas penitentiary utilized unofficial physical force as a routine mechanism of informal social control.l The
research shows that the guards’ use of coercion does not result from personality defects or the brutalizing nature of the institutional environment
(Zimbardo, 1972). Neither did their use of coercive power precipitate any
mass disorder or widespread retaliation from the prisoners (Sykes, 1958;
Hepburn, 1985). Instead, this paper demonstrates that the guards’ use of
force was a socially structured tactic of prisoner control that was well
entrenched in the guard culture.
RESEARCH STRATEGY
Data for this paper were collected at the Johnson Unit (a pseudonym), a
large maximum security facility within the Texas Department of Corrections.
The author entered the penitentiary, with the warden’s permission, as a guard
to collect data on social control and order for 19 months (June 1981 through
January 1983), worked throughout the institution (for example, cell blocks,
shops, dormitories), and observed how the guards meted out official and unofficial punishments, coopted inmate elites to act as “convict guards,” cultivated snitches, and other guard work activities. Formal and informal
interviews, documents and records, and direct observations were used (Lofland, 1971; Wax, 1971). In addition, over 20 key informants were cultivated
among the guards and inmate elites or leaders who assisted in analyzing control and order as daily phenomena. Close relationships were developed with
these informants, and their “expert” knowledge about prison life and prisoner
control was essential throughout the fieldwork (Jacobs, 1974; Marquart,
1986). Most importantly, the daily routine of prison events (work, school,
counts, cell and body searches, the administration of punishment) as well as
various unexpected events (fights, stabbings, suicide attempts, escapes) were
observed and noted.
After a time, the author became privy to guard violence and observed and
simply noted 30 incidents wherein the guards physically punished inmates for
various rule violations. Key guard informants also described an additional 20
force situations. These 50 cases occurred between December 1981 and
November 1982. At this point, a general description of the incidents was
written up and the altercations were discussed at great length with 7 guard
and 15 inmate key informants. The guard informants consisted of 3 supervisors (sergeant, lieutenant, captain) and 4 hall officers-a highly regarded slot
1. Unofficial force is defined as force not related to the protection of life and
property.
PRISON GUARDS AND PHYSICAL COERCION
for nonranking guards. All 15 convict informants were called building tenders. These inmates were used by the guards to maintain control in the living
areas. Most had violent records and many years of prison experience. These
22 informants were extremely reliable because of their positions, sympathy
with the research effort, and consistency in providing accurate information.
Essentially, these 50 cases served as a base to further develop a systematic
method of data collection and analysis. Then, after reviewing the literature
on social control in prison and social control theory in general (as well as the
police use of force), the author developed a systematic strategy to catalogue
and code four functions of the guards’ use of unofficial force. This analytic
strategy was then applied to 30 cases of observed and informant-reported
guard violence that occurred between December 4, 1982, and January 28,
1983. These latter 30 cases serve as the data base and will be examined at
length throughout this paper.
THE RESEARCH SETTING
The Johnson Unit is a large maximum security institution housing, in 1981,
nearly 3,000 inmates (47% black, 36% white, 17% Hispanic) and is located
on 14,000 acres of farmland. Inmates assigned to this prison were classified
by Texas Department of Corrections as recidivists over the age of 25, all of
whom had been in prison (excluding juvenile institutions) three or more
times. Johnson had a system-wide reputation for tight disciplinary control
and housed a large number of inmate troublemakers from the Texas prisons.
Structurally, the prison had 18 inside cell blocks (or tanks) and 12 dormitories which branched out from a single central hall-a telephone pole design.
The hall was the main thoroughfare of the prison and was almost one quarter
of a mile long, measuring 16 feet wide by 12 feet high.
The staff at the prison numbered around 235 officers (85% white, 10%
black, 5% Hispanic). This all-male security force was divided into two
forces-building and field. The interest in this investigation lies with the
building force that numbered nearly 145 officers. They were distributed
between the three shifts.2 The apex of the organizational structure was the
warden, and beneath him were two assistant wardens. Although the wardens
were the prison’s chief security officers, they served primarily as administrators. The actual management and supervision of the daily security measures
and convict “business” was the responsibility of the Building Major. The
Major supervised two Captains who in turn supervised four lieutenants. Last,
there were eight sergeants who helped the lieutenants manage the shifts.
Between the ranking staff and the line prison guards was a group of nearly
2. The morning shift was from 5:45 am to 1:45 pm, the evening shift 1:45 to 9:45 pm,
and the night shift 9:45 pm to 5:45 am. The researcher was fortunate enough to work on
all three shifts.
MARQUART
25 guards called hall officers. At Johnson, all officers began their careers
working in the cell blocks or tanks. Officers who demonstrated they could
“work a tank” were defined as “good officers” and were selected by their
supervisors (lieutenants and sergeants) to become hall officers. Properly
“working a tank” involved keeping correct inmate counts, breaking up fights,
the maintenance of discipline in a “cool manner” without yelling and arguing
with inmates or constantly writing disciplinary reports. Although counting
ability and “common sense” (the ability to manage inmates in ordinary situations) were musts, the willingness and initiative to break up fights with
inmates, not backing down in confrontations with inmates, and the inclination to actually fight inmates were the critical factors leading to selection for a
hall “boss” slot. As one supervisor stated, “I don’t want him (as a hall
officer) if he doesn’t have nuts.” These officers were regarded as the best of
the line prison officers, and selection for this position was regarded as a promotion, a status symbol, and a sign of a promising future within this prison
system. The remaining officers staffed the cell blocks, dormitories, gun towers, dining halls, and other security-related jobs and were rarely promoted.
This latter group supplied the rapid turnover cadre that characterizes all
prisons.
INTIMIDATION AND PHYSICAL COERCION
To control the inmates at Johnson, the guard staff employed both rewards
and punishments. In the official control structure, the guards used a privilege
system (for example, good time, furloughs, improved job and living quarters)
that provided the majority of prisoners with enough incentive to follow the
rules most of the time. Failure to comply typically resulted in the loss of
privileges and usually solitary confinement. Because Johnson was so highly
regimented, the fear of getting caught and losing privileges deterred most
inmates from serious rule infractions. However, those who frequently broke
the rules or engaged in serious violations (for example, assaulted staff,
fomented rebellion, or stabbed other inmates) were unofficially controlled by
the guards through verbal intimidation and various degrees of physical punitive force.
VERBAL INTIMIDATION
Inmates who challenged an officer’s authority (for example, by insubordination, cursing at him, or “giving him a hard time”) usually received verbal
assaults from ranking officers or supervisors (sergeants, lieutenants, and captains). Verbal assaults, though physically harmless, induced humiliation and
were used to cripple or demean the erring inmate’s self concept. In addition,
this control tactic intimidated, ridiculed, or destroyed the “face” of the
offending inmate and often involved racial epithets, name calling, derogation,
PRISON GUARDS AND PHYSICAL COERCION
threats, and scare tactics. The following verbal assault by one ranking officer
upon an inmate illustrates a typical humiliation ceremony. “You stupid nigger, if you ever lie to me or any other officer about what you’re doing, I’ll
knock your teeth in.” On another occasion the researcher observed a supervisor make this frequently heard threat: “Say, big boy, you’re some kind of
motherfucker aren’t you? I ought just go ahead and whip your ass here and
now. If you think you’re man enough let’s do it.”
Verbal assaults such as these were daily occurrences. In some cases,
inmates were threatened with extreme physical injury (“you’ll leave here [the
prison] in an ambulance”) or even death (“nobody cares if a convict dies in
here, we’ll beat you to death”). Essentially, verbal assaults alluding to physical force were scare tactics meant to deter inmates from future transgressions.
Those who failed to “internalize” the message and repeatedly violated the
rules were roughed up as a matter of course.
TYPES OF COERCION
The first type of unofficial physical coercion was called (by inmates and
officers alike) a “tune up,” “attitude adjustment,” or “counselling.” These
force displays were used for minor officer-inmate offenses (for example, refusing to obey an order, swearing at or arguing with an officer, belligerence, and
the expression of a flippant and negative attitude) and rarely involved serious
physical injury. “Tune ups” consisted of verbal humiliation, shoves, kicks
and head and body slaps.
This type of coercion functioned as an “attention getter” and was meant to
scare and intimidate the inmate-victim. The following account, related to the
researcher by an officer eyewitness, illustrates the circumstances that led to
most “tune ups.”
I [hall officer] had a hard time in the North Dining Hall with an inmate
who budged in line to eat with his friend. Man, we had a huge argument
right there in the food line after I told him to “Get to the back of the
line.” I finally got him out [of the dining hall] and put him on the wall. 3
I told my supervisor about the guy right away. Then the inmate yelled
“Yea, you can go ahead and lock me up [solitary] or beat me if that’s
how you get your kicks.” Me and the supervisor brought the guy into
the Major’s office. 4 Once in the office, this idiot [inmate] threw his chewing gum in a garbage can and tried to look tough. One officer jumped up
3. The “wall” was the wall area near the Major’s office. Practically every time a hall
officer had a problem with an inmate, the inmate was instructed to “catch the wall.” Once
“on the wall,” the inmate waited until the officer or his supervisor talked over the problem.
It was not uncommon for inmates to “stand on the wall” for hours, or even days.
4. The Major’s office was the place where all disciplinary measures against inmates
were meted out.
MARQUART
and slapped him across the face and I tackled him. A third officer joined
us and we punched and kicked the shit out of him. I picked him up and
pulled his head back by the hair while one officer pulled out his knife and
said “You know, I ought to just go ahead and cut your lousy head off.”
Besides being roughed up, this inmate was indeed scared. He had actually
believed that the officers would not hit him. I saw this inmate, who had several lumps and bruises on his face, standing “on the wall” by the Major’s
office and asked him what happened. He said “Man, I didn’t think you got
fucked up for smarting off.” Although this inmate had been at Johnson for
six months, he stated to the author that he knew the guards would use force,
but he also believed they would not hit him for such a “petty ass” violation.
Many “tune ups” also took place after disciplinary court. One reliable
officer informant told the researcher about two “tune ups” following the
court procedure.
The first inmate was tried for refusing to work. The tape recorder was
shut off5 and a supervisor said, “You’re going to work from now on, you
understand?” After this, the supervisor slapped him on the head, kicked
him in the ass, and literally threw him out the door. The next inmate
came in and was tried and found guilty of self-mutilation. He injested
numerous razor blades. One supervisor yelled at him, “It’s hard enough
for me to keep the rest of these inmates in razor blades to shave with
around here, let alone having you eat them all the time.” The inmate
stuttered and a supervisor slapped him twice across the face.
Inmates “tuned up” after court were the victims of multiple punishments.
That is, they received both official (loss of privileges or solitary confinement)
and unofficial forms of punishment.
The second form of physical coercion was dubbed “ass whippings” and
befell inmates who broke more serious rules such as challenging an officers’s
authority, threatening an officer, totally defying an officer’s authority, or
fighting back during a “tune up.” Further, these were force situations where
the officers employed various types of weapons, such as blackjacks, 6 riot
batons, fist loads, or aluminum-cased flashlights. Although weapons were
employed, the inmate-victims were not brutalized enough to require hospitalization or other extensive medical treatment. A noteworthy example occurred
when a newly arrived inmate, who was in the Major’s office for an initial
interview retorted, “I can see I’m going to have trouble making it on this
farm [prison].” Several officers immediately attacked the inmate and threw
him to the floor. While one officer literally stood on the inmate’s head,
(called a “tap dance”), another hit him on the buttocks and thighs with a riot
5. Disciplinary court procedures deemed as major cases were tape recorded.
6. One old-time convict was the staff’s blackjack “connection.” This inmate routinely made and repaired blackjacks for the “right” staff members.
PRISON GUARDS AND PHYSICAL COERCION
baton, and several others kicked him. During this event, a supervisor was
heard yelling “Hurt him, hurt him” and even encouraged the other officers by
saying “Go on, get you some of that ass.”
The third type of force used at Johnson was the severe beating. Such beatings occurred infrequently and were reserved for inmates who violated certain
“sacred” rules through such actions as attacking staff members, inciting work
strikes or mob action, or escaping. The purpose of a beating was intentional
physical injury and in some cases hospitalization. For example, while making
a routine check of the inmates in a solitary confinement area, the author
observed an inmate who had struck an officer earlier in the day; he was beaten
so severely that he could not stand up. In this particular case, the inmate was
forceably dragged from the hall into the Major’s office and beaten, and then
beaten again while being locked in a solitary cell.
Beatings, like the latter two types of coercion, were primarily backstage
events and conducted in closed settings to avoid witnesses. However, “public” beatings were occasionally staged to set an example. A good illustration
of a “front-stage” beating occurred in the hall near a spot adjacent to the
Major’s office and was reported by an officer eyewitness.
I was sitting at the Searcher’s desk and Rick [convict] and I were talking
and here comes Joe [convict] from 8-block. Joe thinks he knows kung
fu, hell he got his ass beat about four months ago. He comes down the
hall and he had on a tank top, his pants were tied up with a shoe lace,
gym shoes on, and he had all his property in a large sack. As he neared
us, Rick said, “Well, Joe’s fixing to go crazy again today.” He came up
to us and Rick asked him what was going on and Joe said they [staff]
were fucking with him by not letting him have a recreation card. I told
him, “Well, take your stuff and go over there to the Major’s office” and
there he went. Officer A went over and stood in front of Joe, so did
Officer B who was beside Joe, Officer C was in back of Officer A, and two
convicts stood next to Officer A. Inmate James, an inmate who we tuned
up in the hospital several days before, stood about ten feet away. All of a
sudden Joe took a swing at Officer A. Officers A and B tackled Joe. I
ran over there and grabbed Joe’s left leg while a convict had his right leg
and we began kicking his legs and genitals. Hell, I tried to break his leg.
At the same time Officer B was using his security keys, four large bronze
keys, like a knife. The security keys have these points on their ends
where they fit into the locks. Well, Officer B was jamming those keys
into Joe’s head. Joe was bleeding all over the place. Then all of a sudden
another brawl broke out right next to us. Inmate James threw a punch
at Officer D as he came out of the Major’s office to see what was going
on. James saw Joe getting beat and he decided to help Joe out. I left Joe
to help Officer D. By the time I got there (about two seconds), Officer D
and about six convicts were beating the shit out of James. Officer D was
MARQUART
beating James with a blackjack. Man, you could hear that crunch noise
every time he hit him. At the same time a convict was hitting him in the
stomach and chest and face. These other inmates were kicking him and
stomping him at the same time. It was a wild melee, just like being in a
war. I got in there and grabbed James by the hair and Officer D began
hitting him on the head and face with a blackjack. I mean he was hitting
him, no love taps. He was trying to beat his brains out and yelling, “You
mother fucker, you think you’re bad, you ain’t bad, you mother fucker,
son of a bitch, you hit me and I’ll bust your fucking skull.” I think we
beat on him alone for ten minutes. I punched him in the face and head.
Then Officer D yelled, “Take him [James] to the hospital.” Officer C
and me had to literally drag him all the way to the hospital. Plus we
punched and stomped him at the same time. At the hospital, Officer D
began punching James in the face. I held his head up so Officer D could
hit him. Then Officer D worked James over again with a blackjack. We
then stripped James and threw him on a bed. Officer D yelled at James,
“I’m going to kill you by the time you get off this unit.” Then Officer D
began hitting him in the shins and genitals with a night stick. Finally,
we stopped and let the medics take over. James had to leave via the
ambulance. Joe required some stitches and was subsequently put in
solitary.”7
This gruesome event occurred in the full view of many inmates in the hall
and hospital. In addition, the screams of the inmate-victims were heard
throughout the building and for several days after this event, the entire prison
operated smoothly with few officer-inmate confrontations. This beating was
the talk of the prison and many officers used the incident as a scare tactic. In
other words, “If you don’t do what I say you’ll get what Joe and James got
and worse.”
Beatings such as these were not restricted specifically to serious altercations
between officers and inmates. In early August 1982, during breakfast in the
South Dining Hall, three inmates fatally stabbed another inmate. Seven
officers armed with riot batons and baseball bats led the aggressors, weapons
in hand, out of the dining hall to a spot near the Major’s office. A supervisor
ordered the inmates to throw down their weapons, but they refused. The
supervisor made his plea one more time and the inmates still refused. At this
point, two hall officers attacked the inmates with aluminum baseball bats.
The inmates immediately dropped their weapons and were stripped, and
escorted to the Major’s officer, and beaten severely. The staff was outraged at
7. The inmates who helped the staff in this fight were called building tenders and
turnkeys. These inmates were violent criminals who were coopted by the staff with special
privileges to help in controlling the ordinary inmates, especially in the cell blocks. For a
more in-depth analysis of these inmates, see Marquart and Crouch (1984) and Marquart
(1983).
PRISON GUARDS AND PHYSICAL COERCION
this homicide and made examples of the culprits.8
THE LEGITIMATION OF VIOLENCE
These latter examples of guard violence were obviously illegal and violated
written departmental policy as well as civil and criminal law. The informal
norms of the guard staff justified violence that violated legal and administrative policy in certain instances. The use of unofficial force was so common in
the institution under study that the guards viewed it as an everyday operating
procedure and legitimized its use. Further, Johnson was not an anomaly with
regard to punitive force. Although this researcher did not observe the use of
force in other Texas prisons, the trial proceedings from a prison reform case
documented numerous (and quite similar) incidences of guard coercion in
seven other state prisons. The Court found that the guards’ use of punitive
force was not an isolated phenomonon but constituted a routine (and rampant) guard activity (Ninth Monitor’s Report to the Special Master, 1983).
In almost every situation where a staff member struck an inmate at Johnson, post facto explanations were manufactured (Van Maanen, 1978). Due to
the intervention in recent years of the Federal courts into prisoner discipline,
inmates frequently sued officers for various types of civil rights violations,
particularly for brutality. In light of this fact, the staff involved in such force
situations got together after the fact and wrote statements to the effect that
the inmate-victim assaulted a staff member and force was needed to subdue
the inmate (similar to “throw downs”). The more force used against an
inmate, the more the inmate was said to have “fought back.” The officers
involved generally used a “covering charge” of striking an officer to justify
physical coercion (Manning, 1977). For most “tune ups,” statements were
not made. However, “ass whippings” and beatings were quickly followed up
with statement and disciplinary report writing sessions. Many times inmates
filed civil suits concerning excessive force and brutality against the officers.
These civil suits were routinely investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation but were quashed due to the weight of the staffs’ evidence. In short, no
medical reports were made to verify physical damage and, in the end, it was
the word of one inmate against two, three, or more officers and sometimes
several prostaff inmate witnesses as well.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
The use of punitive force by the guards was not a random activity or
directed against any particular prisoner for any particular reason. Instead,
8. Killing of any sort at the prison was a rare phenomenon. This was the second
inmate murder by other inmates since 1972. However, one officer, a major, died in 1979 of
a heart attack during a fight with an inmate.
MARQUART
coercion was a socially structured and highly organized form of guard behavior. To understand why the guards relied on force, it is necessary to first
describe the setting for this behavior. Then four reasons for the use of coercion are analyzed. These are: (1) coercion maintains control and order;
(2) coercion maintains status and deference; (3) coercion facilitates promotions; and (4) coercion builds guard solidarity.
THE SETTING FOR COERCION
Twenty-eight of the force situations occurred in the Major’s Office and two
in a solitary confinement area. These areas were private settings free from the
eyes of other inmates. Physically coercing or “adjusting an inmate’s attitude”
in private reduced the chances of the inmate-victim securing witnesses for a
civil action. In this way, the victim’s ability to win a brutality case was virtually impossible. The “hidden” force situation was difficult for the FBI or
Department of Justice to investigate. If a suit was filed and investigated (and
several were), the guards implicated simply denied knowledge of the event or
else read a manufactured report that claimed self-defense, which in turn led
to a dismissal of the inmate’s claim of brutality.
The application of force was always done in the presence of more than one
officer. Hall officers and ranking guards always carried out the physical punishment of inmates. In all 30 incidents, between 2 and 6 of these guards were
present. Further, it was an unwritten rule that at least 2 staff members must
be present, for safety and evidentiary reasons, whenever an inmate was physically punished. Most coercive situations were initiated by a ranking guard
and then the other officers moved in and finished the episode. It was not
uncommon for 4, 5, or even 6 officers to be involved in a “tune up” or other
force situations.
COERCION MAINTAINS CONTROL AND ORDER
The guards regarded force as an important means to achieve tight disciplinary control and punish recalcitrant inmates. Of the observed force situations, the majority (n = 21) involved inmates who challenged the guards’
authority or disrupted the well-defined prison order (for example, refusing to
obey an order, swearing at or threatening officers). On one occasion, for
example, a guard ordered an inmate to quit talking while standing in line to
receive some medicine. The inmate then stated, “I can talk to anybody I
please and I sure as hell can talk as loud as I want.” This inmate was immediately escorted to the Major’s office where the officer made his report about
the incident. The inmate was allowed to make a statement and then was
slapped across the face and kicked in the buttocks by several ranking officers.
Although these episodes were not serious, they were defined by the guards as
mutinous and not to be tolerated.
PRISON GUARDS AND PHYSICAL COERCION
The guards argued that these latter offenses undermined prison discipline
and control and inmate violators had to be retaliated against. As guards, they
also maintained that the prison was their domain and internal order was their
paramount goal. These beliefs therefore justified their use of force, at least to
themselves. They firmly believed that coercion was a legitimate mechanism
of social control. Further, new officers at Johnson were constantly reminded,
as well as placated, by ranking guards with the maxim, “We don’t tolerate
officers getting jumped on or talked crazy to around here, they’ll [inmates]
ride the ambulance if they try it.”
Punitive force was not always directed against inmates who openly challenged the guards’ authority. In some cases, inmates were “tuned up” for
inmate-on-inmate offenses. For the most part, the guards did not consider
minor inmate-on-inmate incidents (such as gambling, tatooing, stealing) as
malicious or as undermining their authority or as serious breaches of prison
order. However, for serious inmate-inmate rule infractions such as fighting
with weapons, sexual attacks, or threatening other inmates, the guards generally took action. Nine of the 30 cases of force involved these latter offenses.
Of these 9 cases, 3 were for homosexual threats, 4 for physical threats, and 2
for continuous fighting (these 2 inmates had several fights at work and in
their cell). For example, a small black inmate told the staff that a larger,
“stronger” black inmate was “talking sex stuff” to him and making other
threatening advances. The aggressive inmate was called to the Major’s office
and confronted with the complainant’s accusation. Although the aggressor
denied the threats, he was slapped across the face several times and pushed
around by one guard. During this episode, 6 other staff members repeatedly
derogated and threatened the aggressor with severe bodily harm if he continued to make homosexual or any other kind of threats against other inmates.
COERCION MAINTAINS STATUS AND DEFERENCE
The data indicate that inmate deportment and race were critical elements
in the guards’ decision to use or not use force. After being confronted with a
rule violation, those inmates who responded in an antagonistic or nondeferential attitude towards the staff typically provoked a physical response from the
guards. Of the 30 force situations, 23 were directed against inmates who
offered increased resistance, lied to, antagonized, or exhibited disrespect
toward an officer either at the time of apprehension for a violation or at a
later stage during interrogation. For example, on December 4, 1982, inmate
Sims lied to an officer about the loss of his work boots. Sims concocted a
story to obtain a new pair of boots by saying his old pair were stolen while he
was bathing. The officer issued Sims a permit to procure new boots. One
hour later, an inmate informer told the officer that Sims merely threw his old
boots away in the cell block’s trash can. The shoes were retrieved and Sims
was “tuned up” for lying to the officer. On another occasion, an offi
