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Hi attached are the directions for the assignment. I will be writing a long paper on it afterward and will most likely be asking you for assistance so feel free to choose a topic that you can speak a lot on like the holocaust. I had you write another one of my papers before and I enjoyed it but some of the words were a bit too sophisticated so please keep that in mind. I would greatly appreciate it and look forward to hearing from you.
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MAPPING YOUR RESEARCH IDEAS
Figure out what you want to write about & then learn how to broaden and narrow your topic.
1
Draw a circle in the middle of a blank piece of
paper. Inside the circle, put an idea for your
paper topic.
If you’re not sure what to write, start by
connecting keywords from the paper prompt
with something you are passionate about.
For example, if the paper is on theology and you
are interested in feminism, you might start with
“feminist theology.”
2
3
Next, take 2-3 minutes to brainstorm as many
questions as you can about the topic. Write
down questions for everything you’re curious
about. Experiment with a variety of question
words and phrases:
• Why?
• When?
• In what ways?
• How?
• Where?
• Under what
• What?
• Are?
• Who?
• Do?
circumstances?
Now, look for opportunities to build on your
questions. For example, you might:
• think about your question from a variety of
perspectives.
• divide broad questions into narrow ones.
• ask a friend to help you generate questions
– what questions do they have about your
topic?
UCLA Library Inquiry Labs
j.mp/inquirylabs
4
← cultural aspects
← geography
← groups
← time
You can continue narrowing your topic by asking questions about cultural aspects,
geographic areas, groups of people, time spans, and historical events.
5
Now review your topic map. Which questions are you most passionate about? Which ones have the
most potential to address the paper prompt? Highlight the words and phrases you are most
interested in investigating in the next phase of your research!
What’s next?
Find 1 or more research guides related to
your topic at guides.library.ucla.edu
Look for a “Reference” or “Encyclopedias” tab
on the research guide. Search an online
encyclopedia to get background information
on your topic.
Visit your instructor during office hours. Bring
your topic. Get feedback on which research
questions have the most potential.
Come visit us in the Inquiry Labs (Powell 220)
for more help. Bring your topic map, and we’ll
help you search for sources for your paper!
Find the “Articles” tab on the research guide.
Then search for scholarly articles.
UCLA Library Inquiry Labs
j.mp/inquirylabs
Unintended Consequences
of US Immigration Policy:
Explaining the Post-1965
Surge from Latin America
Douglas S. Massey
Karen A. Pren
The year 1965 is often cited as a turning point in the history of US immigration, but what happened in the ensuing years is not well understood. Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act passed in that year repealed
the national origins quotas, which had been enacted during the 1920s in
a deliberate attempt to limit the entry of Southern and Eastern European
immigrants—or more specifically Jews from the Russian Pale and Catholics
from Poland and Italy, groups at the time deemed “unassimilable.” The quotas supplemented prohibitions already in place that effectively banned the
entry of Asians and Africans. The 1965 amendments were intended to purge
immigration law of its racist legacy by replacing the old quotas with a new
system that allocated residence visas according to a neutral preference system
based on family reunification and labor force needs. The new system is widely
credited with having sparked a shift in the composition of immigration away
from Europe toward Asia and Latin America, along with a substantial increase
in the number of immigrants.
Indeed, after 1965 the number of immigrants entering the country did
increase, and the flows did come to be dominated by Asians and Latin Americans. Although the amendments may have opened the door to greater immigration from Asia, however, the surge in immigration from Latin America
occurred in spite of rather than because of the new system. Countries in the
Western Hemisphere had never been included in the national origins quotas,
nor was the entry of their residents prohibited as that of Africans and Asians
had been. Indeed, before 1965 there were no numerical limits at all on immigration from Latin America or the Caribbean, only qualitative restrictions.
The 1965 amendments changed all that, imposing an annual cap of 120,000
on entries from the Western Hemisphere. Subsequent amendments further
limited immigration from the region by limiting the number of residence visas
P o p u l a t i o n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t R e v i e w 3 8 ( 1 ) : 1 – 2 9 ( MA R C H 2 0 1 2 )
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U n i n t e n d e d C o n s e q u e n c e s o f U S I m m i g r at i o n P o l i c y
for any single country to just 20,000 per year (in 1976), folding the separate
hemispheric caps into a worldwide ceiling of 290,000 visas (in 1978), and
then reducing the ceiling to 270,000 visas (in 1980). These restrictions did not
apply to spouses, parents, and children of US citizens, however.
Thus the 1965 legislation in no way can be invoked to account for
the rise in immigration from Latin America. Nonetheless, Latin American
migration did grow. Legal immigration from the region grew from a total of
around 459,000 during the decade of the 1950s to peak at 4.2 million during
the 1990s, by which time it made up 44 percent of the entire flow, compared
with 29 percent for Asia, 14 percent for Europe, 6 percent for Africa, and
7 percent for the rest of the world (US Department of Homeland Security
2012). The population of unauthorized immigrants from Latin America also
rose from near zero in 1965 to peak at around 9.6 million in 2008, accounting for around 80 percent of the total present without authorization (Hoefer,
Rytina, and Baker 2011; Wasem 2011). How this happened is a complicated
tale of unintended consequences, political opportunism, bureaucratic entrepreneurship, media guile, and most likely a healthy dose of racial and ethnic
prejudice. In this article, we lay out the sequence of events that culminated in
record levels of immigration from Latin America during the 1990s. We focus
particularly on the case of Mexico, which accounted for two-thirds of legal
immigration during the decade and for three-quarters of all illegal migration
from the region.
The unintended legacy of
immigration reform
Paradoxical as it may seem, US immigration policy often has very little to do
with trends and patterns of immigration. Even when policies respond explicitly to shifts in immigration, rarely are they grounded in any real understanding of the forces that govern international migration. Instead, over time the
relative openness or restrictiveness of US policies is more strongly shaped by
prevailing economic circumstances and political ideologies (Timmer and Williamson 1998; Massey 1999; Meyers 2004). In the United States, especially,
immigrants carry significant symbolic weight in the narrative of American
peoplehood (Smith 1997, 2003), and how they are depicted in the media,
portrayed by politicians, and treated by legislators probably reveals more
about America’s aspirations and hopes—and its fears and insecurities—than
anything to do with immigration itself (Tichenor 2002; Ngai 2003).
Americans’ fears and apprehensions prevailed in the 1920s and led
to the passage of the discriminatory quotas. In response to rising economic
inequality along with new currents of scientific racism, xenophobia, and
conservative ideology, the Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924 sought to reduce
the number of immigrants entering the United States and shift their origins
away from Southern and Eastern Europe and toward Northern and Western
Douglas S. Massey / Karen A. Pren
3
Europe, while maintaining outright prohibitions on all immigration from
Asia and Africa (Zolberg 2006). In contrast, hopes and aspirations were the
dominant force of the 1960s, and legislators sought to enact liberalizing reforms and introduce greater openness into the immigration system. As the
civil rights movement gathered force, discriminatory quotas against certain
Europeans and prohibitions on African and Asian immigration came to be
seen as intolerably racist and were duly repealed by Congress in 1965.
At that time, the United States was nearing the end of a “long hiatus”
with respect to immigration (Massey 1995). Indeed, with so few immigrants
settling in the United States, the foreign-born percentage in 1970 dipped below 5 percent for the first and only time in US history (compared with 12.4
percent in 2010). As a result, immigration was not a very salient issue in 1965,
except to a few conservative senators who actually favored the restrictive
quotas. To the extent that legislators were concerned at all, their attention
focused mainly on the consequences of opening the door to Asian and African
immigration, not immigration from Latin America. Newly elected Senator
Ted Kennedy, who served as floor leader for the bill, assured his colleagues
that “our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants annually…[and]
the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset. . . . Contrary to the charges
in some quarters, [the bill] will not inundate America with immigrants from
any one country or area, or the most populated and economically deprived
nations of Africa and Asia” (Congressional Digest, May 1965, p. 152).
The second order of business for immigration reformers with a civil
rights agenda was ending a scheme admitting short-term foreign workers
known as the Bracero Program. Originally established in 1942 as a temporary wartime measure, the program was extended by Congress and massively expanded in the latter half of the 1950s. By the 1960s, however, the
Bracero Program had come to be seen as an exploitive labor regime on a par
with Southern sharecropping, and in 1964, over vociferous objections from
Mexico, Congress voted to terminate it (Calavita 1992; Massey, Durand, and
Malone 2002). The program was phased out between 1965 and 1967 and the
flow went to zero in 1968, the same year the new cap on immigration from
the Western Hemisphere took effect.
Immigration was a back burner issue for most Americans in the 1960s.
They concerned themselves instead with civil rights, the war in Vietnam, the
sexual revolution, and urban riots. Nonetheless, out of view of both citizens
and politicians, immigration from Latin America had been quietly but steadily
growing, especially from Mexico. Owing to the Bracero Program, however,
the lion’s share of the migration was temporary and circular and, hence, invisible to citizens. During the period 1955–59, around half a million Mexicans
were entering the country each year, the number fluctuating around 450,000
temporary Bracero migrants and 50,000 permanent residents (Massey
2011). Given this large annual inflow, the sudden elimination of the Bracero
Program clearly would have dramatic consequences on migration between
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Mexico and the United States; and with the imposition of a hemispheric cap,
and eventually country quotas, the displaced temporary migrants were not
going to be accommodated within the system for legal immigration.
In short, as a result of shifts in US immigration policy between the late
1950s and the late 1970s, Mexico went from annual access to around 450,000
guestworker visas and a theoretically unlimited number of resident visas in
the United States (in practice averaging around 50,000 per year) to a new
situation in which there were no guestworker visas and just 20,000 resident
visas annually. The effect of these new limits on the system of Mexican
migration that had evolved during the Bracero era was predictable and is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows Mexican entries into the United States in
three categories by legal status for the period 1955–1995: temporary migrants
(Braceros before 1965 and H-visa holders thereafter), legal immigrants (those
entering with permanent resident visas), and illegal immigrants (proxied
here by a series based on the annual number of apprehensions per thousand
Border Patrol agents—see Table A1). Former illegal migrants adjusting under
the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) have been removed
from the series on legal immigrants as they are already accounted for in the
series on illegal immigrants.
The number of apprehensions recorded in any year is a joint function of
the number of migrants attempting unauthorized entry and the effort made
to apprehend them. Raw apprehension counts in themselves are seriously
flawed as indicators of the volume of illegal migration. However, once the
enforcement effort is accounted for, here by dividing the number of migrants
arrested by the number of Border Patrol agents looking for them, the adjusted
FIGURE 1 Mexican immigration to the United States in three categories, 1955–95
650,000
600,000
Annual number of migrants
550,000
500,000
450,000
Hemispheric quota
imposed; Bracero
Program terminated
Country
quotas
imposed
IRCA
enacted
Temporary
migrants
400,000
350,000
Illegal
immigrants
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
Legal immigrants
100,000
50,000
0
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
SOURCE: US Department of Homeland Security (2012). See text and Table A1.
1985
1990
1995
Douglas S. Massey / Karen A. Pren
5
apprehension counts offer serviceable indicators of trends in illegal migration.
We do not claim that the estimates yielded by this procedure capture the true
number of undocumented entries, only that fluctuations in them over time
reflect trends in the volume of undocumented migration.
As already noted, by the late 1950s a massive circular flow of Mexican
migrants had become deeply embedded in employer practices and migrant
expectations and had come to be sustained by well-developed and widely
accessible migrant networks (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). As a result, when avenues for legal entry were suddenly curtailed after 1965, the
migratory flows did not disappear but simply continued without authorization or documents. As shown in the figure, the end of the Bracero Program
corresponded exactly in time with the rise of illegal migration. From a figure
of around 40,000 in 1965, the number of apprehensions per thousand agents
rose to peak at around 460,000 in 1977. It then fluctuated between 330,000
and 460,000 from 1978 to 1986 whereupon it fell into the range of 240,000–
320,000 per year after passage of IRCA. This act offered legal status to millions
of undocumented migrants who before 1965 had moved back and forth across
the border and contributed to the annual count of apprehensions.
In sum, illegal migration rose after 1965 not because there was a sudden surge in Mexican migration, but because the temporary labor program
had been terminated and the number of permanent resident visas had been
capped, leaving no legal way to accommodate the long-established flows.
With permanent resident visas capped, moreover, the inflow of legal immigrants could not rise and remained below 50,000 through the early 1970s
and thereafter fluctuated between 50,000 and 100,000 per year. The number
of legal immigrants was able to exceed the annual statutory cap of 20,000
because parents, spouses, and minor children of US citizens were exempted
from numerical limitation (we return to this point later).
Rise of the Latino threat narrative
In the absence of access to any avenue of legal entry, the post-1965 increase
in illegal migration was attributable almost entirely to the termination of the
Bracero Program. Once the status quo ante of circular migration had been
reestablished under undocumented auspices in the late 1970s, growth in
illegal migration ceased and ultimately declined in the wake of IRCA’s legalization. The increase in illegal migration from 1965 through the late 1970s
is critically important to understanding the dynamics of policy responses in
the years that followed, however, for it was this development that enabled
political activists and bureaucratic entrepreneurs to frame Latino immigration
as a grave threat to the nation.
Chavez (2001, 2008) has documented the rise of what he calls the “Latino threat” narrative in American media after the 1960s. When he coded
national magazine covers on immigration as positive, negative, or neutral
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he found a steady rise of negative portrayals through the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s. The rise in the threat narrative occurred during a time of increasing
income inequality, and as social psychologist Susan Fiske (2011: 89) has
shown, “feeling individually deprived… may alert a person to feeling collectively deprived…[and] this collective feeling leads to blaming out-groups
(immigrants, rich elites, the party in power).”
The most common negative framing depicted immigration as a “crisis”
for the nation. Initially marine metaphors were used to dramatize the crisis,
with Latino immigration being labeled a “rising tide” or a “tidal wave” that
was poised to “inundate” the United States and “drown” its culture while
“flooding” American society with unwanted foreigners (Santa Ana 2002).
Over time, marine metaphors increasingly gave way to martial imagery, with
illegal immigration being depicted as an “invasion” in which “outgunned”
Border Patrol agents sought to “hold the line” in a vain attempt to “defend”
the border against “attacks” from “alien invaders” who launched “banzai
charges” to overwhelm American defenses (Nevins 2001; Chavez 2008).
To document the rising use of such metaphors in the American media,
we used the Proquest Historical Newspaper Files to search for instances in
which the words “undocumented,” “illegal,” or “unauthorized” were paired
with “Mexico” or “Mexican immigrants” and the words “crisis,” “flood,” or
“invasion.” We focused our analysis on the country’s four leading papers:
the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times.
To control for random noise and isolate the underlying trends, we computed
three-year moving averages. The results are plotted in Figure 2. As can
be seen, the use of the negative metaphors to describe Mexican immigration was virtually nonexistent in 1965, at least in major newspapers, but
thereafter rose steadily, slowly at first and then rapidly during the 1970s to
reach a peak in the late 1970s, roughly at the same time illegal migration
itself peaked. From 1965 through 1977 the correlation between the illegal
migration series shown in Figure 1 and the negative metaphor series shown
in Figure 2 is 0.911.
The framing of immigration as a “crisis” and the increasing use of martial imagery were actively promulgated by immigration officials. In 1976, for
example, the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) published an article in Reader’s Digest entitled “Illegal Aliens: Time to
Call a Halt!” in which he told readers that “when I became commissioner [of
the INS] in 1973, we were out-manned, under-budgeted, and confronted by
a growing, silent invasion of illegal aliens. Despite our best efforts, the problem—critical then—now threatens to become a national disaster” (Chapman
1976: 188). Similarly, in 1992 the Chief of the San Diego Sector of the Border
Patrol, Gustavo de la Viña, filmed and released a video entitled “Border Under
Siege,” which in one vivid scene showed migrants scrambling over cars and
dodging traffic on Interstate 5 to enter the United States without inspection
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Douglas S. Massey / Karen A. Pren
FIGURE 2 Frequency of pairing of the terms “flood,” “crisis,” or
“invasion” with “Mexico“ or “Mexican immigrants,” in four
leading US newspapers (three-year moving average), 1965–1995
40
Average frequency per year
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
SOURCE: Proquest Historical Newspaper Files.
in and around the San Ysidro Port of Entry, then the country’s busiest border
crossing (Rotella 1998).
Politicians quickly discovered the political advantages to be gained by
demonizing Latino immigrants and illegal migration. Ronald Reagan, for example, asserted that illegal immigration was a question of “national security,”
and in a 1986 speech he told Americans that “terrorists and subversives are
just two days’ driving time from [the border crossing at] Harlingen, Texas”
(Kamen 1990). In his 1992 reelection campaign, California Governor Pete
Wilson called on Congress to “stop the invasion” and borrowed footage from
“Border Under Siege” for a series of attack ads. As images of migrants dashing
through traffic rolled, a narrator intoned, “they keep coming. Two million
illegal immigrants in California. The federal government won’t stop them
at the border yet requires us to pay billions to take care of them” (Massey,
Durand, and Malone 2002: 89).
The media discovered that the trope of a border under siege made for
dramatic copy and good visuals and happily played handmaiden to aspiring
politicians and bureaucrats. Later, a host of pundits joined the anti-immigrant
chorus to attract attention and sell books. Lou Dobbs (2006) framed the “invasion of illegal aliens” as part of a broader “war on the middle class.” Patrick
Buchanan (2006) charged it was part of an “Aztlan Plot” hatched by Mexicans
to recapture lands lost in 1848, stating that “if we do not get control of our
borders and stop this greatest invasion in history, I see the dissolution of the
U.S. and the loss of the American southwest” (Time, 28 August, p. 6). From
his lofty Harvard position, Samuel Huntington (2004) warned Americans that
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“the persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United
States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages…. The United States
ignores this challenge at its peril.” All these views received extensive coverage
in print and broadcast media throughout the country.
Effects on public opinion
The shift in the legal auspices of Mexican migration thus transformed what
had been a largely invisible circulation of innocuous workers into a yearly and
highly visible violation of American sovereignty by hostile aliens who were
increasingly framed as invaders and criminals. The relentless propagandizing
that accompanied the shift had a pervasive effect on public opinion, turning it
decidedly more conservative on issues of immigration even as it was turning
more conservative with respect to social issues more generally. Indeed, the
rise of illegal migration remains inadequately acknowledged as a factor in the
rightward shift of American public opinion.
To support this argument, we extracted data from the General Social
Survey (GSS) from its inception in 1972 to the present and estimated the effect that the annual number of border apprehensions had on the likelihood
that a respondent self-identified as conservative (Massey and Pren 2012).
We controlled for individual demographic, social, and economic characteristics as well as the country’s overall economic climate. Holding these factors
constant, we found that border apprehensions were strongly associated with
the likelihood of self-identifying as conservative. An increase in the number
of apprehensions from its minimum to its maximum doubled the likelihood
that a respondent self-identified as conservative.
Admittedly, self-identification as conservative does not necessarily
predict anti-immigrant sentiment; but annual data on attitudes toward immigration are not available. To establish this link, we drew on GSS data for
1996 and 2004, two years in which the survey questionnaires had asked
about attitudes toward immigration, enabling us to create a reliable scale of
support for exclusionist policies (ibid.). We regressed this measure on respondents’ self-identification as slightly conservative or as extremely conservative
(compared to not conservative at all), controlling for age, education, income,
occupation, race, region, city size, and national economic climate. We found
that conservative self-identification strongly predicted support for exclusionist
policies. Both effects were highly significant. Other things equal, conservative
self-identification and exclusionist sentiments are strongly interrelated.
Policy feedbacks
Not surprisingly, the rise of the Latino threat narrative and the concomitant increase in conservatism were associated over time with the passage of
Douglas S. Massey / Karen A. Pren
9
increasingly restrictionist immigration legislation and the implementation
of ever more stringent enforcement policies. Table 1 presents a cumulative
list of 15 restrictive immigration bills passed from 1965 to 2010. As can be
seen, over time restrictionist bills were passed at an increasingly rapid pace.
In the 30 years from 1965 to 1995, for example, only six major immigration
bills were enacted, whereas in the decade from 1996 to 2006, eight pieces
of legislation were signed into law. Table 2 lists 16 named enforcement operations launched between 1993 and 2010. They typically were announced
with great fanfare, including official releases, press conferences, and saturated media coverage. The pace at which such operations were launched
also increased over time. Moreover, they became more sweeping in scope,
covering locations within the United States as well as along the Mexico–US
border.
This sustained, accelerating accumulation of anti-immigrant legislation
and enforcement operations produced a massive increase in border apprehensions after the late 1970s, when the underlying flow of migrants had actually
leveled off. For any given number of undocumented entry attempts, more
restrictive legislation and more stringent enforcement operations generate
more apprehensions, which politicians and bureaucrats can then use to inflame public opinion, which leads to more conservatism and voter demands
for even stricter laws and more enforcement operations, which generates
more apprehensions, thus bringing the process full circle. In short, the rise
of illegal migration, its framing as a threat to the nation, and the resulting
conservative reaction set off a self-feeding chain reaction of enforcement
that generated more apprehensions even though the flow of undocumented
migrants had stabilized in the late 1970s and actually dropped during the late
1980s and early 1990s.
The dimensions of the paradox are illustrated in Figure 3, which contrasts estimated illegal entries (from Figure 1) with total apprehensions (which
reflect both the enforcement effort and underlying traffic). Controlling for
the enforcement effort, we see that illegal migration rose from 1965 to 1977,
as the circulation of the Bracero Era was reestablished, but thereafter leveled
off and fluctuated before ultimately falling. In contrast, the total number of
apprehensions grew at a faster pace after 1977, peaking at 1.7 million in 1986
before declining to around 900,000 and then rising again to 1.3 million by
1995. As one would expect, temporal variation in the total number of apprehensions is closely related to the use of threatening immigration metaphors.
From 1965 through 1995, the temporal correlation between the frequency
of newspaper allusions to crises, floods, and invasions and the total number
of apprehensions is 0.956.
After the late 1970s, in other words, anti-immigrant sentiment increasingly fed off itself to drive the bureaucratic machinery of enforcement forward
to new heights, despite the lack of any real increase in illegal migration. In
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Table 1 Restrictive immigration legislation enacted by Congress
affecting Latin Americans, 1965–2010
1965
1976
1978
1980
1986
1990
1996
1996
1996
1997
2001
2004
2005
2006
2010
Hart–Cellar Act
Imposed first-ever annual cap of 120,000 visas for immigrants from Western
Hemisphere
Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act
Put Western Hemisphere under preference system and country quotas
Amendments to Immigration and Nationality Act
Combined separate hemispheric caps into single worldwide ceiling of
290,000
Refugee Act
Abolished refugee preference and reduced worldwide ceiling to 270,000
Immigration Reform and Control Act
Criminalized undocumented hiring and authorized expansion of Border Patrol
Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act
Sought to cap visas going to spouse and children of resident aliens
Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
Authorized expedited removal of noncitizens and deportation of aggravated
felons
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
Increased resources for border enforcement, narrowed criteria for asylum,
and increased income threshold required to sponsor immigrants
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
Declared documented and undocumented migrants ineligible for certain
entitlements
Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act
Allowed registered asylum seekers from Central America (mostly Nicaraguans) in the US for at least 5 years since December 1, 1995 to obtain legal
status; but prohibited legalization and ordered deportation for those who
lacked a valid visa or who previously violated US immigration laws (mostly
Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Salvadorans)
USA Patriot Act
Created Department of Homeland Security, increased funding for surveillance and deportation of foreigners, and authorized deportation of noncitizens
without due process
National Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act
Funded new equipment, aircraft, Border Patrol agents, immigration investigators, and detention centers for border enforcement
Real ID Act
Sharply increased the data requirements, documentation, and verification
procedures for state issuance of drivers licenses
Secure Fence Act
Authorized construction of additional fencing, vehicle barriers, checkpoints,
lighting and funding for new cameras, satellites, and unmanned drones for
border enforcement
Border Security Act
Funded hiring 3,000 more Border Patrol agents and increased BP budget by
$244 million
Figure 4 we model these hypothesized causal paths using a two-stage least
squares estimation strategy on time-series data for the 30-year period from
1965 to 1995 (see Table A1). Data on apprehensions, the number of Border
Table 2 Restrictive enforcement operations launched by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service or the Department of
Homeland Security 1993–2010
1993
Operation Blockade
Border Patrol’s (BP) militarization of the El Paso Sector
1994
Operation Gatekeeper
BP’s militarization of the San Diego Sector
1998
Operation Rio Grande
BP program to restrict the movement of migrants across the Texas and New
Mexico border with Mexico
1999
Operation Safeguard
BP’s militarization of the Tucson Sector
2003
Operation Endgame
Plan launched by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to detain
and deport all removable noncitizens and “suspected terrorists” living in the
United States
2004
Operation Frontline
Program launched by ICE to address “vulnerabilities in immigration and
trade” by focusing on immigration violators who pose an “enhanced public
safety or national security threat”
2004
Arizona Border Control Initiative
Multi-agency effort supporting Homeland Security’s anti-terrorism mission
through the detection, arrest, and deterrence of all persons engaged in crossborder illicit activity
2004
Operation Stonegarden
Federal grant program administered through the State Homeland Security
Grant Program to provide funding to state and local agencies to improve immigration enforcement
2005
Secure Borders Initiative
Comprehensive multi-year plan launched by ICE to secure America’s borders and reduce illegal migration
2005
Operation Streamline
Program mandating criminal charges for illegal migrants, including first-time
offenders
2006
Operation Return to Sender
Sweep of illegal immigrants by ICE to detain those deemed most dangerous,
including convicted felons, gang members, and repeat illegal immigrants
2006
Operation Jump Start
Program authorizing the deployment of National Guard troops along the
US–Mexico border
2007
Secure Communities Program
ICE program to identify and deport criminal noncitizens arrested by state
and local authorities
2007
Operation Rapid REPAT
Program to Remove Eligible Parolees Accepted for Transfer by allowing
selected criminal noncitizens incarcerated in US prisons and jails to accept
early release in exchange for voluntary deportation
2008
Operation Scheduled Departure
ICE operation to facilitate the voluntary deportation of 457,000 eligible illegal migrants from selected cities
2010
Operation Copper Cactus
Deployment of Arizona National Guard troops to assist BP in apprehension
of illegal migrants
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U n i n t e n d e d C o n s e q u e n c e s o f U S I m m i g r at i o n P o l i c y
FIGURE 3 Annual number of apprehensions and estimated illegal entries,
1955–1
