Displacement

Description

What is displacement? Briefly describe the various types of displacement. Explain the difference between the predictions made by traditional/dispositional theories and those made by environmental criminological theories regarding displacement. What is diffusion of benefits? Explain the two reasons why diffusion of benefits might occur. Finally, summarize the empirical evidence on displacement and diffusion of benefits.

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DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE
CORNER? A CONTROLLED STUDY OF
SPATIAL DISPLACEMENT AND DIFFUSION
OF CRIME CONTROL BENEFITS*
DAVID WEISBURD
Hebrew University and University of Maryland
LAURA A. WYCKOFF
Police Foundation
JUSTIN READY
John Jay School of Criminal Justice
JOHN E. ECK
University of Cincinnati
JOSHUA C. HINKLE
University of Maryland
FRANK GAJEWSKI
Jersey City Police Department (retired)
KEYWORDS: crime displacement, diffusion of crime control benefits, hot
spots policing, police crackdowns, routine activities, rational choice
*
This research was supported by grant No. 98-IJ-CX-0070 from the National
Institute of Justice to the Police Foundation. The opinions and positions expressed
in this paper are those of the authors. We would like to thank Ronald V. Clarke,
Herman Goldstein, Stephen Mastrofski, and Jerome Skolnick of our “strategy
review team” for their help in identifying sites and strategies for this project. We
also would like to thank Rosann Greenspan, then Research Director of the Police
Foundation, who played an important role in the early stages of our project, the
Jersey City Police Department (JCPD) for allowing the research team full access to
their staff and data, and Emmanuel Barthe and Charlie Bellucci of the JCPD for
their assistance with the Jersey City Police Department data. We also want to
express our thanks to Regina Brisgone, Lorraine Mazerolle, Martha J. Smith,
Doron Teichman, and Charles Wellford for their comments on earlier versions of
this manuscript. Finally we would like to thank Brian Barth, Kristen Miggans,
Nancy Morris, Wayne Sharp, and Sue-Ming Yang at the University of Maryland at
College Park for their assistance in data entry, data analysis, and editing. Please
direct all correspondence to David Weisburd; Department of Criminology and
Criminal Justice; University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742; e-mail:
[email protected].
CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 44 NUMBER 3 2006
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Recent studies point to the potential theoretical and practical benefits
of focusing police resources on crime hot spots. However, many
scholars have noted that such approaches risk displacing crime or
disorder to other places where programs are not in place. Although
much attention has been paid to the idea of displacement,
methodological problems associated with measuring it have often been
overlooked. We try to fill these gaps in measurement and understanding
of displacement and the related phenomenon of diffusion of crime
control benefits. Our main focus is on immediate spatial displacement
or diffusion of crime to areas near the targeted sites of an intervention.
Do focused crime prevention efforts at places simply result in a
movement of offenders to areas nearby targeted sites—”do they simply
move crime around the corner”? Or, conversely, will a crime
prevention effort focusing on specific places lead to improvement in
areas nearby—what has come to be termed a diffusion of crime control
benefits? Our data are drawn from a controlled study of displacement
and diffusion in Jersey City, New Jersey. Two sites with substantial
street-level crime and disorder were targeted and carefully monitored
during an experimental period. Two neighboring areas were selected as
“catchment areas” from which to assess immediate spatial displacement
or diffusion. Intensive police interventions were applied to each target
site but not to the catchment areas. More than 6,000 20-minute social
observations were conducted in the target and catchment areas. They
were supplemented by interviews and ethnographic field observations.
Our findings indicate that, at least for crime markets involving drugs
and prostitution, crime does not simply move around the corner.
Indeed, this study supports the position that the most likely outcome of
such focused crime prevention efforts is a diffusion of crime control
benefits to nearby areas.
Recent studies point to the potential theoretical and practical benefits
of focusing research on crime places (Eck and Weisburd, 1995; Sherman,
1995; Taylor, 1997; Weisburd, 2002; Weisburd, Bushway et al., 2004). A
number, for example, suggest that significant clustering of crime at place
exists, irrespective of the specific unit of analysis defined (Brantingham
and Brantingham, 1999; Crow and Bull, 1975; Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs,
1986; Roncek, 2000; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Weisburd,
Maher, and Sherman, 1992; Weisburd and Green, 1994a; Weisburd,
Bushway et al., 2004). The concentration of crime at place also suggests
significant crime prevention potential for such strategies as hot spots
patrol (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), which focus crime prevention
resources tightly at places with large numbers of crime events (Sherman,
DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? 551
Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Weisburd and
Green, 1995a).
Although there is growing evidence that police can have an impact on
crime at the specific areas where they focus their efforts (see Sherman et
al., 1997; Weisburd and Eck, 2004), such approaches risk shifting crime or
disorder to other places where programs are not in place. This
phenomenon is usually termed spatial displacement, and it has been a
major reason for traditional skepticism about the overall crime prevention
benefits of place-based prevention efforts (Reppetto, 1976).
In recent years, this prevailing orthodoxy has been the subject of
substantial criticism. The assumption that displacement is an inevitable
outcome of focused crime prevention efforts has been replaced by a new
assumption that displacement is seldom total and often inconsequential
(Barr and Pease, 1990; Clarke, 1992; Eck, 1993; Gabor, 1990; Hesseling,
1994). Clarke and Weisburd (1994), moreover, suggest that scholars need
to be cognizant of the reverse of displacement. They point to evidence
indicating that situational and place-oriented crime prevention strategies
often lead to a “diffusion of crime control benefits” to areas outside the
immediate targets of intervention. Such spatial diffusion of crime control
benefits has now been noted in a number of studies (Braga et al., 1999;
Caeti, 1999; Hope, 1994; Sherman and Rogan, 1995; Weisburd and Green,
1995a).
Whereas much attention has been paid to the idea of displacement,
methodological problems associated with measuring it have often been
overlooked (Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Weisburd and Green, 1995a; for
exceptions, see Barr and Pease, 1990; Pease, 1993). Indeed we could not
identify a single direct empirical study of displacement for review. That is
not to say that displacement has not been studied, only that empirical
examinations of displacement or diffusion have been a by-product of the
study of something else. Typically, knowledge of displacement or diffusion
has been gained from a study focusing on the effects of an innovative
crime prevention program. The problem is that a study designed to
measure direct program effects will likely face significant methodological
problems in measuring displacement or diffusion (Weisburd and Green,
1995b).
The failure of scholars to examine displacement and diffusion effects
directly was to some extent understandable when it was assumed that
there would be little overall crime control benefit from focused crime
prevention initiatives, and when few practical crime prevention
approaches concentrated on places or situations. Given the substantial
growth of such crime prevention programs in recent years, however, and
the growing controversy over the magnitude and nature of displacement,
such focus is now warranted. Our study sought to fill these gaps in the
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WEISBURD ET AL.
measurement and understanding of displacement and diffusion. Our main
focus is on immediate spatial displacement or diffusion of crime control
benefits to areas near the targeted sites of an intervention. Do focused
crime control efforts at places simply result in a movement of offenders to
areas nearby targeted sites—do they simply move crime around the
corner? Or, conversely, will a crime prevention effort focusing on specific
places lead to improvement in areas nearby—what has come to be termed
a diffusion of crime control benefits? Though our main focus is on
immediate spatial displacement and diffusion, we also collect data on
other potential forms of displacement and the ways in which focused
place-based intervention efforts affect them.
Our data are drawn from a controlled study of displacement and
diffusion in Jersey City, New Jersey. Two sites with substantial street-level
crime and disorder were targeted and were carefully monitored during an
experimental period. One site included a clearly focused geographic
concentration of drug crime, and the other street-level prostitution. Two
neighboring areas were selected as “catchment areas” to assess immediate
spatial displacement or diffusion. Intensive police interventions were
applied to each target site but not applied to the catchment areas. More
than 6,000 20-minute social observations were conducted in the target and
catchment areas during the study period. These data were supplemented
by interviews and ethnographic field observations.
DISPLACEMENT AND DIFFUSION
The idea of spatial displacement can be traced to early work by
sociologists who noted the role of opportunities for crime at places, but at
the same time assumed that the concentration of crime prevention efforts
at places would simply shift crime events from place to place without any
clear long-term crime prevention benefit. Sutherland (1947), for example,
recognized the importance of criminal opportunities in the crime equation
even as he presented his theory of differential social learning among
individuals. He noted in his classic introductory criminology text that “a
thief may steal from a fruit stand when the owner is not in sight but refrain
when the owner is in sight; a bank burglar may attack a bank which is
poorly protected but refrain from attacking a bank protected by watchmen
and burglar alarms” (1947: 5). Nonetheless, like other early criminologists,
Sutherland did not see crime places as a relevant focus of criminological
study. This was the case, in part, because crime opportunities provided by
places were assumed to be so numerous as to make crime prevention
strategies targeting specific places of little utility for theory or policy. In
turn, criminologists traditionally assumed that situational factors played a
DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? 553
relatively minor role in explaining crime as compared with the “driving
force of criminal dispositions” (Clarke and Felson, 1993: 4; Trasler, 1993).
Though the possibility that crime prevention might move crime rather
than curtail it is not new, it was not until 1976 that Reppetto provided the
first explicit rationale for displacement.
The police, however, cannot be everywhere; all houses and
commercial establishments cannot be secured with attack-proof
doors and windows, and all neighborhood environments cannot
be altered. A different level of protection between various
potential targets, both human and nonhuman, will always exist.
Given the differential and no reduction in the offender
population, will not the foreclosure of one type of criminal
opportunity simply shift the incidence of crime to different forms,
times and locales? (1976: 167)
Displacement refers to the shift of crime either in terms of space, time,
or type of offending from the original targets of crime prevention
interventions (Reppetto, 1976). It is often seen as a negative consequence
of focused crime prevention efforts, but harnessing the displacement
phenomenon may in fact benefit the community. For example, moving
prostitutes from an area near a local school, or shifting the time of
prostitution later into the night when younger people or commuters are
less likely to be present may be desirable. In turn, if offenders can be
displaced from more to less violent crime, the community may benefit
(Barr and Pease, 1990). Nonetheless, if displacement is an inevitable result
of focused prevention efforts, then the utility of place-based crime
prevention approaches would be limited.
CHALLENGES TO TRADITIONAL CONCERN WITH
DISPLACEMENT OUTCOMES
Based on assumptions about the large number of crime opportunities
available in modern societies, and the highly motivated nature of many
offenders, crime prevention scholars have traditionally assumed that most
of the crime control benefits of situational prevention strategies would be
lost due to displacement. Some early studies appeared to support this
position (for example, Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson, 1974; Lateef,
1974; Mayhew et al., 1976; Press, 1971). However, careful review of these
findings, as well as of a series of studies in the 1980s and 1990s, has led to
general agreement that displacement of crime is seldom total and often
inconsequential (Barr and Pease, 1990; Clarke, 1992; Eck, 1993; Gabor,
1990; Hesseling, 1994; for an opposing view, see Teichman, 2005).
Evidence suggesting that displacement is much less of a problem than
had originally been assumed can be understood only if we abandon
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simplistic assumptions about opportunity and crime that have been
predominant among crime prevention scholars. The idea that criminal
opportunities are indiscriminately spread through urban areas has been
challenged by a series of studies showing that crime is concentrated in time
and space (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981; Sherman, Gartin, and
Buerger, 1989; Weisburd, Maher, and Sherman, 1992; Weisburd and
Green, 1994a; Weisburd, Bushway et al., 2004). Moreover, criminal
opportunities are differentially distributed, both in terms of the benefits
they offer and the ease with which they can be seized.
In one study of situational measures used to prevent bank robberies, for
example, little displacement was noted to other types of targets
(convenience stores and gas stations), primarily because they did not offer
enough financial reward for the criminal gangs that had been targeting the
banks (Clarke, Field, and McGrath, 1991). Using the example of homes
and cars, Clarke (1995) suggests that what appears at first glance to be an
endless quantity of criminal opportunities, may be bounded both by issues
of guardianship and significant variation in the value of goods that can be
stolen (see also Hesseling, 1994).
The portrait of offenders as driven to criminality has begun to be
replaced by one that recognizes the situational, often serendipitous,
character of much offending (Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Weisburd and
Waring, 2001). Even for crimes that have been assumed to be most
vulnerable to displacement effects, evidence suggests that situational
characteristics may dampen displacement impacts. For example, in an
evaluation of a crackdown on prostitution in Finsbury Park, London,
Matthews (1990) found little evidence of displacement. He explains this by
noting that the women involved were not strongly committed to
prostitution, but looked at the targeted location as an easy area from
which to solicit.
Perhaps the strongest evidence against the assumption of immediate
spatial displacement has come from recent studies of focused interventions
at crime hot spots. In the Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment
(Weisburd and Green, 1995a), for example, displacement within two block
areas around each hot spot was measured. No significant displacement of
crime or disorder calls was found. These findings were replicated in a
series of other hot spots experiments including the New Jersey Violent
Crime Places Experiment (Braga et al., 1999), the Beat Health Study
(Green and Roehl, 1998), and the Kansas City Gun Project (Sherman and
Rogan, 1995). Only Hope (1994) reports direct displacement of crime as a
result of a focused hot spots intervention, though this occurred only in the
area immediate to the treated locations, and the displacement effect was
much smaller overall than the crime prevention effect.
DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? 555
Further challenge to the displacement hypothesis is found in recent
studies that suggest a positive though unanticipated consequence of crime
control practices. In these cases, investigators found improvement in areas
close to, but not targeted by, crime prevention efforts (see Green, 1995;
Weisburd and Green, 1995a). Clarke and Weisburd (1994) argue that this
phenomenon is general enough to deserve a standard term—“diffusion of
crime control benefits.” It has been described elsewhere by investigators
variously as the free rider effect (Miethe, 1991), the bonus effect
(Sherman, 1990), the halo effect (Scherdin, 1986), or the multiplier effect
(Chaiken, Lawless, and Stevenson, 1974). In essence, diffusion is the
reverse of displacement. It refers to the diffusion of crime control benefits
to contexts that were not the primary focus of crime prevention initiatives.
Diffusion has now been documented in crime prevention strategies as
diverse as police crackdowns (Sherman, 1990; Weisburd and Green,
1995a), book protection systems (Scherdin, 1986), electronic surveillance
(Poyner and Webb, 1987), and enforcement of civil regulations at nuisance
locations (Green, 1996).
Clarke and Weisburd (1994) identify two main processes underlying
diffusion: deterrence and discouragement. In the case of deterrence,
offenders generally overestimate the crime prevention efforts of the police
or other social control agents and assume erroneously that they are at
higher risk of apprehension or punishment. Sherman (1990) cites an
example of this process of deterrence when he shows that the crime
control benefits of police crackdowns generally last much beyond the
actual crackdown periods. Discouragement occurs when a crime
prevention program reduces the rewards associated with a criminal act.
For example, removing coin-fed gas and electricity meters from
apartments that had been burglarized in a public housing estate in
England led to an overall decline across the entire housing project (Pease,
1997). In this case, it seemed that taking out a proportion of the meters
was enough to discourage potential burglars, who “could no longer be sure
of finding a meter containing cash without expending a great deal of
additional effort” (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994: 173).
LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH ON DISPLACEMENT
Since 1990 three main reviews of empirical studies have reported on
displacement: Barr and Pease (1990); Eck (1993); and Hesseling (1994).
Unfortunately, to date there have been no similar reviews of diffusion of
crime control benefits.1 The three reviews vary in their comprehen1.
Although there have not been similar comprehensive reviews of diffusion of crime
control benefits, Smith, Clarke, and Pease (2002) examine a related phenomenon
which they term anticipatory benefits. In a review of situational crime prevention
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siveness. Barr and Pease restricted themselves to studies from the United
Kingdom. Eck assessed thirty-three studies from the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries printed in English.
Hesseling examined fifty-five studies from North America, Europe, and
other areas printed in English or Dutch.
Each of these reviews arrived at the same three basic conclusions. First,
there is little evidence of crime prevention strategies that displaced as
much crime as was prevented (displacement equal to 100 percent).
Second, displacement, when it occurs, is usually less than the amount of
crime prevented (displacement less than 100 percent but greater than 0
percent). And, third, for crime prevention evaluations that reported on
displacement, the most common finding was that there was no evidence of
displacement (displacement equal to 0 percent). In sum, most studies
found no, or negligible, displacement of crime.
These results must be taken with three important caveats. First, the
amount of displacement depends, in part, on the type of intervention that
is applied. For example, Hesseling (1994) suggests that target hardening
may displace more crime than access control. Second, the amount of
displacement also depends, in part, on the crime or disorder being
prevented. Eck (1993) suggests that drug dealing may be more likely to
displace than other forms of crime (for the opposite view, see Weisburd
and Green, 1995b) and that certain forms of drug markets are particularly
susceptible to displacement. Third, and most important, because the
studies did not set out to examine displacement, it was rare that evaluators
were able to use a methodologically sound research design for detecting it.
This is in part because researchers must make decisions about the
allocation of scarce research funds and resources. If, for example, a
researcher is unsure about the direct crime control benefits of a program,
it makes sense to invest in assessing the direct target effects rather than
outcomes that are important only if a target effect is found.
Even if resources are available for measuring displacement and
diffusion effects, a research design optimal for identifying the direct
impacts of a program will often be a weak design for measuring
displacement and diffusion. For example, Sherman and Weisburd (1995)
designed the Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment to have a high level of
statistical power for detecting the effects of police patrol at targeted
locations. However, the sites that provided enough activity to ensure a
high enough base rate for the study were often surrounded by high crime
studies, they find that 40 percent of studies including sufficient detail for analysis
evidenced some degree of crime prevention effect “before” an intervention had
begun. We discuss the implications of these findings for our study in the discussion
section.
DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? 557
areas. Weisburd and Green (1995a) demonstrate that potential
displacement in the Minneapolis study was extremely difficult to identify
using conventional measurement techniques. Although a statistically
significant direct program impact was found overall, in any particular hot
spot the actual change in the number of crimes was relatively small. At the
same time, the areas immediately surrounding the hot spots often had a
large number of crimes. Detecting displacement in such cases is a bit like
looking for a needle in a haystack.
These problems have been brought up in the past. When first describing
the problem of displacement, Reppetto writes, “to date, no concerted
attempts appear to have been made to forecast the forms and dimensions
of the displacement problem, this topic seems ripe for comprehensive and
quantitative research” (1976: 68). We have reason to speculate that
displacement is not as inevitable as he believed, but the type of study he
described is still lacking. The fact that we now have ample evidence of the
effectiveness of spatially focused crime prevention efforts (Committee to
Review Research on Policy and Practice, 2004; Weisburd and Eck, 2004)
suggests that it is especially important that we conduct direct studies of
displacement and diffusion in crime hot spots. This study aims to address
the limitations of previous displacement research by using methods
specifically designed to capture displacement and diffusion effects.
THE STUDY
Our first task was to identify a police agency willing to develop and
implement crime prevention strategies with the goal of understanding
displacement and diffusion. We recognized at the outset that such a study
would not only demand a very high level of cooperation from a police
agency, but also stray significantly from the typical interest of police
departments in identifying effective crime prevention approaches. Here,
we were requesting that an agency develop crime prevention in a context
that would not necessarily lead to the largest crime prevention benefit, but
would instead allow for the clearest examination of displacement and
diffusion. We were fortunate to have worked with then Deputy Chief
Frank Gajewski of the Jersey City Police Department (JCPD) on a series
of earlier studies of innovative crime prevention approaches focused on
hot spots (see Braga et al., 1999; Weisburd and Green, 1995a), who not
only agreed to support the research in the JCPD but also directly
supervised implementation of the policing strategies.
Although our selecting Jersey City was based primarily on the
willingness of the JCPD to work with us, the city was also attractive as a
site because it had robust crime problems and crime trends that followed
national patterns. Jersey City (population 240,055 in 2000) is the second
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largest city in the state, and home to a predominantly working-class
population. According to the 2000 decennial census on population and
housing, 33 percent of residents are white, 28 percent are black, and 28
percent are Hispanic. In the late 1990s, when the study was being
developed, the city was ranked higher in per capita drug arrests than
Cincinnati, Baltimore, Newark, Tampa, and New York City—all among
the top ten cities for drug arrests in the United States. At the same time,
violent crime declined during the 1990s, as it did in most other major
American cities (Blumstein and Wallman, 2000). For example, homicides
dropped from sixteen to seven incidents per 100,000 residents from 1994 to
1997. In the same period, assaults dropped from 848 to 224 per 100,000
residents.
SELECTING CRIME SITES
We assembled a team of policing and crime prevention experts to assist
in identifying crime sites that were optimal for studying displacement and
diffusion. This “strategy review team” included some of the leading
scholars and practitioners with expertise in community and problemoriented approaches to policing.2 During a series of meetings, various
high-crime areas of Jersey City were assessed using a number of
quantitative and qualitative variables to select the most appropriate areas
for study. These measures included crime maps created from crime
incidence data, police calls for service data, and observations of potential
sites.
We looked for sites that consistently showed high levels of activity. This
would allow for a more sensitive, statistically powerful research design
(see Lipsey, 1990; Weisburd and Green, 1995b)— the larger the number of
possible crimes that can be deterred, the greater the amount of
displacement that can be expected. Nonetheless, it was decided to exclude
target areas in which crime in surrounding areas was so high that it would
make it more difficult to detect displacement, like trying to find a needle
in a haystack, or so low that it would be impossible to identify a diffusion
of crime control benefits. We also sought sites that were isolated from
other potentially confounding crime prevention programs and police
operations. In addition, places were identified where the predominant
criminal activity was thought to be well suited to measure displacement
outcomes. Accordingly, crimes were chosen that involved income
generation, with the assumption that offenders would feel strong pressure
to continue committing crime despite police intervention.
2.
The scholars who served on this strategy review team were Ronald Clarke, Herman
Goldstein, Stephen Mastrofski, and Jerome Skolnick.
DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? 559
We recognized at the outset that our criteria for selection would lead to
a relatively small group of possible sites. This fit our overall study design,
which focused on collecting detailed information about displacement and
diffusion that resulted from specific crime prevention interventions. We
sought to examine displacement and diffusion in a controlled context in
which the sites not only met the specific criteria noted above, but in which
there would be a good deal of control over police activities and the
possibility for collecting very detailed data about crime and disorder in the
sites selected (see below). The significant costs of such a data collection
effort at any one site, and the demands on the police agency involved in
bringing interventions in each site, meant that only a small number of
areas could be selected for study.
Twenty locations were identified as possible sites based on the above
criteria. Police officers from the Jersey City Police Department provided
more detailed information about the crime problems in these sites, which
was used to narrow this list down, first to twelve and then to three. Two of
these sites, one characterized by drug crime problems,3 and the second by
prostitution, are described below. A third site, characterized by burglary,
was originally selected but then excluded because our observations
suggested that implementation of the crime control strategies had been
weak and inconsistent.
Defining displacement and diffusion catchment areas. An important part
of our site selection process was to identify sites that had potential for
displacement of crime or diffusion of crime control benefits to areas
nearby the targeted sites. As noted, we chose the target areas with
attention to the overall level of crime in the immediate surrounding street
blocks. But we also wanted to make sure that the physical layout of the
area would allow crime to shift to areas surrounding the target site. This
meant that a target site could not be bounded, for example, by a waterway
or other physical obstruction to displacement or diffusion.
For each site, we identified an area, which we termed catchment area 1,
of about one block surrounding the target site. If crime were simply to
“move around the corner,” we assumed that it would be most likely to be
found in this area. At the same time, we also wanted our study to be
sensitive to displacement or diffusion to areas farther from the target site.
Accordingly, we defined a second catchment area that extended our
observations at least two blocks around the target areas.
3.
Though this area was originally defined as also having high rates of violent crime,
we found that the primary crime patterns at the site involved drug crimes, and that
the base rate of violent street-level activity was too low in our study for robust
statistical analysis.
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THE CORNELISON AVENUE PROSTITUTION SITE
The Cornelison Avenue target site had a history of prostitution activity
dating back more than a decade (see figure 1). It had once been a
neighborhood of thriving businesses, industrial warehouses, homes, and
the Jersey City Police Department stables. At the time of this study,
however, the area appeared all but abandoned. Only a small number of
occupied residential houses remained on Westervelt, Ivy, and Grand
streets. There was also a substance abuse treatment center at the northern
end of the target site near Fairmount Avenue, and a few warehouses and
small factories. Our observations in these areas suggested that the
employees of these businesses seldom ventured onto the streets of the
target area. Moreover, in preliminary observations, observers reported
that the prostitutes in this area worked out in the open and didn’t take
many precautions to avoid police detection.
Catchment area 1 contained a small number of multifamily housing
units and small businesses including an auto body shop, a car wash, and a
lumber yard. There was pedestrian traffic during commuting hours, but
little motor vehicle traffic. This description was markedly different in the
second catchment area, which housed three of the city’s largest public
housing projects (Booker T. Apartments, Lafayette Gardens, and
Montgomery Houses), and had heavy pedestrian and vehicle traffic.
Overall, catchment area 2 had few businesses other than a liquor store and
small convenience store.
Figure 1. Map of the Prostitution Site Target and Catchment Areas
DOES CRIME JUST MOVE AROUND THE CORNER? 561
THE STORMS AVENUE DRUG CRIME SITE
The Storms Avenue drug crime target area was located about a quarter
mile from the prostitution target site and was in the same police district.4
In contrast to the prostitution target area which appeared to be largely
abandoned, this area had the feel of a densely populated urban
neighborhood. Half of the ninety-six buildings in the target area were
three-story structures with a business or agency on the ground floor and
apartment units on the upper floors. The majority of these commercial
establishments were on Bergen Avenue, which borders the western edge
of the target area (see figure 2). The eastern side consisted of multifamily
dwellings and a large number of vacant lots and abandoned buildings.
Storms Avenue and Reed Street lie to the east of Bergen Avenue. Both
were one-way