553- Operational Management

Description

Discussion Question: Consider a proper security
budget for your current or past organization. Identify the top three costs
associated with your security budget. Now, compare and contrast your top three
costs with the top three cost concerns you feel might be selected by your Chief
Executive Officer (CEO). As a CEO, you must consider such things as personnel
costs, technology, risk management, and perhaps other factors unique to your
experience or organization.

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White Paper for the Integrated Public Safety Response to the
Active Shooter/Active Assailant
Prepared by:
The North Carolina Active Assailant and Mass Violence Work Group
In cooperation with:
The North Carolina Department of Justice
The North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations
The North Carolina State Highway Patrol
The North Carolina Division of Emergency Management
The North Carolina Office of Emergency Medical Services
The North Carolina Office of the State Fire Marshal
The North Carolina Chapter of the Association of Public Safety Communications
The North Carolina Chapter of the National Emergency Number Association
The Department of Homeland Security
January 20, 2017
Version 1.0
Table of Contents
Executive Summary
3
North Carolina State Emergency Response Commission Resolution of Support
5
North Carolina Agency Support
6
Definitions
7
Purpose
10
Stakeholders
10
Unified Incident Command
11
9‐1‐1 Communications Subcommittee Section
13
Law Enforcement Subcommittee Section
16
Fire Service Subcommittee Section
19
Emergency Medical Services Subcommittee Section
22
Emergency Management Subcommittee Section
27
Appendix A: Recommended Readings
32
Appendix B: Training and Exercises
32
Appendix C: Common Acronyms in Active Assailant Response
34
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To cite this document, please use the following:
Clumpner, M., Vernon, A., Tanner, T., Bachman, M., Jeffries, D. & Groves, J. (2017). White paper for the
integrated public safety response to the active shooter/active assailant. Raleigh, NC: State of North
Carolina.
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Executive Summary
The threat of active shooters and active assailants continues to increase in the United States. Multiple
agencies in North Carolina recognized the importance of planning and preparation for these types of
incidents. Various agency leaders determined the need to define common response concepts to aid in
operational continuity. The complexity of active assailant incidents demonstrates that mutual aid
response is frequently required to mitigate these incidents with minimal loss of life. Optimal success at
active assailant incidents requires a common response plan.
Recent active assailant attacks and numerous after‐action‐reports demonstrate that previous response
models continue to result in unnecessary loss of life. Research from previous active shooter incidents
demonstrates that half of the injured victims will have moderate to severe injuries1,2. Additional data
demonstrates that 67% of these injured victims will die if they do not receive basic medical care within
30 minutes of the injury3. Multiple research studies demonstrate that victims continue to die needlessly
at active assailant incidents because of delays in point‐of‐wounding care, extraction, treatment, and
transport4,5.
North Carolina emergency responders have recognized that a new, aggressive response model is
necessary to reduce death and serious injury at these incidents. This new model complements the North
Carolina law enforcement rapid deployment model (REDS) and adds the rapid treatment and extraction
of injured victims. The rescue task force (RTF) concept is a nationally recognized response model that
integrates fire department and EMS providers with law enforcement officers to provide rapid care for
active shooter victims. The RTF operates with law enforcement security to render care to victims in
areas adjacent to potential hostile activity. The RTF model is scalable depending on the available
resources, as well as the size and complexity of the incident.
An established, multi‐disciplinary team consisting of numerous North Carolina public safety responders
and subject matter experts spent more than three years to create this best practices document.
Representatives from law enforcement, the fire service, emergency medical services, emergency
management, 9‐1‐1 communications, military installations, airports, universities, intelligence analysts,
1
Kaplowitz, L., Reece, M., Hershey, J. H., Gilbert, C. M., & Subbarao, I. (2007). Regional health system response to
the Virginia Tech mass casualty incident. Disaster Medicine Public Health Preparedness, 1, S1‐S9.
2
Linkous, D., & Carter, K. F. (2009). Responding to the shootings at Virginia Tech: Planning and preparedness.
Journal of Emergency Nursing, 35, 321‐325.
3
Strawder, G. S. (2006, 2nd Quarter). The Golden Hour standard: Transforming combat health support. Joint
Forces Quarterly, 41, 60‐67.
4
Fabbri, W. P. (2014, October). Improving survival in active shooter events [Special section]. Journal of Emergency
Medical Services, 4‐9.
5
Jacobs, L.M. (2014). Joint committee to create a national policy to enhance survivability from a mass casualty
shooting event: Hartford Consensus II. Journal of American College of Surgeons, 218(30):476‐478.
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the Department of Homeland Security, and the Committee for Tactical Emergency Casualty Care all
provided input on this paper.
This document is based on best practice recommendations from professional and government
organizations, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of
Fire Chiefs, the International Association of Fire Fighters, and the Department of Homeland Security.
Multiagency planning, preparation, and training are critical for successful response. This document
provides a basic guideline for agencies to develop or modify their active assailant response protocols.
This document does not replace or supersede individual agency policies or procedures. It is imperative
for each agency, jurisdiction, and municipality to create a response plan that will maximize available
resources to successfully mitigate these incidents.
There exists no “cookie‐cutter” template for active assailant response, and each jurisdiction must
develop a plan that fits the needs and abilities of the community. On behalf of the North Carolina Active
Assailant/Mass Violence Work Group, we hope that you will find this document to be a useful adjunct in
planning and preparing for an active assailant response in your community.
Sincerely,
August Vernon: Emergency Services Manager, Wake Forest University
Work Group Chair
Michael Clumpner, PhD, MBA, NRP, CCEMTP, TP‐C, FP‐C; Fire Captain, Charlotte Fire Department
Chair, Fire Service Subcommittee
Theresa Tanner: Assistant Special Agent in Charge, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation
Chair, Law Enforcement Subcommittee
Michael Bachman, MHS, EMT‐P: Deputy Director of Medical Affairs, Wake County EMS
Chair, Emergency Medical Services Subcommittee
Dinah Jeffries, ENP: Emergency Services Director, Orange County Emergency Services
Chair, 9‐1‐1 Communications Subcommittee
James Groves, MA, MEP, CEM: Director, Durham County Fire Marshal and Emergency Management
Chair, Emergency Management Subcommittee
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North Carolina State Emergency Response Commission
The North Carolina State Emergency Response Commission unanimously passed the resolution on April
21, 2017 recommending that North Carolina public safety agencies utilize this document to enhance
agency response to active assailant events. The following are duly sworn members of the Commission:
Public Safety Secretary Erik Hooks, North Carolina Department of Public Safety
Director Mike Sprayberry, North Carolina Division of Emergency Management
Director Robert Schurmeier, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations
Colonel Glenn McNeill, North Carolina State Highway Patrol
Major General Gregory Lusk, North Carolina National Guard
Chief Thomas Mitchell, North Carolina Office of Emergency Medical Services
State Fire Marshal Michael Causey, North Carolina Office of the State Fire Marshal
Chief Eddie Buffaloe, North Carolina Association of Police Chiefs
Director Jerry VeHaun, North Carolina Emergency Management Association
President Kevin Staley, North Carolina Association of EMS Administrators
Honorable William Schatzam, North Carolina Sheriff’s Association
Chief Cecil Martinette, North Carolina Association of Fire Chiefs
Secretary of Transportation James Trogden, North Carolina Department of Transportation
Branch Head Dr. Julie Casani, North Carolina Department of Public Health
Director Fleda Anderson, North Carolina Department of Labor
Coordinator Christopher Raynor, North Carolina Community College System
Chief Deputy Secretary John Nicholson, North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality
Director Maria Thompson, North Carolina Department of Information Technology
Mr. Larry Perkins, International Association of Venue Managers
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North Carolina Agency Support
In addition to the State Emergency Response Commission, the following have endorsed this paper:
Tripp Winslow, MD; North Carolina State EMS Medical Director
Chair Brent Myers, MD; North Carolina Chapter of National Association of EMS Physicians
President Scot Brooks, North Carolina Emergency Management Association
President Jeryl Anderson, North Carolina Chapter of the Association of Public Safety Communications
President Lisa Reid, North Carolina Chapter of National Emergency Number Association
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Definitions
Active assailant: An active assailant is an armed person(s) who uses any type of weapon to inflict serious
harm and/or deadly physical force on others in public and continues to do so while having
access to additional victims6. Examples of active assailant attacks include an active shooter
incident, mass stabbings, explosives, vehicle‐as‐a‐weapon, fire‐as‐a‐weapon, and so forth.
(These are also known as active shooter events, hostile incidents, mass violence attacks,
rampage violence, spree killings, and so forth.)
Casualty collection point: A casualty collection point is a location where providers can assemble victims
for basic treatment of life‐threatening injuries while awaiting extraction from the crisis site.
Cleared: Cleared is an area in which law enforcement has conducted a rapid, protective sweep and no
obvious threats are identified, or obvious threats have been neutralized. Victims may or may
not be present in a cleared area.
Cold zone: The cold zone is an area surrounding an active assailant incident in which law enforcement
has determined that there are no suspects or any other threats, including the presence of
explosive devices.
Contact team: A contact team is a law enforcement officer or officers who proceed immediately into
an incident with the goal of rapidly identifying, locating, isolating, containing, and neutralizing
the perpetrator(s).
Crisis site: The crisis site is a geographical area at an active assailant incident where civilians and
responders have a significantly increased risk of danger from violent actions committed by the
perpetrator or perpetrators.
Direct‐to‐threat: Direct‐to‐threat is the action of law enforcement officers to quickly advance towards
the perpetrator(s) with the immediate goal of stopping the perpetrator(s).
Direct threat care: Direct threat care is gross hemorrhage control provided to a victim when there is a
direct threat of hostile activity. The goal of direct threat care is to immediately remove the
victim from the hostile action.
Hot zone: The hot zone is an area surrounding a hostile incident where there is a clear and present
danger from a perpetrator(s) or other deadly threats.
6
Many definitions recognize an active shooter incident as one in which three or more people are shot in the
absence of gang or drug activity, or in the commission of secondary crime (such as a bank robbery).
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Indirect threat care: Indirect threat care is care provided to a victim when there is no direct threat, but
there is a potential threat of engagement or reengagement by hostile forces.
Medical director: The medical director is a physician with oversight of an agency’s prehospital medical
care as defined by North Carolina Administrative Code, 10A NACC 13, Sections .0101 and .0400.
Point‐of‐wounding care: Point‐of‐wounding care is the care for victims at their initial point of injury.
Rescue task force: The rescue task force (RTF) is an integrated group of medically trained responders
and law enforcement officers who quickly enter into the warm zone to provide point‐of‐
wounding care and rapid extraction of victims to safety.
Tactical evacuation: Tactical evacuation is the concept of providing rapid and secure extraction of a
victim in a hostile environment to an appropriate level of care.
Triage/Treatment/Transport location: The triage/treatment/transport location is typically in the cold
zone where triage, treatment, and transport of injured victims will occur. This is an area in which
ambulances are available to transport victims.
Secured: A secured area is an area in which law enforcement has conducted a thorough search and
threats are not found or have been neutralized. Law enforcement will maintain a continual
security presence in a secured area.
Unified command: The unified command organization consists of a single incident commander with
supervisory personnel from each responding agency. The unified command will allow the
responding agencies to develop common objectives and strategies, share information, and
maximize available resources.
Warm zone: The warm zone is an area where there are no direct or immediate threats, but a potential
threat can exist or emerge.
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Purpose and Scope
The threat of active assailants is a problem that faces communities large and small. North Carolina is not
immune to the threat, as several towns and cities in the state have had active assailant incidents. The
State of North Carolina recognizes that active assailant incidents are a real threat facing every
community. Regardless of size and capacity, every public safety agency must plan and prepare to
respond to these types of incidents. Active assailant incidents are not limited to large cities. Ninety‐eight
percent of active shooter incidents in the United States have occurred in jurisdictions served by a police
department with 100 or fewer officers7.
Law enforcement officers focus on rapid response and immediate neutralization of the threat(s).
However, the law enforcement response comprises only a part of the solution at active assailant
incidents. The six highest active assailant victim incidents since 2000 happened despite law enforcement
arriving on scene in less than three minutes8. Multiple research studies demonstrate that victims
continue to die needlessly at active assailant incidents because of delays in point‐of‐wounding care,
extraction, treatment, and transport9,10,11.
The Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International Association
of Fire Fighters, the National Fire Protection Agency, and the Hartford Consensus have all published best
practice papers that state that law enforcement, fire personnel, and emergency medical services
personnel must have an aggressive, integrated response plan to ensure optimal victim survivability at
active assailant incidents. This document provides best practice guidance for the development and
implementation of comprehensive, interagency strategies to reduce potentially preventable mortality
during active violence incidents. Optimal survivability is dependent on integrated public safety response
to these incidents.
The goal of this document is to provide guidance and share best practices to agency officials regarding
planning, training, and response to active assailant incidents. This document provides recommendations
on all phases of active assailant response, and includes responsibilities for all public safety disciplines.
The recommendations in this document are scalable to allow variations for agencies, and to provide a
7
Schweit, K.W. (2013). Addressing the problem of the active shooter: FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Quantico, VA:
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
8
Washington State Fusion Center & Oregon State Fusion Center (2014‐July 14). Countering violent extremism:
Rampage school shootings. WSFC 14‐0081.
9
Fabbri, W. P. (2014, October). Improving survival in active shooter events [Special section]. Journal of Emergency
Medical Services, 4‐9.
10
Goodwin, J. (2013, September). Preparing for the unthinkable. Best Practices in Emergency Services, 16(9), 1‐11.
11
Jacobs, L.M. (2014). Joint committee to create a national policy to enhance survivability from a mass casualty
shooting event: Hartford Consensus II. Journal of American College of Surgeons, 218(3):476‐478.
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consistent recommendation across North Carolina. This document is not intended to replace, override,
or limit any agency response procedure. The Work Group encourages agency officials to use this
document to assist in creating, modifying, or maintaining current active assailant response procedures.
Stakeholders
The Work Group recommends that every community in North Carolina identify specific agencies and
stakeholders responsible for community planning and response to active assailant incidents. At a
minimum, the following stakeholders should create the community’s unified active assailant response
plan:
 Local, state, and federal law enforcement
 Jurisdictional and county EMS agencies
 Local fire departments and rescue squads
 Local and state emergency management
 Local 9‐1‐1 dispatch and communications agencies
 Military installations
 Tribal jurisdictions
In addition, other community stakeholders should provide input and assist with guidance on the policy
as needed. These stakeholders may include elected officials, educational institutions, healthcare
facilities, malls, local businesses, airports, and any other high‐risk facility or infrastructure that
represents a potential for a high loss of life.
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Unified Incident Command
As introduced above, optimal survivability during active assailant incidents is dependent upon
integrated interagency response. While reviewing each of the public safety section reports below,
consider that the utilization of unified command is essential to the success of any large‐scale incident,
including active assailant incidents. Incident command often is one of the most challenging aspects of
any multi‐agency response. Responders must use the appropriate National Incident Management
System (NIMS) terminology and structure to ensure efficient communication between agencies and
accomplishment of shared tasks.
Public safety leaders need to recognize and address challenges to implementing NIMS structure during
active assailant incidents. There are three specific challenges that responders will face with the incident
command system at active assailant incidents. Responders have faced these challenges at actual
incidents and large‐scale active assailant exercises.
First, the dynamic speed is an inherent and natural component of these incidents. Approximately 70% of
active shooter incidents end in five minutes or less with approximately 25% of incidents over in two
minutes12. The average active shooter incident lasts three minutes and 70% of incidents are over before
arrival of the first police officer13. Therefore, the challenge is overlaying an incident command structure
on top of a dynamic, ongoing incident. The incident command structure must be flexible to rapidly
change tactical priorities as the incident unfolds.
Second, the major challenge to NIMS structure implementation may be establishing immediate
interoperable communication both between and within responding agencies. Law enforcement (and
possibly other agencies) may have personnel already responding inside a developing scene, as well as
arriving concurrently. Establishing usual lines of communication within responding agencies may be
chaotic, in addition to establishing communication across agencies.
Third, law enforcement, fire personnel, and EMS personnel all have critical responsibilities to perform at
these incidents. The law enforcement agency having jurisdiction is ultimately responsible for the
command and control of an active assailant incident. However, the law enforcement agency may not be
the ideal lead agency to provide command and control during firefighting operations or victim extraction
and care. A functional unified command system allows appropriate agencies to command the incident
when their agency expertise is required. Figure 1 provides a description of a typical incident command
model at an active assailant incident. The unified incident command is making decisions utilizing each
public safety specialty.
12
Blair, J. & Schweit, K.W. (2014). A study of active shooter events, 2000‐2013. United States Department of
Justice: Washington, D.C.
13
Ibid.
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Figure 1
Incident Command in the First 60 Minutes of an Active Assailant Incident
Despite the challenges of a unified incident command, establishing unified command with all responding
agencies is essential for scene organization, safety, and efficiency. Unified incident command functions
best when the agency leaders are all physically present and standing next to each other at the command
post. The first arriving supervisors from the respective response disciplines must develop and implement
unified command as early as possible in the incident. For example, an initial challenge is the staging of
incoming units. During the Aurora, Colorado incident, 55 police vehicles were on site within 16 minutes
of the initial 911 call, not including other responding EMS or fire vehicles14. According to the official
after‐action report, an initial lack of staging coordination caused delays in victim access and transport15.
Given the goal of minimizing delays, traditional staging of multiple units at some distance until the scene
is “secured” is not effective in these incidents. Coordinating the initial response of multiple units across
agencies in a dynamic fashion is paramount in developing a successful ingress and egress of all
emergency vehicles and a primary early goal of the unified command team.
14
Tri‐Data Corporation. (2014). Aurora Century 21 Theater Shooting: Official after action report for the City of
Aurora. Arlington, VA: Author.
15
Ibid.
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As law enforcement personnel develop and deploy contact teams, the unified command structure
should ensure the safe and efficient integration of medical and law enforcement personnel into rescue
task force (RTF) teams in parallel operations while the threat(s) is neutralized. Therefore, once an area is
deemed “cleared” by law enforcement contact teams or is remote from the threat, the pre‐established
RTFs may immediately begin operations as directed by unified command. In many instances, the initial
contact team(s) and other communication sources will provide the unified command with the location
of known victims. It is essential that command immediately relay this information to the RTF(s) so that
they may efficiently move to the location of the victims. Providing a specific section, hallway or floor to
the RTF will also prevent the RTF from going to the wrong location and delaying access to the victims.
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9‐1‐1 Communications
Introduction and Background
Emergency Communications Centers (e.g. 9‐1‐1/ECC) have an integral role in all public safety response.
Emergency Communications Centers throughout North Carolina vary in size from large, integrated
centers with numerous communicators to a call center with a single communicator. Some jurisdictions
have a consolidated communication center that handles all 9‐1‐1 calls and dispatches law enforcement,
fire, and EMS personnel from a single center. Other jurisdictions have a central 9‐1‐1 receiving public
safety answering point (PSAP) and stand‐alone ECCs for law enforcement, fire service, and EMS.
Regardless of the size or type of 9‐1‐1 system, each jurisdiction must plan and prepare for the
complexity of active assailant incidents.
Universally, almost every active assailant incident in the United States demonstrated that 9‐1‐1
communication centers could improve response operations to these incredibly overwhelming and
complex incidents. Multiple after‐action‐reports address areas of improvement for 9‐1‐1
communications. These recommendations include call‐taking procedures, call overload procedures,
information sharing with responders, command staff notification, and the use of non‐standard
communication from victims, including social media, text messages, and other non‐traditional forms of
communication.
An active assailant incident will result in a massive influx of 9‐1‐1 calls into the PSAP and
secondary/tertiary PSAPs. At the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, the Virginia Tech Police Department 9‐1‐1
center received 2,027 9‐1‐1 calls into a center staffed by two communicators and supervisor16. At the
2011 reported active shooter incident at Scott and White Hospital in Temple, Texas, 600 emergency calls
were received by the hospital PBX system and several hundred 9‐1‐1 calls were received by Temple
9‐1‐1 in the first 60 minutes of the incident17. At the 2013 Garden State Mall shooting in Paramus, New
Jersey, 1,000 9‐1‐1 calls were received in the first 45 minutes requiring calls to be diverted to other New
Jersey counties, the New York City Police Department, and call centers in Pennsylvania18. At the 2014
Aurora Theater shooting, the Aurora 9‐1‐1 center received more than 6,000 9‐1‐1 calls into a center
staffed with 13 call takers and communicators19.
16
Larson, R.D. (2008). The shootings at Virginia Tech. 911 Magazine. Retrieved from www.9‐1‐1magazine.com.
Mayes, T. (2015). Scott and White hospital shooting. ALERRT Active Shooter Conference, San Marcos, Texas.
18
Henry, S. (2013, November 15). New Jersey police release mall shooting video and 911 calls. Associated Press.
Retrieved from www.ap.org.
19
Tri‐Data (2014) Aurora Century 21 Theater Shooting: Official after action report for the City of Aurora. Arlington,
VA: Tri‐Data Corporation.
17
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Best Practice Considerations
Active assailant incidents provide several areas in which ECCs can implement best practice
considerations. Each center should take time to address the following identified problem areas with
active shooter incidents:
 The development of the definition between an active assailant incident versus shots fired or a
person with a gun
 Coordination with jurisdiction response agencies to develop a standard initial dispatch
recommendation for law enforcement, fire, and EMS resources to active assailant incidents
o This initial response recommendation can ensure that adequate resources are
responding, but yet prevent a massive influx of unnecessary resource response
 Discussion of when to utilize the standardized active assailant call taking procedure, including
providing instructions to callers such as “Run, Hide, Fight”
 Modification of standard call taking questions to streamline call taking and increase capacity to
handle numerous incoming 9‐1‐1 calls
 Coordination with responding agencies to ensure that the 9‐1‐1 center can communicate with
all potential responding agencies (local, state, federal resources, mutual aid resources, and so
forth)
 Identification of facilities that utilize PBX systems that would intercept internal emergency calls
before the calls go to the 9‐1‐1 center
o Information sharing from the PBX operator(s) to the 9‐1‐1 center
o Training PBX operators on active assailant call taking
 Training of secondary and tertiary PSAPs on call taking during an active assailant incident
o This is especially important if the secondary and tertiary PSAPs do not typically take law
enforcement‐related 9‐1‐1 calls
 Discussion of rolling calls when the 9‐1‐1 center is overwhelmed
o All 9‐1‐1 centers should establish policies that address how these other 9‐1‐1 centers
will relay information back to the primary PSAP when all communicators are busy
 Discussion of how communicators will handle the large number of potentially inconsistent,
inaccurate, or delayed information from 9‐1‐1 callers
 Creation of a non‐emergency telephone number that can handle the large influx of family
members calling 9‐1‐1
 Monitoring social media sites to identify victim locations
This white paper is unable to provide blanket recommendations on how to handle the above best
practice considerations because of the extreme variance in capabilities of ECCs throughout North
Carolina. It is incumbent on each center to address these considerations and develop an action plan that
will work given the number of resources in each jurisdiction.
Planning and Training
Every ECC should plan and train before an active assailant incident to ensure successful mitigation of the
incident with minimal loss of life.
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Some identified, but not all‐inclusive, issues are:
 Development of active assailant/mass violence incident response procedures and protocols
 Checklist of ECC actions during active assailant incidents
 Use definitions established by the Work Group to aid in interoperability throughout the state
 Notification of command staff, additional staff, other agencies to include counties who
participate in the Telecommunicator Emergency Response Team (T.E.R.T.) program and the
public
 Debriefing / hot wash / after‐action‐reports / improvement planning
 Training – (active assailant, National Incident Management System (NIMS), stress management,
critical decision‐making, and so forth)
 Response to media, family members, and the “worried well”
 Use of non‐standard communications from victims, including social media, text messages, and
so forth
Operations and Response
The response to an active assailant incident involves multiple responses with multiple disciplines.
Responders must have a reliable communication methodology that enables sharing of pertinent
information. This information sharing allows for a developed, coordinated response that meets incident
objectives. Inefficient communication can result in delaying the response effort, creating confusion
about priorities and objectives, and generally waste valuable airtime and resources. Many land mobile
radio systems (LMRS) throughout the nation have poor coverage, poor structural penetration, and poor
capacity (not enough channels). In addition, the failure to properly train field responders on proper
radio communications (radio discipline) exacerbates the existing LMRS infrastructure challenges. Poor
LMRS infrastructure, the lack of radio discipline, and the lack of an incident communications plan has
caused communication failures in previous active assailant incidents and has been identified as an area
of weakness in after action reports. Considering the number of responding personnel to an active
assailant incident as well as the number of participants scanning and/or monitoring the incident, the
development and implementation of an incident communications plan is essential before an incident
occurs.
There are multiple components vital to incident communication success. One important component is to
assure channel assignment within and across agencies as part of the planning process to maximize
successful transmission, minimize confusion, and avoid overloading the system. A component often
overlooked, is ensuring all responders are trained on proper radio communications during a major
incident. Responders must learn how to minimize transmissions, as this is often a major contributor to
failure, and they must also be disciplined to remain on their assigned channels and utilize clear text. The
planning process must account for the likelihood of occasional technical or system‐based
communication failures. Identifying non‐repeated channels, commonly known as “talk around” or “line
of sight” should be considered as a method of communication for the functions as assigned within the
incident command system. Agencies must also consider the tried and true methods of communication
by establishing “runners” and/or “message relayers” during an incident in case of technology failure.
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All ECCs need to understand the unified incident command structure and methods that the ECC can
s